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RESUMEN EJECUTIVO
 
La tesis doctoral se titula “Ensayos sobre información y predicción” y se compone de un total de
cuatro capítulos. El tema central es el estudio del papel que pueden desempeñar ciertos
mecanismos de agregación de información, como pueden ser los mercados predictivos o las
elecciones, a la hora de mejorar la precisión de los algoritmos predictivos.
El primer capítulo se titula: “Determinantes Económicos de la Alternancia Política: Un estudio 
con datos de panel para los países de la OCDE” y estudia la relación entre la economía y la 
alternancia política. La hipótesis inicial es que el proceso estocástico que determina la alternancia
política no es independiente de la economía, de manera que la evolución reciente de las variables
macroeconómicas sería muy relevante a la hora de explicar los resultados electorales. Detrás de
esta situación subyace la “hipótesis de la responsabilidad”, mediante la cual los votantes están 
pendientes de la información económica ya que consideran que el gobierno es responsable, 
mediante sus acciones, de la buena o mala situación económica del país. De esta forma, las
variables económicas pueden predecir en parte la probabilidad de alternancia política. A lo largo 
del capítulo se realiza una revisión crítica de la literatura , con especial atención al artículo Brender 
& Drazen (2008), y se propone la estimación de un modelo de probabilidad de reelección 
utilizando para ello indicadores macroeconómicos.
Las aportaciones de este capítulo a la literatura son diversas. Por un lado, los resultados obtenidos
contradicen a los hallados en la literatura de “voto económico”. Por otro lado, también hay
aportaciones metodológicas: la utilización de una tasa de descuento para permitir que los votantes
den mayor peso a los datos más recientes, una nueva forma de medición de la alternancia política
y la utilización de datos estructurales de déficit que solucionen (o al menos mitiguen) el problema
de la multicolinealidad entre las variables independientes. 
En contraste con lo observado en otros estudios, el crecimiento del PIB per cápita es la variable
más relevante a la hora de explicar la alternancia económica. Concretamente, un incremento de un 
1% en el crecimiento ponderado del PIB per cápita a lo largo de la legislatura incrementa la 
probabilidad de reelección aproximadamente un 8%, ceteris paribus. Al mismo tiempo, el
incremento descontrolado del déficit público a lo largo de la legislatura está asociado a una menor 
probabilidad de reelección. Sin embargo, no existen evidencias de que la variación de la política
fiscal en el año previo a la convocatoria electoral afecte a las probabilidades de reelección. 
Finalmente, varios ciclos políticos son identificados en las variables macroeconómicas, tanto en la
evolución del PIB per cápita como en las variables fiscales.
El segundo capítulo se titula: “Determinantes Económicos de la Alternancia Política y Crecimiento 
Económico en el Largo Plazo”. Este artículo estudia la relación entre el nivel (intensidad) del voto 
económico y el crecimiento económico en el largo plazo. Se propone la estimación de la 
sensibilidad de la alternancia política frente al crecimiento económico para cada uno de los países 
de la OCDE.
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La principal aportación metodológica de este capítulo es el empleo de métodos bayesianos
(algoritmo de Monte Carlo) por sus mejores propiedades en muestras pequeñas..
Se observa una notable heterogeneidad en las sensibilidades de la alternancia política frente al
crecimiento económico. Para ciertos países, el incremento del crecimiento económico a lo largo 
de la legislatura (percentil 80 en vez de percentil 20) incrementa la probabilidad de reelección un 
50\%, mientras que para otros países el incremento es prácticamente nulo. En segundo lugar, se
observa que la correlación entre estas sensibilidades y el crecimiento económico en el largo plazo 
es negativa y estadísticamente significativa. Por último, se repite el análisis pero estimando esta
vez la sensibilidad de la alternancia política frente a la política fiscal. En este caso, también existe
una correlación negativa entre dicha sensibilidad y el crecimiento económico en el largo plazo. 
Específicamente, aquellos países cuyos votantes valoran en mayor medida un ciclo presupuestario 
cóncavo presentan un menor crecimiento en el largo plazo.
El tercer capítulo se titula: “Un algoritmo basado en los mercados predictivos para modelar 
resultados de fútbol”. A lo largo de este trabajo se propone un algoritmo que utiliza datos
procedentes de los mercados predictivos (donde los agentes apuestan sobre determinados
resultados) para simular una liga, en vez de resultados históricos, como es habitual en la literatura. 
En este trabajo, se propone un modelo de Poisson con intensidad constante en el tiempo y se
utilizan varios métodos de estimación: MCO, MCO ponderado y modelos bayesianos
jerarquizados. 
Los resultados indican que el algoritmo de estimación propuesto tiene muy buenas capacidades
predictivas, siendo capaz de vencer a las predicciones del mercado, salvo en las últimas jornadas
del campeonato. Al mismo tiempo, presenta mejores resultados que los modelos tradicionales en 
la literatura, los cuales se basan en resultados históricos. Por lo tanto, hay evidencias de que el uso 
de información de los mercados predictivos permite conocer con mayor exactitud las
distribuciones de probabilidad de los eventos futuros.
El cuarto capítulo se titula: “Sobre la agregación de información en los mercados predictivos
centralizados”. A lo largo de este trabajo se pretende estudiar el proceso de agregación de
información en los mercados predictivos. En primer lugar, se analiza la eficiencia y calibración de
los precios competitivos generados por los mercados predictivos. En segundo lugar, se aplica el
modelo propuesto en el tercer capítulo, tras añadirle una serie de refinamientos, con el objetivo de:
(1) modelar “in-play prices”, (2) evaluar la capacidad de los mercados para agregar información y 
actualizar los precios competitivos y (3) examinar la existencia de oportunidades de inversión. 
Los mercados predictivos en ocasiones tienen dificultades para agregar información, en especial
cuando gran cantidad de información es revelada en poco tiempo. El modelo planteado para
modelar “in-play prices” presenta un mejor ajuste, medido por la distancia De Finetti, que los
precios competitivos, a pesar de disponer de una menor cantidad de información. Por último, el
algoritmo de inversión identifica estrategias rentables bajo ciertas circunstancias.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
The dissertation is entitled: "Essays on information and prediction" and consists of a total of four 
chapters. The central issue is the study of the role that certain mechanisms of aggregation of 
information, such as predictive markets or elections, can play in improving the accuracy of 
predictive algorithms.
The first chapter of the thesis is entitled: "Economic Determinants of Political Alternation: A Panel
Data Analysis of OECD Countries" and studies the relationship between economic performance
and political alternation. The initial hypothesis is that the stochastic process that determines the
political alternation is not independent of the economy, so that the recent evolution of the
macroeconomic variables would be very relevant when explaining the electoral results. We are
implicitly considering the "responsibility hypothesis", by which voters are aware of the economic
information since they consider that the government is responsible, through its actions, for the
good or bad economic situation of the country. In this way, economic variables can predict the
probability of political alternation. Throughout the chapter, a critical review of the literature is
presented, with special attention to the article Brender & Drazen (2008) and later the estimation of 
a re-election probability model is proposed, using macroeconomic indicators.
The contributions of this chapter to literature are diverse. On the one hand, the results obtained 
contradict those found in the "economic vote" literature. On the other hand, there are also 
methodological contributions: the use of a discount rate to allow voters to give more weight to the
most recent data, propose an alternative way of measuring political alternation and the use of 
structural deficit data to solve the problem of multicollinearity between the independent variables.
In contrast to previous studies, this paper finds that higher growth rates of GDP per capita increase
the probability of re-election in OECD countries. In particular, a ceteris paribus increase of 1 
percentage point in the weighted average growth rate during the term in office increases the
probability of re-election by 8%. At the same time, increases in government deficit over the term
in office (excluding last year) decrease the probability of re-election. However, there is no evidence
that fiscal policy changes at the end of the legislature affect the re- election chances of the
incumbent parties. Finally, several Political Business Cycles and Political Budget Cycles are
found. Re-elected governments present, in general terms, higher economic growth rates, a more
balanced budget policy and the path of the surplus/deficit over the legislature is more sensible. 
The second chapter is entitled: "Economic Determinants of Political Alternation and Long-term
Economic Growth". This work studies the relationship between the level (intensity) of the
“economic voting” and long-term economic growth. The main objectives of this chapter are: (1) 
study the relationship between ’economic voting’ and ’long term economic growth’ (2) analyse
the long-term welfare implications of politicians’ career concerns and (3) check the presence of 
country-level heterogeneity in economic voting.
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The contributions of this chapter to literature are varied. First, Bayesian Methods (Monte Carlo 
algorithm) are used because of their better behaviour in small samples. Second, the results found 
give empirical support to the theoretical models that maintain that the incentive structure of 
policymakers affects the functioning of institutions, and thus long-term welfare. 
There is a substantial heterogeneity in the sensitivities of political alternation to economic growth.
It is observed that for some countries an increase in the GDP per capita growth over the legislature
(80th percentile instead of the 20th percentile) increases the probability of re-election by 50%, 
while for other countries the effect is almost zero. Secondly, a statistically significant negative
correlation between these sensitivities and long run economic growth is observed. These empirical
results represent support for those theoretical models that maintain that the politicians’ career 
concerns (incentive structure) have an impact on the functioning of the institutions, affecting the
long-term welfare. Under the presence of strong economic voting, politicians are only concerned 
with the evolution of the economy in the short term, so they try to manipulate macroeconomic
variables generating distortions and neglecting long-term policies. Finally, the analysis is repeated 
estimating this time the sensitivity of political alternation to fiscal policy for each of the countries. 
In this case, there is also a negative correlation between the degree of economic voting and long-
term economic growth. Specifically, those countries where voters further reward a concave
political budget cycle face lower long-run economic growth. 
The third chapter is entitled: “A Market-based Algorithm for Predicting Soccer Outcomes”. The
main objective of this article is to propose a market-based model (Poisson) for predicting soccer 
outcomes, using information from Betfair Exchange Market. OLS techniques and Bayesian 
methods are used for the estimation of the model (defensive and offensive parameters). 
The results indicate that the proposed estimation algorithm has very good predictive capabilities, 
being able to beat market predictions, except in the last weeks of the league. At the same time, it
presents better results than traditional models in the literature, which are based on past
performance. Therefore, there is evidence that the use of information from predictive markets
allows us to know more accurately the probability distributions of future events.
The fourth chapter is entitled: “On the aggregation of Information in Centralized Prediction 
Markets”. The objective of this work is to apply the model developed in the previous chapter in 
order to: (1) check the calibration of competitive prices, (2) evaluate the efficiency of prediction 
markets, (3) evaluate its ability to add new information and to update the competitive prices and 
(4) examine the existence of investment opportunities. 
Predictive markets sometimes have difficulty adding information, especially when a large amount
of information is revealed in a short period of time. The model proposed to model "in-play prices"
presents a better adjustment, measured by the “De Finetti” distance, than competitive prices, 
despite having a smaller amount of information. Finally, the investment algorithm identifies
profitable strategies under certain circumstances.
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Resumen en Castellano 
Este art´ıculo estudia la relacio´n entre la evolucio´n de la economı´a y la alternancia pol´ıti­
ca en pa´ıses de la OECD (1975-2014). La revisio´n del art´ıculo Brender & Drazen (2008) 
concluye con la identiﬁcacio´n de varias limitaciones metodolo´gicas y al mismo tiempo se 
detecta falta de robustez en algunos de sus resultados. A continuacio´n se proponen varias 
modiﬁcaciones en el modelo con el ﬁn de obtener estimaciones ma´s precisas. En primer 
lugar, la alternancia pol´ıtica se mide a nivel de partido pol´ıtico en vez de a nivel de l´ıder 
pol´ıtico. En segundo lugar, con el objetivo de evitar problemas de multicolinealidad en­
tre las variables ﬁscales y el crecimiento econo´mico, se opta por utilizar datos de de´ﬁcit 
pu´blico estructural. Por u´ltimo, se introduce un factor de descuento que permite construir 
una media ponderada del crecimiento econo´mico a lo largo de la legislatura que otor­
gue un mayor peso a los datos ma´s recientes. Tras la incorporacio´n de estas novedades 
metodolo´gicas se estima un modelo de probabilidad de reeleccio´n para identiﬁcar los de­
terminantes econo´micos de la alternancia pol´ıtica. En contraste con lo observado en otros 
estudios (Brender & Drazen, 2008), el crecimiento del PIB per ca´pita es la variable ma´s 
relevante a la hora de explicar la alternancia econo´mica. Concretamente, un incremento 
de un 1 % en el crecimiento ponderado del PIB per ca´pita a lo largo de la legislatura incre­
menta la probabilidad de reeleccio´n aproximadamente un 8 %, ceteris paribus. Al mismo 
tiempo, el incremento descontrolado del de´ﬁcit pu´blico a lo largo de la legislatura esta 
asociado a una menor probabilidad de reeleccio´n. Sin embargo, no existen evidencias de 
que la variacio´n de la pol´ıtica ﬁscal en el an˜o previo a la convocatoria electoral afecte a 
las probabilidades de reeleccio´n. Finalmente, varios ciclos pol´ıticos son identiﬁcados en las 
variables macroecono´micas. 
Palabras clave: Voto econo´mico, alternancia pol´ıtica, pol´ıtica ﬁscal
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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between economic performance and politi­
cal alternation in OECD countries (1975-2014). Firstly, a critical review of Bren­
der & Drazen (2008) is presented, identifying some methodological shortcomings and 
analysing the (lack of) robustness of some of their results. The correlations identiﬁed 
in Brender & Drazen (2008) are not robust against changes in the sample period or 
the model speciﬁcation. Subsequently, several methodological changes are proposed 
in order to obtain better estimates, such as measuring political alternation at a polit­
ical party level instead of at a political leader level, using cyclically adjusted primary 
balances to avoid multicollinearity problems between ﬁscal variables and GDP and 
computing a weighted-average of GDP per capita growth. After that, an alternative 
speciﬁcation is used to estimate the economic determinants of political alternation. 
In contrast to previous studies, this paper ﬁnds that higher growth rates of GDP 
per capita increase the probability of reelection in OECD countries. In particular, 
a ceteris paribus increase of 1 percentage point in the weighted average growth rate 
during the term in ofce increases the probability of reelection by 8%. However, there 
is no evidence that ﬁscal policy changes at the end of the legislature a↵ect the re­
election chances of the incumbent parties. Finally, several Political Business Cycles 
and Political Budget Cycles are found. Re-elected governments present, in general 
terms, higher economic growth rates, a more balanced budget policy and the path of 
the surplus/deﬁcit over the legislature is more sensible. 
Keywords: Economic Voting, Political Alternation, Fiscal Policy
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1.1 Introduction 
Modern democracies rely on elections as a device to aggregate individual preferences. In 
this context, information plays a critical role in determining voting behaviour and election 
outcomes. The search of the main determinants of election outcomes (and political alter­
nation) is a key topic in Political Economy literature. It is widely documented that the 
behaviour of politicians is largely a↵ected by the incentive structure within which policy­
makers operate. Then identifying the determinants of election results allows us to better 
understand the political decision-making process and the functioning of political institu­
tions. For instance, if voters take recent evolution of the GDP growth into account when 
voting, then the existence of political business cycles can be expected in some situations, 
although this policy is dynamically inefcient. 
Although there are many factors that can inﬂuence election outcomes (quality of 
politicians, ideology, foreign policy, scandals, wars, campaign spending...) it is widely 
documented that economic information plays an important role. A branch of Political 
Economy, often referred to as ”Economic Voting”, analyses the relationship between eco­
nomic performance and election outcomes (See Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000 and Hibbs, 
2005 for a comprehensive review of the literature). 
Many empirical studies have found a high correlation between economic performance 
and election outcomes, in other words, the recent evolution of the economy largely explains 
the reelection prospects (economic voting hypothesis). However, in the literature, there 
is no consensus on which are the most relevant economic variables. Di↵erent variables 
have been proposed: real disposable personal income, real GDP per capita growth, un­
employment rate, budgetary policy (surplus/deﬁcit), monetary policy (inﬂation), public 
debt, taxes, transfers, level of inequality (Gini index), etc. 
In this paper, we study the extent to which economic information inﬂuences the re­
election prospects. The main objective is to re-examine the economic determinants of 
political alternation, checking whether the correlations identiﬁed in the literature between 
economic variables and political alternation are robust or unstable. To do that we will use 
data from OECD countries for the period 1960-2014. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.2, a brief summary of the 
literature on economic voting is presented. In Section 1.3, a critical review of Brender 
& Drazen (2008) is carried out to ﬁnd some methodological shortcomings, such as mul­
ticollinearity problems and poorly deﬁned variables. In this part, some regressions are 
performed in order to reveal the lack of robustness of some of their results. In Section 
1.4, an alternative speciﬁcation is used for predicting political alternation. In Section 1.5, 
we study the existence of Political Business Cycles and Political Budget Cycles. Finally, 
conclusions are presented. 
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1.2 Literature review 
In order to summarise the state of the art on ”economic voting”, a selection of some of 
the most important articles in this ﬁeld is presented: 
Most studies on ”economic voting” are country-level studies. Within this group, some 
articles focus on the role of taxes as an explanatory factor of electoral results. Besley 
& Case (1995) focus on USA gubernatorial elections and ﬁnd that the probability of 
incumbent defeat is increased by an increase in state taxes. However, this e↵ect is o↵set (at 
least in part) if neighbours increase their taxes simultaneously. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) 
study municipal elections in Flanders and ﬁnd incumbents are punished for higher tax 
rates. The electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. 
Alternatively, several country-level studies focus on the impact of economic growth on 
election results. Hibbs (2000) proposes the ”Bread and Peace Model”. The per capita 
disposable income growth and the cumulative numbers of American military personnel 
killed in action largely explain the results (% vote) for the U.S. presidential elections. 
However, few studies address the existence of economic voting in a cross-section of 
countries. Moreover, the ﬁndings obtained when analysing a panel of countries are usually 
quite unstable. Results sometimes di↵er from country-to-country or even time-to-time 
(Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). 
Powell and Whitten (1993) propose a multivariate model to study the electoral impact 
in industrialised democracies of several economic and political factors, obtaining that 
support for right-wing governments is increased by lower inﬂation and hurt by higher 
inﬂation, while inﬂation is not relevant in the case of left and center governments. Exactly 
the opposite occurs when analysing the impact of unemployment rate. 
Wilkin, Haller & Norpoth (1997) found that ”election-year economic growth inﬂuences 
the vote of the major party in ofce” in a cross-national research. 
Anderson (2000) studies 13 European democracies and ﬁnds that economic e↵ects are 
stronger when the institutional context clariﬁes who is in charge of policymaking, when 
the target of credit and blame is large and when citizens have fewer viable alternative 
choices. 
Brender & Drazen (2008) test whether good economic conditions and expansionary 
ﬁscal policy help incumbents get reelected in a large panel of democracies. They ﬁnd that 
GDP per capita is not a signiﬁcant variable. At the same time, voters reward budgetary 
discipline and penalise rising deﬁcits. This article will be extensively analysed and reviewed 
in the next section. 
Jones et al. (2012) provide evidence and microfoundations for the following argument 
”voters reward public spending when they can pass the cost on to someone else (e.g., as 
in Argentina), and punish it otherwise (e.g., as in the United States)”. 
Finally, Alesina, Carloni & Lecce (2012) ﬁnd ”no evidence that governments which 
quickly reduce budget deﬁcits are systematically voted out of ofce” in a sample of 19 
OECD countries from 1975 to 2008. 
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1.3 Brender & Drazen (2008). A critical review. 
1.3.1 Objectives and model speciﬁcation 
The aim of Brender & Drazen’s work is to study the inﬂuence of economic growth and 
ﬁscal policy on the probability of re-election in a large sample of countries over the period 
1960-20011 . The authors suggest as a starting point the responsibility hypothesis: ”Voters 
believe that the government is responsible for the evolution of the economy” and also the 
retrospective voting hypothesis: ”Voters reward (or punish) politicians as a function of 
the good (or bad) evolution of the economic situation over their term in ofce.” 
To test these hypotheses, the authors propose the estimation of a reelection probability 
model. As a general rule2, the dependent variable (ReelectLeader) receives the value 1 
if the incumbent leader 3 is reelected in the elections and a value of 0 if the incumbent 
leader is defeated4 . 
The explanatory variables included in the regression model can be classiﬁed into two 
groups (economic and control variables): 
i) Economic variables. The model speciﬁcation includes the following economic 
variables: real GDP per capita growth and two ﬁscal variables: 
-GDPpcGrowth: Average real GDP per capita growth over the term of ofce. s 
GDP0GDP pcGrowth = 100 ⇤ x - 1 (1.1) 
GDP_x 
where, GDP0 is the value of real GDP per capita in the election year; GDP_x is the 
value of real GDP per capita in the ﬁrst year of the legislature; x is the number of years 
in ofce. Source: ”World Development Indicators” (WB). 
-SurplusTerm: The change in the average surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years pre­
ceding the elections (not including the election year) compared to the previous two years. 
SurplusT erm = 1/2 ⇤ (B_1 + B_2) - 1/2 ⇤ (B_3 + B_4) (1.2) 
where, B_i is the surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the elections. Sources: 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
-SurplusLastYear: The change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the election year relative 
to the previous year. 
SurplusLastY ear = (B0 -B_1) (1.3) 
where, B_i is the surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the elections. Sources: 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
1The authors perform their analysis using both an expanded and a narrow sample. Throughout this 
article we always focus on the ”expanded” sample. 
2There are some speciﬁc cases that are detailed in the Appendix (as the rule chosen when the incumbent 
leader is not eligible for re-election due to the existence of term limits). 
3Prime minister in parliamentary systems and president in presidential systems. 
4Sources: ”Database of Political Institutions ( DPI)” and Za´rate’s Political Collections (ZPC). 
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ii) Control variables. The authors use political variables to control for di↵erent 
characteristics of the countries, such as: 
-NewDemocracy: A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving 
the value 1 if country is deﬁned as a New Democracy. Otherwise, the country is deﬁned 
as an Old Democracy and the variable receives a value of 0. 
-MajoritarianSystem: A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiv­
ing the value 1 in a country with a majoritarian electoral system, and 0 otherwise. 
1.3.2 Main results 
Table 1.1 presents the logistic regression output by Brender & Drazen (2008) for devel­
oped countries (OECD) over the period 1960-2001. The ﬁrst column shows the estimated 
coefcients and p-values in parentheses, while the second column presents the marginal 
e↵ects computed at the sample means of the data. Greater ﬁscal discipline (increase in 
the primary surplus or decrease in the primary deﬁcit) in the election year increases the 
likelihood of re-election of the ruling leader. At the same time, greater ﬁscal discipline 
throughout the rest of the term in ofce also increases the probability of re-election of the 
incumbent leader. In other words, voters value budgetary discipline and penalise govern­
ments that increase the public deﬁcit. Finally, there is no evidence that ”average economic 
growth over the term in ofce” is a signiﬁcant variable in developed countries (OECD), 
other things equal. 
Other things equal, the probability of reelection is higher in New Democracies, while 
the binary variable that di↵erentiates between majoritarian and proportional systems is 
not statistically signiﬁcant. 
At the end of the article, the authors make a recommendation to politicians, ”Running 
deﬁcits in an election year is not an e↵ective tool to help reelection and in fact is punished 
at the polls in developed countries. Politicians, take note!”. At the same time, according 
to authors, there is evidence that ﬁscal adjustments increase the probability of reelection. 
At this point, we may ask ourselves why it is so important to think about Brender & 
Drazen’s results. First of all, their work was published in American Economic Review, 
has been cited in many articles (358 citations to date according to Google Scholar) and 
was also cited in various publications of the OECD. In addition, their ﬁndings are quite 
striking, because unlike other studies the authors claim that per capita GDP growth does 
not inﬂuence the probability of re-election, once taken into account the e↵ect of the ﬁscal 
and control variables. Moreover, the e↵ect of ﬁscal discipline during the election year on 
the probability of re-election is also in some sense counterintuitive. 
Once observed these results, some interesting questions arise: Are these correlations 
robust or unstable? Are they generated by a causal relationship? Are there other corre­
lations between economic performance and political alternation? All these topics will be 
addressed in the rest of the paper. 
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Table 1.1: Reelection Probability Model. Brender & Drazen (2008)
 
OECD (1960-2001)
 
Dependent Variable: ReelectLeader 
  / p-value Mfx 
GDPpcGrowtha -0.008 -0.002 
(0.937) 
SurplusTermb 0.132⇤ 0.033 
(0.096) 
SurplusLastYearc 0.352⇤⇤⇤ 0.088 
(0.001) 
NewDemocracy 1.266⇤⇤ 0.316 
(0.033) 
MajoritarianSystem 0.586 0.146 
(0.142) 
Constant -0.182 
(0.555) 
Observations 180 
Pseudo R2 0.071 
LR chi2 15.348 
Prob > chi2 0.009 
Baseline predicted probability 0.489 
aGDPpcGrowth: the average growth rate of real per capita GDP 
during the term. 
bSurplusTerm: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two 
years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years 
cSurplusLastYear: the change in the government surplus ratio to 
GDP in the election year, compared to the previous year. 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, *Signiﬁcant at 10% 
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1.3.3 Criticism 
a) Multicollinearity problems 
The ”Model of Probability of Reelection” proposed by Brender & Drazen (2008) in­
cludes several explanatory variables that have a high correlation between them. In particu­
lar, there is a high correlation between ﬁscal variables (SurplusTerm and SurplusLastYear) 
and GDPpcGrowth5 . 
The existence of approximate multicollinearity can be a problem when estimating 
and correctly interpreting the model parameters, as it makes it difcult to estimate the 
individual e↵ects of each of the variables. Given that the value of statistics for contrasts of 
individual signiﬁcance is usually small, the probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis 
is increased and it is more difcult to ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant variables. 
As in Alesina et al. (2012), a possible solution to this problem is to work with ”cycli­
cally adjusted balances”6 . The original series of government deﬁcit can be divided into 
two components: (1) structural deﬁcit: deﬁned as a projection of the deﬁcit assuming 
that the economy is at its normal level of activity, and (2) cyclical deﬁcit: deﬁned as the 
part of the deﬁcit related to the economic cycle. The structural deﬁcit data allow the 
correlation between ﬁscal variables and GDP growth to be reduced, thereby avoiding (or 
at least reducing) multicollinearity problems. 
b) Fiscal variables are poorly deﬁned 
In Brender & Drazen’s work, the ﬁscal variables (SurplusTerm and SurplusLastYear) 
are not accurately deﬁned because it does not take into account the length of the legisla­
ture7 nor the month in which the elections are held. 
The variable SurplusLastYear has the same value if elections are held in January or in 
December. When elections are held at the end of the year (November, December...), the 
variable does reﬂect the true purpose for which it was designed, that is simply to compute 
the change in the public surplus in the election year with respect to the previous year. 
However, if elections take place at the beginning of the year, the deﬁnition does not ﬁt 
the time frame required, because it uses surplus/deﬁcit data after the election day (up to 
11 months after elections held in January). Hence in reality, it does not measure changes 
in ﬁscal policy in the last year of the term in ofce, but rather in the ﬁrst year of the next 
term. This lack of precision undermine the purpose for which the variable was included 
in the speciﬁcation and calls into question the model estimations. 
After observing the inaccuracy of the variable SurplusLastYear, an alternative deﬁni­
tion is proposed. We faced difculties in dealing with the subject because only annual 
data is available, as quarterly data of structural deﬁcits are only available for recent years. 
The following assumption is proposed: ”the increase or reduction in the surplus occurs 
5Note that, in fact, ﬁscal variables are usually expressed as a percentage of GDP, so variations in GDP 
growth directly a↵ect ﬁscal variables. 
6Bornhorst et al. (2011) describe the methodology to construct ”Cyclically Adjusted Balances”. 
7The deﬁnition does not take into account the actual length of each legislature. 
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uniformly throughout the year.” It is a fairly strong assumption but it still allows for a 
more accurate deﬁnition to be constructed. The new deﬁnition is the following: 
(m) ⇤ (B0 -B _1) + (12 -m) ⇤ (B _1 -B _2)NewSurplusLastY ear  = (1.4) 
12 
where, B_i is the government surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the 
elections and m is the month in which the elections are held (for example, February=2 
and April=4). 
An example is presented next in order to illustrate the di↵erences between the two 
deﬁnitions. We assume that the elections take place in the ﬁrst part of the year to sharpen 
the di↵erences between the two deﬁnitions, for example, in February 2012. The ﬁrst row of 
Table 1.2 presents the surplus as a percentage of GDP. The second row shows the variation 
in the surplus-to-GDP ratio with respect to the previous year. It can be seen that the 
government in this case implemented an expansive ﬁscal policy in the months before the 
elections, while performing a smooth adjustment after the elections. 
Table 1.2: Fiscal variables comparison. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Surplus-to-GDP 
Change in Surplus-to-GDP 
Last Year Surplus (B & D) 
New Last Year Surplus 
-2% -3% 
-1% 
-4% 
-1% 
-3% 
1% 
1% 
-0.83% 
In our example, according to the deﬁnition of Brender & Drazen (2008), the variable 
SurplusLastYear takes the value 1%, resulting from subtracting the value of the surplus-
to-GDP ratio in 2012 (-3%) minus the value of the ratio in 2011 (-4%). According to this 
deﬁnition, the government is improving the situation of public ﬁnances (by reducing the 
deﬁcit by one percentage point in the pre-election year). This deﬁnition does not adjust 
to reality, in fact, the government has increased the budget deﬁcit in 2011 just before the 
election, while after the election (February 2012) the government has chosen a restrictive 
budgetary policy and has reduced the deﬁcit by one percentage point. 
According to the new deﬁnition proposed in this paper, the variable is calculated as 
follows: 
(m) ⇤ (B0 -B _1) + (12 -m) ⇤ (B _1 -B _2)NewSurplusLastY ear  = = -0.83% (1.5) 
12 
Values: m=2, B0 = 1%, B1 = -1%, B2 = -1% 
where, B _i is the government surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the 
elections and m is the month in which the elections are held. 
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The new deﬁnition is able to capture more accurately the change in ﬁscal policy in 
the last twelve months of the legislature. The di↵erences between the two deﬁnitions are 
greater in elections that are held in the ﬁrst months of the year and are very small when 
they are held at the end of the year. The new deﬁnition allows to better measure the 
change in public surplus at the end of the term, although its value is approximate due 
to the unavailability of quarterly or monthly data for the whole sample and therefore the 
results should be considered with caution. 
Table 1.3 shows the correlation between both variables (SurplusLastYear and New-
SurplusLastYear) depending on the quarter in which the elections are held. As it can be 
seen, the correlation is really high when elections are held in the last quarter of the year 
(correlation=0.97), i.e., both deﬁnition are almost the same in this period. However, the 
correlation decreases when the elections are held at the beginning of the year, obtaining 
a correlation equal to 0.67 and 0.60 for the ﬁrst and the second quarter, respectively. 
Table 1.3: Correlation between SurplusLastYear and NewSurplusLastYear 
First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth Quarter 
0.67 0.60 0.86 0.97 
At the same time, Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of the elections where both def­
initions have opposite signs. It can be seen that this situation is more common when 
elections are held at the beginning of the year. Note that in July and August few elections 
are held, so there is a lot of noise. 
Figure 1.1: Percentage of elections in which both deﬁnitions have opposite signs 
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At the same time, the variable ”SurplusTerm” does not take into account the actual 
length of the legislature. The deﬁnition is exactly the same for every country and for 
every election. It does not take into account that terms of ofce can be di↵erent from one 
country to another nor when elections are called in advance. For instance, Australia has 
a three-year term, USA, Spain, Denmark... have a four-year term and Mexico, the UK... 
have a ﬁve-year term. The new deﬁnition is the following: 
T _12
BiNewSurplusT  erm  = 
X 
(1.6) 
(T - 12)
i=0 
where, Bi is the primary government budget balance (as a percentage of GDP) during 
the i month of the legislature and T is the total number of months of the legislature. 
c) Deﬁnition of ”reelection” 
Brender & Drazen (2008) analyse political change focusing on re-election of the head 
of government. In presidential systems, this position is held by the president; while in 
parliamentary systems, the head of government is the prime minister. 
However, there is an alternative approach that measures political change at a political 
party level. Voters tend to think that the ruling party (or ruling coalition) is responsible 
for the good (or bad) economic situation. Thus, the alternative variable (ReelectParty8) 
is proposed as a new dependent variable. 
d) No discount rate for GDP growth. 
Brender & Drazen (2008) propose that the average economic growth rate over the term 
in ofce be included as an explanatory variable. There is evidence that voters tend to give 
more importance to recent events (Paldam & Nannestad, 2000 and Healy & Lenz, 2014). 
That is, voters (or at least most of them) would have a short time horizon, i.e. they are 
”myopic”. After performing a series of surveys and experiments, Healy & Lenz (2014) 
claim that voters substitute cumulative growth throughout the term for election-year per­
formance (the end for the whole) mainly because the latter is more easily accessible. 
In this context, it appears advisable to replace the arithmetic mean by the weighted 
mean as the latter gives more weight to data close to the elections, in the same way as 
Hibbs (2000). This modiﬁcation allows the impact of economic growth on the probability 
of re-election to be measured more accurately. The formula used to calculate the ”weighted 
economic growth” is: 
n n
GDP pcW eighted = 
X 
>i ⇤ DGDP _i ⇤ (1/ 
X 
>i) (1.7) 
i=0 i=1 
where, DGDP0 is the real GDP per capita growth in the election month; n is the 
number of months of the legislature; GDP _n is the real GDP per capita growth in the 
ﬁrst month of the legislature; > is the discount rate; > 2 (0, 1) 
8The comprehensive deﬁnition is described in the Appendix. 
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1.3.4 Robustness analysis 
This section is intended to check whether the results found in Brender & Drazen (2008) are 
robust. Their reelection probability model will be subjected to several robustness tests. 
1.3.4.1 Robustness test against changes in the sample period. 
Firstly, we check whether the model is robust against changes in the sample period. Bren­
der & Drazen use a panel containing democratic elections in OECD countries from 1960 
to 2001 (180 observations). Keeping constant Brender & Drazen’s speciﬁcation, we re­
estimate the regression but extending the sample period until 2014 (75 additional elec­
tions). Table 1.4 shows the new regression output: 
Table 1.4: Robustness analysis against changes in the sample period 
Original Sample (1960-2001) Extended Sample (1960-2014) 
Dependent variable: ReelectLeader ReelectLeader 
  / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx 
GDPpcGrowtha -0.008 -0.002 0.097 0.024 
(0.937) (0.233) 
SurplusTermb 0.132⇤ 0.033 0.174⇤⇤⇤ 0.044 
(0.096) (0.005) 
SurplusLastYear c 0.352⇤⇤⇤ 0.088 0.108 0.027 
(0.001) (0.112) 
NewDemocracy 1.266⇤⇤ 0.316 1.037⇤ 0.259 
(0.033) (0.083) 
MajoritarianSystem 0.586 0.146 0.273 0.068 
(0.142) (0.393) 
Constant -0.182 -0.259 
(0.555) (0.275) 
Observations 180 255 
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.051 
LR chi2 15.348 16.090 
Prob > chi2 0.009 0.007 
Baseline predicted probability 0.489 0.499 
aGDPpcGrowth: the average growth rate of real per capita GDP during the term in o ce. 
bSurplusTerm: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years preceding the election year, 
relative to the two previous years 
cSurplusLastYear: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in the election year, compared 
to the previous year. 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, *Signiﬁcant at 10%, 
By expanding the sample period, the variable SurplusLastYear stops being signiﬁcant. 
Unlike the original regression, there is no evidence that an improvement in the surplus 
in the last year of the term in ofce increases the probability of re-election. It can be 
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concluded that Brender & Drazen’s results are not robust against changes in the sample 
period. The relationship between the change in the public surplus in the election year and 
the probability of reelection is quite unstable. 
1.3.4.2 Robustness test against changes in the model speciﬁcation. 
In this section, the robustness of the Brender & Drazen’s results against changes in the 
model speciﬁcation is analysed. Three changes are proposed: (1) new deﬁnition of political 
alternation, (2) new deﬁnitions of the ﬁscal variables (SurplusLastYear, SurplusTerm) and 
(3) using ”cyclically adjusted ﬁscal variables” to avoid multicollinearity problems. 
Some comments are required regarding data availability. On the one hand, the primary 
data (primary budget surplus) used in Brender & Drazen (2008) is not fully available to us. 
Speciﬁcally, we have checked the data sources 9 provided in the article but we have only 
found primary budget surplus data for 170 of the 180 elections analysed. Primary budget 
surplus data are not available for several countries in 1960’s, although it was available 
when Brender and Drazen downloaded the data. Moreover, it is not possible to recover 
the data from the additional materials10 provided by the authors because only regression 
variables are available, not the primary data used to compute them. On the other hand, 
cyclically adjusted balance data are only available since 1970, so it is only possible to 
include elections from 1975 onwards. The unavailability of data for structural deﬁcit in 
the 1960s means that this robustness analysis can only be performed on a reduced sample. 
Table 1.5 describes the three regressions we will use as a reference for the robustness 
analysis. Firstly, we have the Original Regression presented in Brender & Drazen (2008). 
Secondly, we have a reduced version that excludes ten elections from the original sample 
due to the unavailability of budget surplus data. From now on, we call it ”Reduced 
Sample 1”. Finally, we have another reduced version of the original sample, where we 
exclude elections prior to 1975, so in this case we only compute the regression using 112 
elections. From now on, we call it ”Reduced Sample 2”. 
Table 1.5: Original and reduced samples 
Name Period Obs. 
Original Regression in B & D 1960-2001 180 
Reduced Sample 1 1960-2001a 170 
Reduced Sample 2 1975-2001b 112 
aTen elections corresponding to 1960’s decade are excluded. 
bStructural ﬁscal data is only available from 1975 onwards. 
9International Financial Statistics (IFS) & Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
10https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.98.5.2203 
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As a ﬁrst step, the original Brender & Drazen model (1960-2001) is re-estimated using 
the information provided by the authors on their website (database and do ﬁle). Addi­
tionally, the reelection probability model is also estimated using Reduced Sample 1 and 
Reduced Sample 2. The regression outputs are presented in Table 1.6. It can be observed 
that results are almost the same when we use a reduced sample. All the equations identify 
exactly the same correlations between Political Alternation and Economic Performance. 
We only observe that the level of signiﬁcance is lower in the second and third column 
probably due to the small number of observations. After this step, the robustness tests 
can be carried out: 
Table 1.6: Reelection Probability Model (Brender & Drazen) 
Original Sample Reduced Sample 1 Reduced Sample 2 
Dependent variable: ReelectLeader ReelectLeader ReelectLeader 
  / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx 
GDPpcGrowtha -0.008 -0.002 0.050 0.012 0.146 0.0364 
(0.937) (0.599) (0.297) 
SurplusTermb 0.132⇤ 0.033 0.139⇤ 0.034 0.142⇤ 0.035 
(0.096) (0.056) (0.099) 
SurplusLastYearc 0.351⇤⇤⇤ 0.088 0.183⇤⇤ 0.045 0.240⇤ 0.059 
(0.001) (0.047) (0.074) 
NewDemocracy 1.266⇤⇤ 0.289 1.037⇤ 0.193 1.176 0.260 
(0.033) (0.083) (0.239) 
MajoritarianSystem 0.586 0.145 0.273 0.101 0.045 0.011 
(0.142) (0.393) (0.932) 
Constant -0.182 -0.332 -0.279 
(0.555) (0.278) (0.464) 
Observations 180 170 112
 
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.045 0.073
 
LR chi2 13.395 10.79 11.31
 
Prob > chi2 0.020 0.055 0.045
 
aGDPpcGrowth: the average growth rate of real per capita GDP during the term in o ce. 
bSurplusTerm: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years preceding the election year, 
relative to the two previous years 
cSurplusLastYear: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in the election year, compared 
to the previous year. 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, *Signiﬁcant at 10%, 
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Table 1.7 describes brieﬂy the regressions proposed for the robustness analysis against 
changes in the model speciﬁcation. 
Table 1.7: Robustness Analysis (Battery of regressions) 
Reelection Fiscal variables New Def.a >b Obs. 
Rob. Analysis (PART Ic) 
Regression 1 Party Non-Adjusted (No, No) No 180 
Rob. Analysis (PART IId) 
Regression 2 Leader Non-Adjusted (No, Yes) No 170 
Regression 3 Leader Non-Adjusted (Yes, Yes) No 170 
Rob. Analysis (PART IIIe) 
Regression 4 Leader Cycl. Adjusted (No, No) No 112 
Regression 5 Leader Cycl. Adjusted (Yes, Yes) No 112 
aNew deﬁnition of the ﬁscal variables (SurplusTerm, SurplusLastYear).
 
bDiscount rate for the per capita GDP growth.
 
cNew Deﬁnition of Political Alternation.
 
dNew Deﬁnitions of the Fiscal Variables.
 
eUsing Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Balances.
 
1.3.4.2.1 Part I: Changing the deﬁnition of political alternation. 
Firstly, Brender & Drazen’s regression is replicated but changing the deﬁnition of 
political alternation. Now we use the following rule ”there is reelection when the incumbent 
party (or incumbent coalition) has won again in the elections”, instead of focusing on the 
incumbent leader (prime minister or president). The justiﬁcation for this modiﬁcation 
is to check whether the correlations are maintained when we asume that voters assign 
responsibility to political parties instead of declaring responsible to the incumbent leader. 
The new dependent variable is called: ReelectParty11 . 
According to ReelectLeader, there were 88 reelections in the Brender & Drazen’s sam­
ple (48% of the elections). Using ReelectParty there were 107 reelections (59%). 
Table 1.8 shows those elections in which both deﬁnitions of political alternation di↵er 
(a total of 25 elections). If we analyse in detail these elections, it can be seen that in 
most of the cases (18) occur the following. The prime minister12 decides not to run 
again, is replaced by another member of his party and the substitute wins the elections. 
In this situation, the deﬁnition of political alternation proposed by Brender & Drazen 
(ReelectLeader) considers that there is no reelection. However, according to our deﬁnition 
(ReelectParty) there was reelection because we are focusing on the political party. 
For instance, if we look at the election held in Luxembourg in 1984, the leader of 
the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) Pierre Werner decided not to run again after 
11The complete deﬁnition of the variable is described in the Appendix.
 
12Not subject to term limits.
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almost 20 years being prime minister because of his age. He was replaced as a candidate 
of the CSV by Jacques Santer and the CSV won the election again bordering the absolute 
majority. In this case, ReelectLeader takes the value 0 (the incumbent retired from the 
race) and ReelectParty takes the value 1. 
Additionally, the other seven times in which there are discrepancies between both 
deﬁnitions relate to complex governments composed of a coalition of parties. 
With this alternative speciﬁcation (Table 1.9), the variable GDPpcGrowth is signiﬁcant 
at 5%. At the same time, the variables SurplusTerm and NewDemocracy stop being 
signiﬁcant. In addition, the pseudo R2 increases from 0.064 to 0.08. We can conclude 
that Brender & Drazen’s speciﬁcation is not robust against changing the deﬁnition of the 
dependent variable. 
Table 1.8: List of elections in which both deﬁnitions di↵er 
Country Elections ReelectLeader ReelectParty 
Australia 1967 0 1 
Austria 1983 0 1 
Belgium 1968, 1977, 1987 0, 1, 1 1, 0, 0 
Finland 1970, 1979 0, 0 1, 1 
Germany 1976 0 1 
Greece 1996 0 1 
Ireland 1992 0 1 
Iceland 1983, 1987 0, 0 1, 1 
Italy 1972, 1979, 1987, 1992 0, 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 1, 1 
Japan 1972, 1976, 1979, 1989 0, 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 1, 1 
Luxembourg 1984, 1994 0, 0 1, 1 
Netherland 1971 0 1 
Turkey 1995 1 0 
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Table 1.9: Robustness analysis against changes in the deﬁnition of political alternation 
Original Sample (1960-2001) Regression 1 
Dependent variable: ReelectLeader ReelectParty 
  / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx 
GDPpcGrowtha -0.008 -0.002 0.027⇤⇤ 0.651 
(0.937) (0.018) 
SurplusTermb 0.132⇤ 0.033 0.059 0.0142 
(0.096) (0.448) 
SurplusLastYear c 0.351⇤⇤⇤ 0.088 0.228⇤⇤ 0.065 
(0.001) (0.041) 
NewDemocracy 1.266⇤⇤ 0.289 0.027 0.006 
(0.033) (0.965) 
MajoritarianSystem 0.586 0.145 0.029 0.007 
(0.142) (0.941) 
Constant -0.182 -0.224 
(0.555) (0.503) 
Observations 180 180 
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.080 
LR chi2 13.395 13.48 
Prob > chi2 0.020 0.0193 
aGDPpcGrowth: the average growth rate of real per capita GDP during the term in o ce. 
bSurplusTerm: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years preceding the election year, 
relative to the two previous years 
cSurplusLastYear: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in the election year, compared 
to the previous year. 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, *Signiﬁcant at 10%, 
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1.3.4.2.2 Part II: Changing the deﬁnition of the ﬁscal variables. 
In this part we check the robustness of the Brender and Drazen’s model against changes 
in the deﬁnition of the ﬁscal variables (Regression 2 and 3). Results are shown in Table 
1.10. 
In Regression 2, we re-estimate the model but modifying the deﬁnition of the variable 
that measure the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the last year, to take into account 
the month in which the elections are held. The alternative variable is called NewSurplus­
LastYear13 and tries to be more precise than the deﬁnition used in Brender & Drazen 
(2008). Applying this change we obtain that the variable NewSurplusLastYear is not sig­
niﬁcant now. As in the original regression, voters reward governments that reduce the 
deﬁcit at the beginning and in the middle of the legislature. 
In Regression 3, we also modify the deﬁnition of the variable that measure the change in 
the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the term in ofce (excluding last 12 months). The new variable 
is called NewSurplusTerm14 . As in the previous case, the variable NewSurplusLastYear is 
not signiﬁcant. In this case the sign of the coefcient is even negative. Moreover, after the 
change in the deﬁnition, the variable NewSurplusTerm is now signiﬁcant at 1% (instead of 
10%). Finally, after the modiﬁcations, the pseudo R2 is greater (0.075 instead of 0.045). 
Both regressions show that Brender & Drazen’s ﬁndings are not robust against changes 
in the deﬁnition of the ﬁscal variables. Once we apply more precise deﬁnitions for the ﬁscal 
variables it is obtained that there is no evidence that increasing public spending (or lower 
taxes) in the last year of the term in ofce helps or harms the chances of re-election. At the 
same time, in both regressions, GDPpcGrowth and NewDemocracy are not statistically 
signiﬁcant. 
13Exact deﬁnition is given in the Appendix. 
14The formal deﬁnition is given in the Appendix. 
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Table 1.10: Robustness Analysis. Di↵erent speciﬁcations I (LOGIT). 
B & D (Red. Sample 1) Regression 2 Regression 3 
Dependent variable: ReelectLeader ReelectLeader ReelectLeader 
  / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx 
GDPpcGrowtha 0.050 0.012 0.076 0.019 0.030 0.761 
(0.599) (0.436) (0.755) 
SurplusTermb 0.139⇤ 0.034 0.121⇤ 0.302 
(0.056) (0.099) 
NewSurplusTermc 0.80 0.020 
(0.004)⇤⇤⇤ 
SurplusLastYeard 0.183⇤⇤ 0.088 
(0.047) 
NewSurplusLastYeare 0.177 0.044 -0.058 -0.014 
(0.168) (0.716) 
NewDemocracy 1.037⇤ 0.193 0.735 0.178 0.561 0.138 
(0.083) (0.234) (0.367) 
MajoritarianSystem 0.273 0.101 0.464 0.115 0.445 0.138 
(0.393) (0.244) (0.260) 
Constant -0.332 -0.426 -0.317 
(0.278) (0.169) (0.325) 
Observations 170 170 170
 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.039 0.075
 
LR chi2 10.79 8.96 14.12
 
Prob > chi2 0.055 0.111 0.015
 
aGDPpcGrowth: the average growth rate of real per capita GDP during the term in o ce. 
bSurplusTerm: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years preceding the election year, 
relative to the two previous years 
cNewSurplusTerm: the change in the surplus-to-GDP over the term in o ce (excluding the last twelve 
months). This deﬁnition takes into account the real length of the legislature. 
dSurplusLastYear: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in the election year, compared 
to the previous year. 
eNewSurplusLastYear: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in in the last twelve months 
of the term in o ce, compared to the previous twelve months. 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, *Signiﬁcant at 10%, 
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Now, we address the same question but using a di↵erent approach. Graphing Political 
Business Cycles we will show that the correlation between SurplusLastYear and Political 
Alternation is quite sensitive to the deﬁnition used. 
Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of the primary budget surplus throughout the legislature 
and has been computed using the same elections as in Brender and Drazen (2008). We are 
applying Brender and Drazen’s deﬁnitions in order to determine when a legislature starts 
and ends15 . In this context, normalisation is required since there is great heterogeneity in 
the duration of the legislatures among countries. To do that, we divide each legislature in 
ten periods and later we compute the mean value of the variable ”primary budget surplus” 
for each period of each election. Now we can compute the cycle for the variable ”primary 
budget surplus”. As we can see, there is a clearly di↵erentiated behaviour according to 
whether or not there is alternation once the legislature ends. The primary budget surplus 
is monotonously increasing when the incumbent party (or coalition) is reelected (red line). 
Note that the trend line (black line) is almost a straight line. At the same time, the primary 
budget surplus always decreases when the incumbent is not reelected (green line). Thus, 
looking at Figure 1.2 we obtain the same conclusion as with Brender and Drazen’s model: 
”Rising deﬁcits during the incumbent’s term are associated with a lesser probability of 
reelection”. 
Figure 1.2: Primary Budget Surplus (PBS). Evolution throughout the legislature using 
Brender & Drazen’s deﬁnitions. 
Figure 1.3 presents the same graph as before but now the timing is slightly di↵erent 
because we are taking into account the month when elections are held. In the ﬁrst half 
of the legislature, ”good governments” improve the primary budget surplus while ”bad 
15In other words, we are considering that every legislature ﬁnishes in December. 
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governments” increase the deﬁcit (or reduce the surplus). However, in contrast with the 
former case, in the second half of the legislature both curves are not so di↵erent. These 
results are consistent with the robustness analysis performed previously. When we measure 
precisely the end of the legislatures, it is not a clearly di↵erentiated path according to 
whether or not there is alternation once the legislature ends. Note that the trend line 
(black line) is clearly concave for ”good governments” and convex for ”bad governments”. 
Figure 1.3: Primary Budget Surplus (PBS). Evolution throughout the legislature consid­
ering the month when elections are held. 
1.3.4.2.3 Part III: Using cyclically adjusted ﬁscal data. 
In Regression 4 we use cyclically adjusted ﬁscal variables (instead of non-cyclically 
adjusted). The new variables are called: SurplusLastYearCA and SurplusTermCA. Ev­
erything else remains identical to the original regression. The results change signiﬁcantly 
(Table 1.11). Economic growth becomes a signiﬁcant variable (10%) and the sign of the 
coefcient is positive, implying that higher economic growth over the term in ofce in-
creases the probability of reelection, other things equal. Furthermore, the ﬁscal variables 
are not signiﬁcant at usual levels. It can be concluded that eliminating multicollinear­
ity problems (using cyclically adjusted ﬁscal variables) there is empirical evidence that 
economic growth is a signiﬁcant variable. 
In Regression 5 we continue using cyclically adjusted ﬁscal variables and we also apply 
the new deﬁnitions for the ﬁscal variables. With this new speciﬁcation GDPpcGrowth 
keeps being signiﬁcant at 10%. The same occurs with the variable NewSurplusTermCA, 
which measure the change in the cyclically adjusted surplus over the term in ofce (ex­
cluding last 12 months). There is no evidence that ﬁscal discipline during last year of the 
legislature helps incumbent being reelect. In fact, the coefcient of the variable NewSur­
plusLastyearCA is negative. In addition, the pseudo R2 increases from 0.049 to 0.063. 
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Table 1.11: Robustness Analysis. Di↵erent speciﬁcations II (LOGIT). 
B & D (Red. Sample 2) Regression 4 Regression 5 
Dependent variable: ReelectLeader ReelectLeader ReelectLeader 
  / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx   / p-value Mfx 
GDPpcGrowtha 0.146 0.0364 0.279⇤ 0.069 0.276 ⇤ 0.069 
(0.297) (0.061) (0.075) 
SurplusTermb 0.142⇤ 0.035 
(0.099) 
SurplusTermCAc 0.101⇤ 0.025 
(0.055) 
NewSurplusTermCAd 0.519⇤ 0.129 
(0.089) 
SurplusLastYeare 0.240⇤ 0.059 
(0.074) 
SurplusLastYearCAf 0.080 0.020 
(0.284) 
NewSurplusLastYearCAg -0.071 -0.017 
(0.743) 
NewDemocracy 1.176⇤ 0.260 0.584 0.140 0.539 0.130 
(0.239) (0.503) (0.540) 
MajoritarianSystem 0.045 0.011 0.073 0.018 0.100 0.025 
(0.932) (0.890) (0.844) 
Constant -0.279 -0.581 -0.608 
(0.464) (0.116) (0.108) 
Observations 112 112 112
 
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.049 0.063
 
LR chi2 11.31 6.58 8.69
 
Prob > chi2 0.045 0.254 0.122
 
aGDPpcGrowth: the average growth rate of real per capita GDP during the term in o ce. 
bSurplusTerm: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the 
two previous years 
cSurplusTermCA: the change in the surplus-to-GDP over the term in o ce (excluding the last twelve months). This 
deﬁnition takes into account the real length of the legislature. 
dNewSurplusTermCA: the change in the surplus-to-GDP over the term in o ce (excluding the last twelve months). 
This deﬁnition takes into account the real length of the legislature. 
eSurplusLastYear: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in the election year, compared to the previous 
year. 
fSurplusLastYearCA: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in in the last twelve months of the term in 
o ce, compared to the previous twelve months. 
gNewSurplusLastYearCA: the change in the government surplus ratio to GDP in in the last twelve months of the 
term in o ce, compared to the previous twelve months. 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, *Signiﬁcant at 10%, 
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1.3.4.2.4 Summary: Robustness analysis against changes in the speciﬁcation. 
Table 1.12 summarises the results obtained from the robustness analysis, indicating 
which variables are signiﬁcant in each regression. Correlations found in Brender & Drazen’s 
work (2008) do not seem very robust. Recall that the authors claimed to have found 
evidence that a higher surplus (or lower deﬁcit) in the election year increased the chances 
of re-election in the OECD countries. By contrast, economic growth was not a statistically 
signiﬁcant variable in their model of re-election probability. 
However, when introducing some reasonable changes in the model’s speciﬁcation, very 
di↵erent results are obtained and new correlations are uncovered. Real GDP per capita 
growth is statistically signiﬁcant in most of the regressions and positively a↵ect the chances 
of re-election. Maintaining stable government ﬁnances over the term of ofce also increases 
the chances of re-election as in Brender & Drazen (2008). At the same time, there is 
no evidence that increasing the surplus (or reducing deﬁcit) during the election year is 
positively valued by voters. In summary, voters reward governments that achieve high 
levels of economic growth and reduce the structural deﬁcit at the beginning and in the 
middle of the term of ofce, but not at the end. 
Table 1.12: Summary of the robustness analysis: Which variables are signiﬁcant? 
GDPpcGrowth SurplusTerm SurplusLastYear Obs. 
R. Analysis (PART Ia) 
B & D (Original Model) 
Regression 1 
R. Analysis (PART IIb) 
No 
Yes⇤⇤ 
Yes⇤ 
No 
Yes⇤⇤⇤ 
Yes⇤⇤ 
180 
180 
B & D (Reduced Sample 1) 
Regression 2 
Regression 3 
R. Analysis (PART IIIc) 
B & D (Reduced Sample 2) 
Regression 4 
Regression 5 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes⇤ 
Yes⇤ 
Yes⇤ 
Yes⇤ 
Yes⇤⇤⇤ 
Yes⇤ 
Yes⇤ 
Yes⇤ 
Yes⇤⇤ 
No 
No 
Yes⇤ 
No 
No 
170 
170 
170 
112 
112 
112 
aNew Deﬁnition of Political Alternation
 
bNew Deﬁnitions of the Fiscal Variables
 
cUsing Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Balances
 
It is possible that the lack of signiﬁcance of the economic growth variable in Brender 
& Drazen’s regression was caused by the inclusion of non-cyclically adjusted ﬁscal vari­
ables, highly correlated with GDP. This way, the individual e↵ect of economic growth on 
the likelihood of re-election is not properly estimated in Brender & Drazen (2008). At 
the same time, there is evidence that the correlation between SurplusLastYear and Polit­
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ical Alternation is very sensitive to the deﬁnition of SurplusLastYear. It is necessary to 
take into account the month when elections are held in order to measure accurately the 
correlation. 
1.4	 Alternative speciﬁcation to identify the economic deter­
minants of political alternation. 
Once the lack of robustness of the results found by Brender & Drazen is shown, the 
purpose of this section is to propose an alternative speciﬁcation in order to identify new 
correlations between democracy (election results) and economic performance. Another 
objective is to test the hypothesis that the growth of real GDP per capita is a statistically 
signiﬁcant variable when estimating the probability of re-election. 
Next, a brief overview of variables and data sources used in the new speciﬁcation: 16 
•	 ReelectParty: Dependent Variable. It was constructed from: ”Database of Politi­
cal Institutions”, (World Bank). 
•	 GDPpcWeighted: Weighted economic growth over the term in ofce. It is used 
the same formula as in Hibbs (2000). Discount rate: > = 0.95. Real GDP per capita 
data are from the ”World Developments Indicators” (World Bank). 
•	 SurplusTermCA & NewSuplusLastYearCA: Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Vari­
ables. They was collected from ”Economic Outlook Database” (OCDE). 
•	 Duration: Variable that measures the number of years that the incumbent party 
has been governing the country. Alesina, Carloni & Lecce (2012) suggest that the 
longer the government has been in ofce, the higher its probability of defeat. Source: 
”Database of Political Institutions” (World Bank). 
•	 Control variables. The same binary control variables as in Brender & Drazen 
(2008): NewDemocracy and MajoritarianSystem. 
The sample period is from 1975 to 2014 and only democratic elections are included. It 
has not been possible to include before 1975 elections because structural deﬁcit data are 
only available since 1970, and in order to include an election it is necessary to have data 
from the beginning of the legislature. 
Table 1.13 shows the regression output, using the new speciﬁcation. Unlike Brender 
& Drazen (2008), an increase in the GDP per capita growth rate increases the probability 
of reelection in OECD countries. A ceteris paribus increase of 1 percentage point in the 
average growth rate during the term increases the probability of reelection by 8%. At the 
same time, increases in public deﬁcit over the term in ofce decrease the probability of re­
election. Voters penalise persistent budgetary imbalances. However, there is no evidence 
that ﬁscal policy changes (increase or decrease in the government surplus) in the last year 
of the term in ofce a↵ect the chances of re-election of incumbent parties. 
16A comprehensive description of the variables and data sources is presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 1.13: Alternative speciﬁcation (LOGIT)
 
OECD (1970-2014)
 
1970-2007 1970-2014
 
Dependent variable: ReelectParty 
  / p-value Mfx 
ReelectParty 
  / p-value Mfx 
GDPpcWeighteda 
NewSurplusLastYearCAb 
SurplusTermCAc 
NewDemocracy 
MajoritarianSystem 
Duration d 
0.344⇤⇤ 
(0.014) 
-0.299 
(0.142) 
0.504⇤ 
(0.077) 
-0.305 
(0.743) 
0.841⇤ 
(0.056) 
-0.320⇤ 
0.076 
-0.066 
0.111 
-0.067 
0.185 
-0.070 
0.350⇤⇤⇤ 
(0.001) 
-0.210 
(0.173) 
0.350⇤ 
(0.087) 
-0.304 
(0.740) 
0.803⇤⇤ 
(0.047) 
-0.423⇤⇤ 
0.079 
-0.048 
0.079 
-0.069 
0.183 
-0.096 
Constant 
(0.079) 
0.880 
(0.015) 
1.209⇤⇤ 
(0.128) (0.016) 
Observations 165 194 
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.108 
LR chi2 19.104 27.454 
Prob > chi2 0.004 0.000 
Baseline predicted probability 0.655 0.634 
aGDPpcWeighted: Weighted economic growth over the term in o ce. Discount 
rate (  = 0.95). 
bNewSurplusLastYearCA: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the last 
twelve months of the term in o ce (cyclically adjusted data.) 
cSurplusTermCA: the change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years pre­
ceding the election year, relative to the two previous years (cyclically adjusted data) 
dDuration: Variable that measures the number of years that the incumbent party 
has been governing the country. 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, **Signiﬁcant at 5%, *Signiﬁcant at 10% 
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The probability of reelection is higher in Proportional Systems, while the binary vari­
able that di↵erentiates between new and old democracies is not statistically signiﬁcant. 
Finally, the more years the incumbent party has been in ofce (variable ”Duration”), the 
higher the probability of its defeat, other things equal. 
Now we check the robustness of the new speciﬁcation against extreme events. The 
global economic crisis that began in 2008 caused signiﬁcant declines in GDP and strong 
increases in government deﬁcits in virtually all OECD countries. 
Figure 1.4 shows the evolution of government surplus (blue: non-cyclically adjusted, 
red: cyclically adjusted) for the OECD weighted average17 . If we identify the ﬁve worst 
deﬁcit data in the time series (1975, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012), four of them took place 
in the period (2008-2014), which highlights the magnitude of the economic crisis. 
Figure 1.4: Sovereign Debt Crisis in OECD (2008-2012) 
Source: ”Economic Outlook Database” (OECD) 
We re-estimate the model only for the period 1975-2007 (excluding the 29 elections 
held during the economic crisis). Results are shown in the ﬁrst column of the Table 1.13. 
The independent variables had extreme values in that period, so it is very interesting to 
test the robustness of the model to extreme events. 
We can conclude that excluding the crisis period the estimation results do not change. 
Only a small decrease in the level of signiﬁcance of estimated coefcients is observed, which 
may be explained by the reduction in the number of elections (N=165). 
17Weights are calculated using GDP. 
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1.5 Identifying Political Cycles 
In this section, we can see the evolution of di↵erent macroeconomic indicators throughout 
the legislature for the di↵erent countries of the OECD. The aim of this section is to identify 
the existence of Political Business Cycles and Political Budget Cycles. These graphs, which 
collect observations (elections) from the period 1975-2014, are divided into 10 intervals ­
so if a legislature lasted 40 months the ﬁrst interval would be constructed from the per 
capita GDP growth rate for the ﬁrst four months, the second from months 5 to 8, etc ... 
Likewise, the graphs show three series: ”Total”, which collects all the observations 
of the sample; ”Reelection = 1”, which includes only those in which at the end of the 
legislature there is no change of government; and ”Reelection = 0”, which includes those 
in which there is a change of government at the end of the legislature. In this section, we 
measure political alternation focusing on the party. 
Figure 1.5 shows the evolution of per capita GDP growth. From these series we can 
derive several observations. First, economic growth in all scenarios is reduced at the 
beginning of the legislature and begins to rise in the 60-70% interval. Second, it can be 
observed that the growth rate is higher for those cases in which there is no change of 
government at the end of the legislature, whereas in cases where voters opt for another 
party at the end of the legislature, growth rates are considerably more discrete - the 
di↵erence between the two scenarios moves at around 1% growth. Finally, we can see that 
the volatility in the series is somewhat greater for those cases in which there is change of 
government at the end of the legislature. These results are consistent with the existence 
of economic voting. 
Figure 1.5: Political Business Cycle (GDP Growth). OECD (1975-2014) 
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This seems to point to several hypotheses. Firstly, voters clearly seem to reward 
good economic performance of governments, so that governments which have been in 
power over times of greater expansion are re-elected in greater proportion than those 
who have governed during weak growth stages. Secondly, in all scenarios we can observe 
how there is an acceleration in growth rates at the end of the legislature. This may 
be because governments carry out public expenditure growth or tax reduction to please 
voters as the end of legislature approaches and thereby contribute to their re-election. 
The ﬁscal stimulus would lead to higher growth rates at the end of the term of ofce. 
Another hypothesis is that certain governments behave strategically and call elections 
when growth rates are particularly robust. This would explain the greater growth present 
in all scenarios. 
Figure 1.6 we show the evolution of non cyclically adjusted public surplus. As we 
can see, there is a clearly di↵erentiated behaviour according to whether or not there is 
alternation in power once the legislature ends. 
The main observations derived from the following graph could be the following. Firstly, 
from the basis of all observations, at the beginning of the legislature a reduction in deﬁcit 
takes place. However, from the 30-40% interval the deﬁcit begins to expand and, except 
for a very slight reduction in the period 80-90%, progresses throughout the legislature, es­
pecially in the last interval. Second, those countries in which a change of government takes 
place at the end of the legislature present a greater deﬁcit. This gap widens throughout 
the legislature and only slightly shortens in the last two intervals. 
Figure 1.6: Political Budget Cycle (non-cyclically adjusted surplus). OECD (1975-2014) 
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The graph analysed reinforces some of the hypotheses that we have indicated previ­
ously. In the ﬁrst place, it seems that voters reward the good budgetary behaviour of 
governments, so that those who have maintained a surplus situation are more likely to be 
re-elected. Secondly, except for those cases in which governments are not re-elected, in 
which case the deﬁcit is expanded during most of the legislature, we can observe how gov­
ernments reduce the deﬁcit at the beginning of the legislature and then increase it at the 
end of it. This seems to connect with the previous hypothesis that governments carry out 
ﬁscal expansions at the end of the legislature to stimulate economic growth and thereby 
contribute to their re-election. This expansion of the end of the legislature is especially 
intense in the last interval. 
In Figure 1.7 we show the evolution of the cyclically adjusted (structural) surplus. The 
evolution of this indicator is not very di↵erent from the previous case, except for those 
governments that are voted out. Again, the governments that are re-elected show a more 
balanced budget policy and again for cases where there is a reelection and for the aggregate 
of observations we can see how the reduction of the structural deﬁcit in the ﬁrst measures 
of the legislature derives in a ﬁscal expansion as its conclusion approaches. However, the 
evolution of this indicator varies somewhat with respect to those governments that are 
not re-elected. As we can see, the structural deﬁcit remains stable until the middle of 
the legislature, when there is an expansion followed by a setback in the last two intervals. 
Another interesting observation is that governments that are re-elected and the aggregate 
of governments leave the structural deﬁcit more or less the same as at the beginning of the 
legislature, whereas in cases where a change of government takes place the deﬁcit increases 
remarkably. 
Figure 1.7: Political Budget Cycle (cyclically adjusted surplus). OECD (1975-2014) 
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1.6 Conclusions 
Throughout this article it has been demonstrated that the correlations found in Brender 
& Drazen (2008) were little robust. When some reasonable changes are introduced in the 
model speciﬁcation, in the deﬁnition of variables and in the sample period, the results 
obtained have varied and some of the correlations have disappeared. 
Firstly, the model’s robustness is tested against changes in the sample period. The 
sample period is extended from 2001 to 2014, keeping the rest of the speciﬁcation exactly 
as in the original work. On performing this simple robustness exercise, one of the two 
correlations disappear. In particular, deﬁcits in the last year of the term become not 
signiﬁcant; there is no evidence that increasing the deﬁcit in the last year in ofce reduces 
the likelihood of re-election. 
Secondly, the robustness of the model is tested against changes in the model speciﬁ­
cation and against changes in the deﬁnition of the variables. Three changes are proposed 
(1) new deﬁnition of political alternation, (2) new deﬁnitions of the ﬁscal variables and 
(3) substituting non-cyclically adjusted ﬁscal data by cyclically adjusted data in order to 
avoid multicollinearity problems. Considering again the model with these changes it is 
shown that the deﬁcit in the last year of the term in ofce is not signiﬁcant and that 
economic growth positively a↵ects the probability of re-election in most of the regressions. 
Subsequently, an alternative speciﬁcation for the reelection probability model is pro­
posed, including the changes suggested in the previous section and also adding a variable 
that measures the years that the ruling party has been in ofce (Duration). With this 
alternative speciﬁcation the model is estimated for the period 1975-2014. The results are 
as follows: 
•	 Unlike Brender & Drazen (2008), an increase in the GDP per capita growth rate 
increases the probability of reelection in OECD countries. In particular, a ceteris 
paribus increase of 1 percentage point in the average growth rate during the term 
increases the probability of reelection by 8% 18 . 
•	 At the same time, increases in government deﬁcit over the term in ofce (excluding 
last year) decrease the probability of re-election, but increases in the last year have 
no impact. 
•	 The more years the incumbent party has been in ofce (variable ”Duration”), the 
higher the probability of its defeat, other things equal. 
It is important to note that the new correlations identiﬁed in this article should not be 
considered as conclusive evidence. Unstable results are common in cross-national studies 
about ”economic voting” and it is worth further investigation about this ﬁeld of research. 
In the last part of the paper, several Political Business Cycles are characterised. On 
the one hand, the variable GDP growth decrease at the beginning of the legislature and 
18Marginal e↵ect at mean (MEM). 
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begins to rise in the 60-70% interval regardless of the presence or absence of alternation. 
The path (cycle) is the same for ”good” and ”bad” governments. However, if we look at 
levels, it can be seen that the growth rate is higher when the government is reelected. 
Regarding budget surplus, a di↵erent path is observed for each kind of governments. 
The ”good governments” increase the surplus at the beginning and in the middle of the 
legislature and reduce it before elections. On the contrary, ”bad” governments increase 
the deﬁcit from the beginning of the legislature and later the path is less clear. Finally, 
di↵erences in levels are observed, the governments that are re-elected show in general a 
more balanced budget policy. 
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1.8 Statistical Appendix
 
A. Databases 
•	 Database of Political Institutions (DPI), World Bank. 
•	 International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund. 
•	 Government Finance Statistics (GFS), International Monetary Fund. 
•	 World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
•	 Political Finance Database, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
•	 Polity IV, University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Con­
ﬂict Management. 
•	 Economic Outlook Database (OCDE). 
•	 World Economic Outlook (WEO), International Monetary Fund. 
•	 A Historical Public Debt Database, International Monetary Fund. 
•	 World Political Leaders, Za´rate’s Political Collections 
•	 CPDS I, University of Bern. 
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B. Variable Deﬁnitions 
i) Brender & Drazen’s speciﬁcation (Tables 1.1, 1.4, 1.5 & 1.6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
-ReelectLeader: See comprehensive deﬁnition in Brender & Drazen (2008), pag. 2205­
2206 (Variable ”Reelect”). 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
-GDPpcGrowth: Average real GDP per capita growth over the term in ofce. 
s 
GDP0GDP pcGrowth = 100 ⇤ x - 1 (1.8) 
GDP_x 
where, GDP0 is the value of Real GDP per capita in the election year; GDP_x is the 
value of Real GDP per capita in the ﬁrst year of the legislature; x is the number of years 
in ofce. Source: ”World Development Indicators” (WB). 
FISCAL VARIABLES 
-SurplusTerm: The change in the average surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years pre­
ceding the elections (not including the election year) compared to the previous two years. 
SurplusT erm = 1/2 ⇤ (B_1 + B_2) - 1/2 ⇤ (B_3 + B_4) (1.9) 
where, B _i is the surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the elections. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
-SurplusLastYear: The change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the election year relative 
to the previous year. 
SurplusLastY ear = (B0 -B _1) (1.10) 
where, B_i is the surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the elections. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
-NewDemocracy: A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving 
the value 1 if country is deﬁned as a New Democracy. Otherwise, the country is deﬁned 
as an Old Democracy and the variable receives a value of 0. Source: Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI), World Bank. 
-MajoritarianSystem: A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiv­
ing the value 1 in a country with a majoritarian electoral system, and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI), World Bank. 
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ii) Alternative speciﬁcation (Tables 1.9, 1.10 & 1.11) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
-ReelectParty: The deﬁnition is as follow: 
a) Case 1: The old and the new government are formed by a single party. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the incumbent party wins the elections 
-ReelectParty=0 if the incumbent party is defeated 
b) Case 2: The old government was formed by a single party and the new government is 
formed by a coalition of parties. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the incumbent party is member of the coalition formed after the 
elections and has more than 60% of the seats in the new coalition. 
-ReelectParty=0 otherwise 
c) Case 3: The old government was formed by a coalition of parties and the new govern­
ment is formed by a single party. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the winning party was part of the ruling coalition before the election 
and had more than 60% of the seats. 
-ReelectParty=0 otherwise 
d) Case 4: The old and new government are formed by a coalition of parties. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the parties that were members of the previous coalition have more 
than 60% of the seats in the new coalition and the parties who are members of the new 
coalition had more than 60% of the seats in the previous coalition 
-ReelectParty=0 otherwise 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
-GDPpcWeighted: Weighted economic growth rate over the term in ofce. 
n n
GDP pcW eighted = 
X 
>i ⇤ DGDP _i ⇤ (1/ 
X 
>i) (1.11) 
i=0 i=1 
where, DGDP0 is the real GDP per capita growth in the month in which the election 
was held; n is the number of months of the legislature; GDP _n is the real GDP per capita 
growth in the ﬁrst month of the legislature; > is the discount rate; > = 0.95 
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FISCAL VARIABLES 
-SurplusTermCA: The change in the average surplus-to-GDP ratio in the two years 
preceding the elections (not including the election year) compared to the previous two 
years (cyclically adjusted data). 
SurplusTerm = 1/2 ⇤ (B_1 + B_2) - 1/2 ⇤ (B_3 + B_4) (1.12) 
where, B _i is the surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the elections. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
-SurplusLastYearCA: The change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the election year 
relative to the previous year (cyclically adjusted data). 
SurplusLastY ear = (B0 -B _1) (1.13) 
where, B_i is the surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the elections. Source: 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
-NewSurplusTermCA: The change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio throughout the term 
in ofce, excluding the last twelve months (cyclically adjusted data). 
T _12
NewSurplusTerm  = 
X Bi (1.14) 
(T - 12)
i=0 
where, Bi is the primary government budget balance (as a percentage of GDP) during 
the i month of the legislature and T is the total number of month of the legislature. 
-NewSurplusLastYearCA: The change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in the last twelve 
months of the term in ofce (cyclically adjusted data). 
(m) ⇤ (B0 -B_1) + (12 -m) ⇤ (B_1 -B_2)NewSurplusLastY  ear  = (1.15) 
12 
where, B _i is the government surplus as a percentage of GDP i years before the 
elections and m is the month in which the elections are held (for example, February=2 
and April=4). 
OTHER VARIABLES 
-Duration: number of years that the incumbent party has been governing the country. 
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Economic Determinants of Political Alternation 
and Long-term Economic Growth 
Vı´ctor Herna´ndez Garc´ıa 
November 2017 
Resumen en Castellano 
Este art´ıculo estudia la relacio´n entre el nivel (intensidad) de voto econo´mico y el cre­
cimiento econo´mico en el largo plazo. En primer lugar, la sensibilidad de la alternancia 
pol´ıtica frente al crecimiento econo´mico es estimada para cada uno de los pa´ıses de la 
OCDE utilizando para ello me´todos bayesianos (algoritmo de Monte Carlo). El ana´lisis de 
las distribuciones posteriores de probabilidad muestra la existencia de una notable hete­
rogeneidad entre los pa´ıses analizados. Para ciertos pa´ıses, el incremento del crecimiento 
econo´mico a lo largo de la legislatura (percentil 80 en vez de percentil 20) incrementa 
la probabilidad de reeleccio´n un 50 %, mientras que para otros pa´ıses el incremento es 
pra´cticamente igual a cero. En segundo lugar, se observa que la correlacio´n entre estas 
sensibilidades y el crecimiento econo´mico en el largo plazo es negativa y estad´ısticamen­
te signiﬁcativa. Estos resultados emp´ıricos son consistentes con los modelos teo´ricos que 
mantienen que la estructura de incentivos de los pol´ıticos afecta al funcionamiento de las 
instituciones, y por lo tanto al bienestar en el largo plazo. Bajo la presencia de fuerte 
voto econo´mico, los polcos se preocupan especialmente de la evolucio´n de la economı´a en 
el corto plazo, por lo que intentan manipular las variables macroecono´micas generando 
distorsiones e ignorando las pol´ ´ alisis an­ıticas de largo plazo. Por ultimo, se repite el an´
terior pero estimando esta vez la sensibilidad de la alternancia polca frente a la pol´ıtica 
ﬁscal. En este caso, tambie´n existe una correlacio´n negativa entre dicha sensibilidad y el 
crecimiento econo´mico en el largo plazo. Espec´ıﬁcamente, aquellos pa´ıses cuyos votantes 
valoran en mayor medida un ciclo presupuestario co´ncavo presentan un menor crecimiento 
en el largo plazo. 
Palabras clave: Voto econo´mico, alternancia pol´ıtica, pol´ıtica ﬁscal
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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between the economic determinants of political 
alternation and long-term economic growth. Firstly, the sensitivity of political alter­
nation to economic growth is estimated for each of the OECD countries using bayesian 
methods. The analysis of the approximate posterior distributions show a large het­
erogeneity between countries. It is observed that for some countries an increase in 
the GDP per capita growth over the legislature (80th percentile instead of the 20th 
percentile) increases the probability of reelection by 50%, while for other countries 
the e↵ect is almost zero. Secondly, a statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation be­
tween these sensitivities and long run economic growth is observed. These empirical 
results represent support for those theoretical models that maintain that the politi­
cians’ career concerns (incentive structure) have an impact on the functioning of the 
institutions, a↵ecting the long-term welfare. Under the presence of strong economic 
voting, politicians are only concerned with the evolution of the economy in the short 
term, so they try to manipulate macroeconomic variables generating distortions and 
neglecting long-term policies. Finally, the analysis is repeated estimating this time 
the sensitivity of political alternation to ﬁscal policy for each of the countries. In this 
case, there is also a negative correlation between the degree of economic voting and 
long-term economic growth. Speciﬁcally, those countries where voters further reward 
a concave political budget cycle face lower long-run economic growth. 
Keywords: Politician Incentives, Political Business Cycle, Political Budget Cycle, 
Bayesian Inference 
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2.1 Introduction 
Economic voting theory claims that the stochastic process that determines election out­
comes is not independent of the economic performance. During the last years, economic 
voting theory has received considerable empirical support. There is strong evidence that 
the economy plays a great role in political elections (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). 
In Herna´ndez (2017c) the main objective is to identify the economic determinants of 
political alternation in developed countries. A reelection probability model is estimated 
in order to ﬁnd the main economic determinants, i.e., the most relevant macroeconomic 
variables. To do that democratic elections from 25 OECD countries are included in the 
pooled regression. 
In the present paper the approach and the objectives are slightly di↵erent. In this case 
the main objective is to analyse the relationship between the degree of economic voting 
and long-term economic growth. So in this case we want to study the presence of economic 
voting at a country level (one regression per country) instead of estimating a regression 
with data from all the countries. 
The starting hypothesis is the presence of strong ”economic voting heterogeneity” be­
tween countries. While in some countries voters are very sensitive to economic performance 
and incumbent administrative competencies, in other countries, the short-term evolution 
of the economy explains only a small part of the election outcomes. Our ﬁnal conjecture 
is that these di↵erences can be related with the long-term economic growth, so it can be 
expected a negative correlation between sensitivity of political alternation to economic 
performance and long run economic growth. 
It is widely documented that voter behaviour largely inﬂuences the actions, policies 
and incentives of the politicians (Persson and Tabellini (2000)). If the incumbent believes 
that voters give a disproportionate weight to short-term economic performance, there is an 
incentive to neglect long-term policies (education, infrastructures, R & D, long-term wel­
fare...) and focus on improving the performance of the economy in the short term1. This  
behaviour is known in the literature as short-term bias (Bonﬁglioli and Gancia (2013)) 
and can be dynamically inefcient due to distortions. However, if voters ignore macroe­
conomic variables when voting and only react to other political issues (honesty, ideology, 
rights and freedoms, long-term policies...), the incentive structure is completely di↵erent 
and the short-term bias is likely to disappear. In this case, it would not make sense to 
focus on improving economic growth in the short term nor modifying the ﬁscal policy be-
cause the manipulations may generate distortions in the economy and difcult re-election 
prospects in future elections. So this is why we expect a negative correlation between sen­
sitivity of political alternation to economic performance and long-term economic growth. 
1Unless the polls forecast a large gap between the incumbent and the opposition. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 summarises the literature 
on politicians’ career concerns and economic voting. Section 2.3 introduces the database. 
Section 2.4 introduces the methodology to estimate the correlation between sensitivity 
of political alternation to economic performance and long run economic performance. 
In Section 2.5 the bayesian inference is presented. In Section 2.6 the robustness of the 
proposed models is tested. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
2.2 Literature review 
The present study is related to the literature on politicians’ career concerns (for a review see 
Persson and Tabellini (2000)). Celentani and Conde-Ruiz (2008) propose a dynamic model 
in which politicians’ career concerns have countervailing consequences on welfare. On the 
one hand, they are constructive because they increase the probability of reelection of 
competent incumbents. On the other hand, politicians’ career concerns may promote that 
incumbent distort policies in order to increase reelection prospects. Bonﬁglioli & Gancia 
(2013) propose a model of electoral accountability and obtain that when politicians’ ability 
is ex ante unknown, elections improve political accountability and selection. However, 
incumbents underinvest in costly policies (with future returns) because they prefer to 
signal high ability in order to increase reelection chances. 
However, few studies address this topic from a empirical point of view. In fact, to the 
best of our knowledge, no empirical work has studied the relationship between politicians’ 
career concerns and long-term economic growth. 
Our work is also related to economic voting literature (for a comprehensive review 
of the literature see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) and Hibbs (2005)). It is worth 
mentioning the following references: 
Grilli et al. (1991) claim that the stochastic process that determines the political 
alternation is independent of the economy. At the same time, political alternation af­
fects economic performance. Using simple procedures, they found a negative correlation 
between average government durability and debt accumulation in OECD countries. In 
the same vein, Alesina et al. (1996) ﬁnd that in countries and time periods with a high 
propensity of government collapse, growth is signiﬁcantly lower than otherwise. 
Alesina, Carloni & Lecce (2012) ﬁnd ”no evidence that governments which quickly re­
duce budget deﬁcits are systematically voted out of ofce” in a sample of 19 OECD coun­
tries from 1975 to 2008. Aisen and Veiga (2013) ﬁnd that political instability adversely 
a↵ects growth by lowering the rates of productivity growth and physical and human cap­
ital accumulation. Herna´ndez (2017c) ﬁnds that higher growth rates of GDP per capita 
increase the probability of reelection in OECD countries. However, there is no evidence 
that ﬁscal policy changes at the end of the legislature a↵ect the re-election chances of the 
incumbent parties. 
Finally, classical studies on the determinants of long-term growth do not include these 
kind of factors (economic voting or politicians’ career concerns) as explanatory variables 
(Barro (1996); Doppelhofer et al. (2000)). 
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2.3 Data sources 
We are interested in investigating the relationship between economic voting and long-term 
economic performance in developed countries, so in this study we focus only on OECD 
countries. 
The database used in this article is based on information from various sources2. GDP  
growth rates and population data is collected from ”World Development Indicators” 
(WDI)3 and OECD Statistics. Fiscal data are taken from Economic Outlook Database 
(OECD). Political variables are taken from ”Database of Political Institutions” (DPI). 
Finally, information on the level of democracy is taken from ”Polity Democracy Index” 
(Marshall et al., 2010). The combination of sources allows us to include elections from 
1975 to 20154 . 
We want to restrict our sample only to democratic elections, so we include only the 
elections in which the country has a positive score in the Polity Democracy Index (Marshall 
et al., 2010)5 . Moreover, the ﬁrst democratic election is excluded because it is imposible 
to determine if there has been political alternation due to the lack of an incumbent party. 
Additionally, we only include countries with at least 6 democratic elections in the sam­
ple period (1975-2015) in order to guarantee a minimum of accuracy in the estimation of 
the sensitivity of the political alternation to economic performance. Estimating a regres­
sion (two coefcients) with ﬁve or less elections is not recommended. The following new 
democracies of Eastern Europe are excluded because they do not meet this requirement: 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Letonia, Eslovenia, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. 
At the same time, Mexico6 and Turkey are excluded because of their low income. In 
spite of being members of OECD, their income is more than three times lower than the 
average OECD income. 
Finally, Switzerland is excluded due to its complex executive power, the Swiss Federal 
Council, which is formed by seven member belonging to di↵erent parties. Traditionally 
the presidency rotates among members in mandates of one year and under the approval 
of the Federal Assembly. In this context, it is not easy to identify an incumbent party in 
order to assign responsibility for the progress of the national economy. 
After applying these criteria, it is possible to include a total of 2837 elections corre­
sponding to 25 OECD countries. The number of observations (elections) range from 6 
(Czech Republic and Chile) to 16 (Australia). The list of countries and elections included 
in the analysis is detailed in the Appendix (Table 2.A11). The list of excluded countries 
is also shown (Table 2.A12). 
2A comprehensive description of the data sources is presented in the Appendix (Section B). 
3WDI is the primary World Bank collection of development indicators. 
4DPI data begin in 1975. 
5We require that the country has a positive score in every year of the legislature, not only in the election 
year. 
6Additionally, Mexico does not fullﬁl the requirement of having at least six democratic elections ac­
cording to the Polity Democracy Index (PDI). 
7The sample size decreases to n=200 when ﬁscal variables are included as explanatory variables. 
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2.4 Methodology: Bayesian Econometric Methods
 
The main objective of this paper is to test the following conjecture: ”it is expected a 
negative correlation between the sensitivity of political alternation to economic perfor­
mance and long run economic growth in OECD countries”. To do this, we propose to 
apply Bayesian methods due to its better properties in small samples instead of using the 
standard maximum likelihood estimator. 
Several recent studies have noted that Bayesian Methods (Monte Carlo simulation) 
are better tan frequentist maximum likelihood (ML) methods when dealing with small 
samples (McNeish, 2016). Baldwin & Fellingham (2013) compare the performance of an 
adjusted restricted maximum likelihood (REML) analysis to a Bayesian analysis in the 
context of multilevel models. They ﬁnd that Bayesian Methods can produce more accurate 
inferences about the parameters. Doron & Gaudreau (2014) claim that several reasons 
favoured the use of the Bayesian estimator rather tan the more traditional maximum 
likelihood estimator, among which stands out its best performance in small samples. 
Moreover, using bayesian methods o↵ers extra advantages. For instance, after running 
regressions it is possible to calculate the probability of a parameter being positive or 
negative using the posterior probability distribution. This feature greatly simpliﬁes testing 
conjectures. 
In the ﬁrst phase of the research, the objective is to propose a reelection probability 
model in order to estimate the ”sensibility of political alternation to economic perfor­
mance” for each of the OECD countries. A total of 25 probit8 regressions (one for each 
country) will be estimated using bayesian methods (MC algorithm). 
The dependent variable ”ReelectParty” measures political alternation at a political 
party level9 . The variable is equal to 1 if the ruling party (or ruling coalition) is re-elected 
and equal to 0 otherwise10 . It is computed from: ”Database of Political Institutions” 
(DPI). 
At the same time, we can not include more than one explanatory variable in the model 
at the same time due to small number of observations11 . Throughout the article several 
variables will be proposed as explanatory variables. All these variables are intended to 
be a measure of economic performance, summarising the good or bad economic manage­
ment. We believe that economic growth is the variable that best captures the evolution 
of the economic situation of a country12 . Additionally, other explanatory variables will be 
included in the speciﬁcation, such as ﬁscal variables: cyclically adjusted budget surplus 
and non-cyclically adjusted budget deﬁcit. 
8We propose a Probit model because the dependent variable (Political Alternation) is a binary variable. 
We also estimate a Logit and a Linear Probability Model (LPM) to check if the results are robust. 
9There is an alternative approach that measures political alternation at a leader level, as in Brender & 
Drazen (2008). 
10The complete deﬁnition of the variable is described in the Appendix (II. Variable Deﬁnitions). 
11The mean number of elections per country is only 11. 
12We have not used ”Disposable Personal Income” due to data unavailability for the sample period. 
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The econometric model is as follows: 
ReelectP arty = F (/0 + /1 ⇤ EconomicP erformance + u) (2.1) 
where, F is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the Standard Normal 
Distribution and u is the standard error term. 
Bayesian inference utilises prior probabilities and data to estimate the posterior prob­
ability of the model parameters (instead of a point estimate). In Bayesian econometrics, 
the parameters are random variables whose distribution is unknown. The researcher uses 
data and a subjective distribution of the parameters (prior distribution) and after the 
estimation an estimated distribution (posterior distribution) is obtained. 
The algorithm proposed for the estimation is a variant of the Monte Carlo algorithm. 
Monte Carlo simulation is repeated 200,000 times (trials) to trace out the distribution. 
After the estimation, we will have obtained 200.000 estimated values for /0 y /1, which  
allows us to calculate the estimated distributions (posterior distribution) of /0 y /1. 
Note that in a Probit model the parameters can not be directly interpreted as marginal 
e↵ects. Then now we need to propose a methodology to compute the marginal e↵ect of 
the explanatory variable, which we call ”sensitivity of political alternation to economic 
performance”. At this point, some possibilities arise. An easy way is computing the 
marginal e↵ect at the mean of the independent variable. The disadvantage of this option 
is that it only takes into account a part of the distribution. We consider that is better to 
measure the change in reelection probability when we increase the independent variable 
from the 20th percentile to the 80th percentile13 . This way we are considering a large part 
of the distribution (excluding both extremes). 
Once the posterior distributions of the sensitivities are obtained, we can calculate the 
following variables for each of the OECD countries: (1) the mean and median of the 
distribution, (2) the probability of the sensitivity being positive or negative and (3) the 
probability that the sensitivity is between two values. 
In the second phase of the study, we want to study the correlation between the ”sen­
sitivities of political alternation to economic performance” previously estimated and the 
”long run economic growth”. The correlation will be computed doing a simulation and 
generating random draws from the posterior distributions of the sensitivities. After that 
it will be easy to test the initial conjecture computing the probability of the correlation 
being negative. 
13The percentiles are computed using GDP growth data from each country. 
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2.5 Results
 
As we have argued previously, due to the small number of observations it is not advisable 
to use more than one explanatory variable at the same time. In this section several 
macroeconomic variables are proposed as independent variables: GDP growth (Section 
2.5.1) and ﬁscal variables (Section 2.5.2). 
2.5.1 Using GDP growth as a measure of economic performance. 
The evolution of the real per capita GDP growth may be a good indicator of the economic 
situation of a country. The aim is to compute the sensitivity of political alternation 
to economic growth for each country. To do that, the following econometric model is 
proposed: 
ReelectP arty = F (/0 + /1 ⇤ WGDPpcGrowth  + u) (2.2) 
where, F is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the Standard Normal 
Distribution and the variable u is the standard error term. 
Next, a brief overview of the variables is presented: 
ReelectParty: Dummy variable that measures political alternation14 . 
WGDPpcGrowth: The weighted average of real per capita GDP growth over the 
term in ofce. The weighting factor is a discount rate that gives more weight to the growth 
data closer to the election. The introduction of this discount rate would be justiﬁed by 
the myopia of voters. There is evidence that voters (or at least most of them) would have 
a short time horizon (see Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000, Paldam and Nannestad, 2000 & 
Healy & Lenz, 2014). The formula is as follows (Hibbs, 2000): 
n n
GDP pcW eighted = 
X 
>i ⇤ DGDP_i ⇤ (1/ 
X 
>i) (2.3) 
i=1 i=1 
where, DGDP0 is the real GDP per capita growth in the month in which the election 
was held; n is the number of months of the term in ofce; GDP_n is the real GDP per 
capita growth in the ﬁrst month of the term in ofce; > is the discount rate (> = 0.9515). 
In order to estimate the econometric model, two alternatives are proposed (Model 1 and 
Model 2). Both are Probit models, include a discount factor for the explanatory variable 
and they are estimated using MC algorithm. The only di↵erent is the window chosen for 
the independent variable. In Model 1, the variable WGDPpcGrowth is computed using 
the last 36 months of the legislature, while in Model 2 only the last 24 months are taken 
into account. 
14Detailed deﬁnition is shown in the Appendix.
 
15Exogenous value taken from Hibbs (2000) and Herna´ndez (2017c).
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Table 2.1: Estimating the sensitivity of Political Alternation to Economic Growth 
Model 1 Model 2 
Functional Form Probit Probit 
Dependent Var. ReelectParty ReelectParty 
Independent Var. WGDPpcGrowth WGDPpcGrowth 
Windowa Last 36 months Last 24 months 
Discount Rate > = 0.95 > = 0.95 
Technique Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) 
aMonths used to compute WGDPpcGrowth. 
As an example, Figure 2.1 shows the posterior probability distribution of the sensitivity 
of the political alternation to economic growth for the United Kingdom (Model 1). Note 
that Bayesian provides posterior probability distributions for the parameters instead of 
point estimates, as in classical frequentist models. In the case of the United Kingdom the 
median of the posterior distribution is equal to 0.105. This sensitivity can be interpreted 
as: ”if we increase the value of the variable WGDPpcGrowth from the 20th percentile to 
the 80th percentile, the probability of reelection increases by 10.5%”. At the same time, 
the probability of the marginal e↵ect of WGDPpcGrowth being positive is equal to 83%. 
Figure 2.1: Estimated Distribution Function of the Marginal E↵ect of WGDPpcGrowth 
(UK, Model 1) 
Median of the EDF: 0.105, Mean of the EDF: 0.1167
 
Prob(Marg. E↵ect of WGDPpcGrowth> 0) = 83%
 
Now we are able to estimate the ”sensitivity of political alternation to economic 
growth” for every OECD country. Table 2.2 shows the median value of the posterior 
distributions. There exist a great variation in the degree of economic voting across coun­
tries, as in Paldam (1991). Due to the small size of the sample, the sensitivity is only 
signiﬁcant for 6 countries. 
47 
Table 2.2: Bayesian inference of the sensitivities 
Country 
Model 1 Model 2 
Sensitivitya Sensitivity 
Median of the PDb P-valuec Median of the PD P-value 
Australia 0.059 0.61 0.033 0.56 
Austria -0.038 0.57 -0.124 0.68 
Belgium 0.004 0.51 -0.004 0.51 
Canada 0.216 0.77 0.182 0.71 
Chile -0.269 0.62 -0.263 0.63 
Czech Republic 0.481 0.77 0.512 0.77 
Germany 0.114 0.68 0.026 0.54 
Denmark 0.378* 0.92 0.358* 0.93 
Spain 0.364 0.88 0.370 0.85 
Finland 0.094 0.62 0.117 0.64 
France 0.462** 0.95 0.566** 0.97 
UK 0.105 0.83 0.156 0.69 
Greece 0.384** 0.95 0.412** 0.96 
Ireland 0.155 0.67 0.105 0.62 
Iceland 0.009 0.51 -0.025 0.53 
Israel 0.032 0.54 0.076 0.59 
Italy 0.419 0.93 0.295 0.87 
Japan 0.383** 0.95 0.391** 0.97 
Luxembourg 0.080 0.57 0.029 0.53 
Netherlands 0.305 0.86 0.319 0.86 
Norway 0.022 0.52 0.013 0.51 
New Zealand 0.385 0.89 0.312* 0.90 
Portugal 0.448* 0.93 0.339 0.86 
Sweden 0.422 0.89 0.369 0.88 
USA 0.539* 0.94 0.513** 0.95 
***Signiﬁcant at 1%, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% and * Signiﬁcant at 1%. 
aSensitivity of Political Alternation to Economic Growth, deﬁned as the change in reelection 
probability when we increase the independent variable from the 20th percentile to the 80th per­
centile. 
bPosterior Distribution. 
cDeﬁned as the probability of being positive (negative) if the median value is positive (negative). 
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Table 2.3 presents the average real per capita GDP growth for each OECD country 
during the period 1970-2015. The countries with higher growth rates are Ireland, Chile and 
Luxembourg. At the same time, the growth rates are specially volatile in Czech Republic, 
Greece and Chile. Additionally, the correlation between the long-term economic growth 
and the GDP level in 197016 is equal to -0.12, indicating that the process of convergence 
is not very intense during this period. 
Table 2.3: Real GDP per capita Growth (1970-2015) 
Country 
Real GDP per capita Growtha 
Average Rank. Standard Deviationsb Rank. CVc Rank. 
Australia 1.67 16 1.73 25 0.90 22 
Austria 2.00 10 1.98 22 0.82 24 
Belgium 1.80 14 2.07 19 0.91 21 
Canada 1.59 21 2.09 16 1.08 15 
Chile 2.72 2 4.42 1 1.66 3 
Czech Republic 1.64 18 3.91 3 2.28 1 
Denmark 1.46 22 2.35 13 1.24 10 
Finland 2.02 9 3.18 10 1.29 7 
France 1.62 20 1.93 24 0.90 23 
Germany 1.87 12 2.01 21 1.06 16 
Greece 1.17 25 4.41 2 1.91 2 
Iceland 2.37 4 3.82 5 1.49 4 
Ireland 3.47 1 3.45 8 0.98 20 
Israel 2.09 6 3.32 9 1.23 11 
Italy 1.45 23 2.68 12 1.27 9 
Japan 2.05 8 3.66 6 1.16 12 
Luxembourg 2.53 3 3.51 7 1.36 6 
Netherlands 1.65 17 2.17 15 1.03 18 
New Zealand 1.38 24 2.08 18 1.48 5 
Norway 2.30 5 1.95 23 0.78 25 
Portugal 2.06 7 3.83 4 1.28 8 
Spain 1.83 13 2.96 11 1.11 13 
Sweden 1.64 19 2.25 14 1.09 14 
UK 1.89 11 2.08 17 1.04 17 
USA 1.78 15 2.02 20 0.98 19 
aSource: Economic Outlook Database (OECD) 
bShort-term standard deviation 
cCV: Coe cient of Variation 
16Constant 2010 US. 
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Now, we can study the correlation between the sensitivity of PA to EP and long run 
economic growth. 
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between long-term GDP growth (x-axis) and sensi­
tivity of Political Alternation to Economic Growth (y-axis). The values of the sensitivities 
correspond to the median values of the posterior distribution estimated from model 117 . 
The values of the long-term GDP growth are taken from Table 2.3. The correlation is 
directly computed and is equal to -0.51, so is clearly negative. This procedure do not use 
all the posterior distributions, but only the median value. 
An alternative method to compute the correlation is to generate random draws from the 
posterior distributions of the sensitivities. The procedure is as follows. For each country, 
a random draw is generated from the posterior distribution of the sensitivities. Later, we 
compute the correlation between the sensitivities and long-term economic growth using 
values from Table 2.3. We repeat this process 200.000 times. Finally, we have calculated 
200.000 values for the correlation (posterior distribution). 
Figure 2.3 shows the posterior distribution for the correlation. The probability of the 
correlation being negative is 94%18, so it is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%. 
Figure 2.2: Correlation between ”Sensitivity” and ”long-run GDP Growth” (Model 1) 
17Results for Model 2 are presented in the Appendix (Figure 2.A6). 
18The probability is equal to 91% when model 2 is used. Result are shown in the Appendix (Figure 
2.A7). 
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of the correlation(Model 1) 
Median of the EDF: -0.2512, Mean of the EDF: -0.2482
 
Prob(corr<0)=94%
 
In Herna´ndez (2017c) several opportunistic political business cycles are identiﬁed. The 
economic growth decreases in the ﬁrst half of the legislature and begins to rise when 60% 
of the legislature has passed. The same shape (u-shaped) is observed both when the 
government is re-elected and when it is defeated. However, if we look at levels, it can be 
seen that the growth rate is higher when the government is reelected. 
In this part, we study the sensitivity of political alternation to the degree of convex­
ity/concavity of the political business cycle. Firstly, we use a quadratic function to adjust 
the political business cycle for each election of each country. Doing this exercise we ob­
tain three coefcients for each election: (1) a constant, (2) a linear parameter and (3) a 
quadratic term. Note that if the quadratic parameter is positive (negative), the adjusted 
curve is convex (concave). Figure 2.4 shows the quadratic adjustment for a given elec­
tion (convex path). Secondly, we used the 283 estimated quadratic terms (one for each 
election) to estimate the following model (Model 3) for each country: 
ReelectP arty = F (/0 + /1 ⇤ QuadraticGDP + u) (2.4) 
where QuadraticGDP is simply the quadratic term obtained when we use a quadratic 
function to adjust the political business cycle. 
At this point we have estimated the sensitivity of political alternation to the degree 
of convexity/concavity of the political business cycle for each country, so we can com­
pute the correlation between this sensitivity and long-term economic growth. Results 
are shown in Figure 2.5. It can be seen that the correlation is not very strong in this 
case. The probability of being negative is only 60%, what means that it is not statisti­
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cally signiﬁcant. There is no evidence that the sensitivity of political alternation to the 
degree of convexity/concavity of the political business cycle is correlated with long-term 
economic performance. This result are consistent with (Herna´ndez (2017c)) given that no 
di↵erences in the shape of the political business cycle were found between reelected and 
defeated incumbents. 
Figure 2.4: Quadratic adjustment of the GDP growth curve. 
Constant=2.45, linear=-0.33 , quadratic=0.04 
Figure 2.5: Histogram of the correlation (Model 3) 
Median of the EDF: -0.08, Mean of the EDF: -0.07
 
Prob(corr<0)=60%
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2.5.2 Using budget surplus as a measure of economic performance. 
Variations in public expenditure and taxation have a direct and immediate e↵ect on voters’ 
welfare. A few studies have identiﬁed political budget cycles, which can be an evidence of 
political manipulation. 
Alesina et. al (1992) observe evidence of ”political budget cycles” and ”political mon­
etary cycles” but they ﬁnd little evidence of pre-electoral e↵ects of economic outcomes, in 
particular on GDP growth and unemployment. This result is consistent with the notion 
that it is easy to manipulate policy instruments, while it is more difcult to control policy 
outcomes. 
Herna´ndez (2017c) studies OECD countries and identiﬁes several political budget cy­
cles. Moreover, a di↵erent path is observed depending on whether or not there is political 
alternation. When the government is re-elected the budget surplus increases at the begin­
ning and in the middle of the legislature and slightly decreases just before elections. In 
this case the path is concave (inverted-u shaped). On the contrary, for those elections in 
which political alternation takes place the budget surplus decreases during the ﬁrst half of 
the legislature and later the path is less clear (convex curve). Finally, di↵erences in levels 
are observed, the governments that are re-elected show in general a more balanced budget 
policy. 
The evolution of the ﬁscal variables can be considered as a measure of economic per­
formance, then voters can use this information when deciding their vote. In this part, we 
repeat the analysis performed in Section 2.5.1 but now using ﬁscal variables as a measure 
of economic performance. 
Firstly, we compute the sensitivity of political alternation to the mean level of budget 
surplus over the legislature using the following model19 . 
ReelectP arty = F (/0 + /1 ⇤ SurplusLevel) +  u) (2.5) 
where SurplusLevel is the mean value of the budget surplus throughout the legislature. 
Model 4 uses non-cyclically adjusted budget surplus and Model 5 uses cyclically adjusted 
budget surplus20 . 
Now we can compute the correlation between the estimated sensitivities and long­
term economic growth. Table 2.6 shows the results. In both models, it is obtained a 
statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation between long-term economic growth and the 
sensitivity of political alternation to the mean level of budget surplus over the legislature. 
There is evidence that in those countries where voters give more weight to ﬁscal policy, 
long-term economic performance is worse. A possible explanation is related to politicians’ 
career concerns literature. When voters value a good ﬁscal performance, politicians have 
incentive to manipulate ﬁscal variables in order to increase reelection prospects. 
19The number of elections included in the sample decrease until 201 due to ﬁscal data availability.
 
20Data is taken from Economic Outlook Database (OECD).
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Table 2.4: Estimating the sensitivity of Political Alternation to Fiscal Policy 
Model 4 Model 5 
Functional Form Probit Probit 
Dependent Var. ReelectParty ReelectParty 
Independent Var. Budget Surplus (level) CA Budget Surplus (level) 
Technique Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) 
Secondly, we compute the sensitivity of political alternation to the degree of convex­
ity/concavity of the political budget cycle, following the same methodology as in Section 
2.5.1. Firstly, we use a quadratic function to adjust the political budget cycle for each elec­
tion of each country, obtaining a constant, a linear term and a quadratic term. Secondly, 
we used the estimated quadratic terms (one for each election) to estimate the following 
reelection probability model: 
ReelectP arty = F (/0 + /1 ⇤ QuadraticSurplus + u) (2.6) 
where QuadraticGDP is simply the quadratic parameter obtained when we use a 
quadratic function to adjust the political budget cycle. 
As in the previous case, two models are proposed, whose characteristics are detailed 
in the Table 2.5. Model 6 uses non-cyclically adjusted budget surplus and Model 7 uses 
cyclically adjusted budget surplus. In both models, it is obtained a statistically signiﬁcant 
negative correlation between long-term economic growth and the sensitivity of political 
alternation to the degree of convexity/concavity of the budget surplus curve (Table 2.6). 
There is evidence that in those countries where voters reward concavity, long-term eco­
nomic performance is worse. The possible explanation is similar to the previous case. 
When a more concave political budget cycle increases the probability of reelection, politi­
cians have incentive to manipulate ﬁscal variables in order to increase reelection prospects. 
Table 2.5: Estimating the sensitivity of Political Alternation to the degree of convex­
ity/concavity of the political budget cycle 
Model 6 Model 7 
Functional Form Probit Probit 
Dependent Var. ReelectParty ReelectParty 
Independent Var. Budget Surplus (quadratic) CA Budget Surplus (quadratic) 
Technique Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) 
Table 2.6: Correlation between economic voting and long-term economic growth 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Probability of the 
correlation being negative 
0.88 0.90 0.985 0.91 
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2.6 Robustness Analysis 
In this section we examine the robustness of these ﬁndings to various di↵erent speciﬁca­
tions. For simplicity, we only focus on Model 1. 
Firstly, we test the robustness of the model against changes in the functional form. 
Model 8 proposes the estimation of a Logit model instead of a Probit model. Everything 
else remain exactly the same as in Model 1. At the same time, Model 9 proposes the 
Linear Probability Model (LPM). The probability of the correlation between sensitivity 
of political alternation to GDP growth and long-term GDP growth being negative is 
presented in Table 2.7 (last row). It can be observed that results are not altered when we 
modify the functional form of the model. The correlation continues being negative and 
statistically signiﬁcant. 
Table 2.7: Part I: Changing the functional form 
Model 8 Model 9 
Functional Form Logit LPM 
Dependent Var. ReelectParty ReelectParty 
Independent Var. WGDPpcGrowth WGDPpcGrowth 
Window Last 36 months Last 36 months 
Discount Rate > = 0.95 > = 0.95 
Estimation Method Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) 
Prob. of Corr<0a 0.96 0.93 
aProbability of the correlation between sensitivity of political alternation to GDP growth and long-term 
GDP growth being negative. 
Secondly, we test the robustness of the model when we modify the window used to 
compute the weighted average of the GDP growth. In Model 10, we compute the weighted 
average of GDP growth considering only the last 12 months. In Model 11 the entire 
legislature is used. The correlation continues being negative in both models, but in Model 
11 the correlation is not statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, although it is very close. 
Table 2.8: Part II: Modifying the window for WGDPpcGrowth. 
Model 10 Model 11 
Functional Form Probit Probit 
Dependent Var. ReelectParty ReelectParty 
Independent Var. WGDPpcGrowth WGDPpcGrowth 
Window Last 12months The entire legislature 
Discount Rate > = 0.95 > = 0.95 
Estimation Method Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) 
Prob. of Corr<0a 0.92 0.89 
aProbability of the correlation between sensitivity of political alternation to GDP growth and long-term 
GDP growth being negative. 
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Thirdly, we test the robustness of the model against changes in the estimation meth­
ods. We estimate the model using maximum likelihood (ML) method instead of bayesian 
methods (Model 12). In this case, we obtain point estimates for the sensitivities. The cor­
relation is equal to -0.42. There is evidence that the correlation is negative (the conﬁdent 
interval do not include the zero and the p-value is equal to 0.08). 
Table 2.9: Part III: Changing the estimation method 
Model 12 
Functional Form Probit 
Dependent Var. ReelectParty 
Independent Var. WGDPpcGrowth 
Window Last 36 months 
Discount Rate > = 0.95 
Estimation Method Maximum Likelihood 
Correlationa -0.42* 
p-valueb 0.08 
aCorrelation between sensitivity of political alternation to GDP growth and long-term GDP growth 
bIn this case, p-value is reported. 
Finally, we test the robustness of the model against changes in the deﬁnition of political 
alternation (Model 13). As an alternative deﬁnition, we use the variable proposed in 
Brender & Drazen (2008), that is ReelectLeader. Both deﬁnitions are di↵erent about 15% 
of the elections. It can be observed that the probability of the correlation being negative 
is almost the same (0.92 instead of 0.94). 
Table 2.10: Part IV: Changing the deﬁnition of political alternation 
Model 13 
Functional Form Logit 
Dependent Var. ReelectLeader 
Independent Var. WGDPpcGrowth 
Window Last 36 months 
Discount Rate > = 0.95 
Estimation Method Bayesian Methods (MC algorithm) 
Prob. of Corr<0a 0.92 
aProbability of the correlation between sensitivity of political alternation to GDP growth and long-term 
GDP growth being negative. 
After performing the robustness analysis we can conclude that ﬁndings are not sensitive 
against changes in the functional form, in the estimation method, in the months used to 
compute WGDPpcGrowth and in the deﬁnition of political alternation. The probability 
of the correlation being negative ranges from 89% to 96%, then it is quite stable. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
This paper studies the relationship between the economic determinants of political alter­
nation and long-term economic growth in OECD countries (1975-2015). We are interested 
in whether politicians’ career concerns can inﬂuence long-term welfare. 
Firstly, the sensitivity of political alternation to economic growth is estimated for each 
of the OECD countries using bayesian methods (MC algorithm). Regression outputs show 
a large heterogeneity between countries. It is observed that for some countries an increase 
in the GDP per capita growth over the legislature (80th percentile instead of the 20th 
percentile) increases the probability of reelection by 50%, while for other countries the 
e↵ect is almost zero. 
Secondly, a statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation between this sensitivity and 
the long-run economic growth is observed. These empirical results represent support for 
theoretical models that maintain that the politicians’ career concerns (incentive structure) 
have an impact on the functioning of the institutions, a↵ecting the long-term welfare. 
Under the presence of strong economic voting, politicians are only concerned with the 
evolution of the economy in the short term (long-term bias), so they try to manipulate 
macroeconomic variables generating distortions and neglecting long-term policies. 
Thirdly, the previous analysis is repeated focusing this time on ﬁscal variables. In this 
case, there is also a negative correlation between the sensitivity of political alternation 
to ﬁscal policy and long-term growth. Speciﬁcally, those countries where voters reward a 
more balanced ﬁscal policy face lower long-run economic growth in average. Additionally, 
it is also observed that those countries where voters reward a more concave political budget 
cycle face lower long-run economic growth. Again politician incentives a↵ect long-term 
welfare. 
Finally, robustness tests indicate that ﬁndings are robust against changes in the func­
tional form, in the estimation method, in the months used to compute the variable 
”WGDPpcGrowth” and in the deﬁnition of political alternation. 
57
 
2.8 References
 
Aisen, A., & Veiga, F. J. (2013). How does political instability a↵ect economic growth?. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 29, 151-167. 
Alesina, A., Cohen, G. D., & Roubini, N. (1992). Macroeconomic policy and 
elections in OECD democracies. Economics Politics, 4(1), 1-30. 
Alesina, A., Ozler, S., Roubini, N., & Swagel, P. (1996). Political instability and 
economic growth. Journal of Economic growth, 1(2), 189-211. 
Alesina, A., Carloni, D., & Lecce, G. (2012). The electoral consequences of large 
ﬁscal adjustments. In Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis (pp. 531-570). University of 
Chicago Press. 
Baldwin, S. A., & Fellingham, G. W. (2013). Bayesian methods for the analysis 
of small sample multilevel data with a complex variance structure.Psychological meth­
ods,18(2), 151. 
Barro, R. J. (1996). Determinants of economic growth: a cross-country empirical study 
(No. w5698). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Gro↵, A., Keefer, P., & Walsh, P. (2001). New tools in 
comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions. the world bank 
economic review, 15(1), 165-176. 
Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, (1995). ”Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-
Setting, and Yardstick Competition,” American Economic Review, American Economic 
Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March. 
Bonﬁglioli, A., & Gancia, G. (2013). Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political 
myopia. The Economic Journal, 123(568), 373-400. 
Brender, Adi, & Allan Drazen. (2008). ”How Do Budget Deﬁcits and Economic 
Growth A↵ect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries.” Ameri­
can Economic Review, 98(5): 2203-20. 
Celentani, M, & Conde-Ruiz J. I. (2008). ”Politicians career concerns with political 
uncertainty”. Working paper. 
Doppelhofer, G., Miller, R. I., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (2000). Determinants of long­
term growth: A Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) approach. (No. w7750). 
National bureau of economic research. 
Doron, J., & Gaudreau, P. 2014. A point-by-point analysis of performance in a 
fencing match: Psychological processes associated with winning and losing streaks.Journal 
of Sport and Exercise Psychology,36(1), 3-13. 
Fair, R. C. (1978). The e↵ect of economic events on votes for president. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 159-173. 
58
 
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991). 
Political and monetary institutions and public ﬁnancial policies in the industrial countries. 
Economic policy, 342-392. 
Healy, A., & Lenz, G. S. (2014). Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters 
Respond Primarily to the ElectionYear Economy. American Journal of Political Science, 
58(1), 31-47. 
Herna´ndez, V. (2017c). Economic Determinants of Political Alternation: A Panel Data 
Analysis of OECD Countries. Working Paper. 
Hibbs, Douglas A, Jr, 2000. ” Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections,” 
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 149-80, July. 
Hibbs, D. A. (2005). Voting and the Macroeconomy. Centrum fr forskning om o↵entlig 
sektor (CEFOS). 
Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Paldam, M. 2000. Economic voting: an introduction. Electoral 
Studies, 19: 113-21. 
Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Stegmaier, M. 2000. Economic determinants of electoral out­
comes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3: 183-219. 
Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2010). Polity IV Data Series Version 
2010. College Park, MD: University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://www. systemic­
peace. org/polity/polity4. htm. 
McNeish, D. (2010). On using Bayesian methods to address small sample prob­
lems.Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal,23(5), 750-773. 
Paldam, M. (1991). How robust is the vote function? A study of seventeen nations over 
four decades. Economics and politics: the calculus of support, 9-31. 
Paldam, M., & Nannestad, P. (2000). What do voters know about the economy?: A 
study of Danish data, 19901993. Electoral Studies, 19(2), 363-391. 
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2000). Political economics: explaining public policy. 
59
 
2.9 Statistical Appendix 
A. Additional Tables 
Table 2.A11: Detailed sample 
Country Elections in the Sample Re-election / Total 
Australia 
1972(0), 1974(1), 1975(0), 1977(1), 1980(1), 1983(0), 1984(1), 1987(1), 1990(1), 1993(1), 1996(0) 
1998(1), 2001(1), 2004(1), 2007(0), 2010(1), 2013(0) 
11/17 
Austria 
1971(1), 1975(1), 1979(1), 1983(1), 1986(0), 1990(1), 1994(1), 1995(1), 1999(0), 2002(1), 2006(0) 
2008(1), 2013(1) 
10/13 
Belgium 
1971(1), 1977(0), 1978(1), 1981(0), 1985(1), 1987(0), 1991(1), 1995(1), 1999(0), 2003(1), 2007(0) 
2010(1), 2014(0) 
7/13 
Canada 
1972(1), 1974(1), 1979(0), 1980(0), 1984(0), 1988(1), 1993(0), 1997(1), 2000(1), 2004(1), 2006(0) 
2008(1), 2011(1), 2015(0) 
8/14 
Chile 1993(0), 2000(1), 2005(1), 2009(0), 2013(0) 2/5 
Czech Rep. 1996(1), 1998(0), 2002(1), 2006(0), 2010(0), 2013(0) 2/6 
Germany 1976(1), 1980(1), 1987(1), 1990(1), 1994(1), 1998(0), 2002(1), 2005(0), 2009(1), 2013(1) 8/10 
Denmark 
1971(0), 1975(0), 1977(1), 1979(1), 1981(1), 1984(1), 1987(1), 1988(1), 1990(1), 1994(1), 1998(1) 
2001(0), 2005(1), 2007(1), 2011(0), 2015(0) 
11/15 
Spain 1979(19, 1982(0), 1986(1), 1989(1), 1993(1), 1996(0), 2000(1), 2004(0), 2008(1), 2011(0) 6/10 
Finland 1975(0), 1979(1), 1983(1), 1987(0), 1991(0), 1995(0), 1999(1), 2003(1), 2007(0), 2011(1), 2015(0) 5/11 
France 1973(1), 1978(1), 1981(0), 1986(0), 1988(0), 1993(0), 1997(0), 2002(0), 2007(1), 2012(0) 3/10 
UK 1974(0), 1979(0), 1983(1), 1987(1), 1992(1), 1997(0), 2001(1), 2005(1), 2010(0), 2015(1) 6/10 
Greece 1977(1), 1981(0), 1985(19, 1993(0), 1996(19, 2000(1), 2004(0), 2007(1), 2009(0), 2012(0), 2015(0) 5/11 
Ireland 1977(0), 1981(0), 1982(1), 1987(0), 1989(1), 1992(1), 1997(0), 2002(1), 2007(1), 2011(0) 5/10 
Iceland 
1974(0), 1978(0), 1979(0), 1983(1), 1987(1), 1991(0), 1995(1), 1999(1), 2003(1), 2007(1), 2009(0) 
2013(0) 
6/12 
Israel 
1977(0), 1981(1), 1984(0), 1988(1), 1992(0), 1996(0), 1999(0), 2001(1), 2003(1), 2009(0), 2013(0) 
2015(1) 
5/12 
Italy 1972(1), 1976(1), 1979(1), 1983(1), 1987(1), 1992(1), 1996(0), 2001(0), 2006(0), 2008(0), 2013(0) 6/11 
Japan 
1972(1), 1976(1), 1979(1), 1983(1), 1986(1), 1990(1), 1993(0), 2000(1), 2003(1), 2005(1), 2009(0) 
2012(0), 2014(1) 
11/14 
Luxembourg 1974(0), 1979(0), 1984(1), 1989(1), 1994(1), 1999(1), 2004(1), 2009(1), 2013(0) 6/9 
Netherlands 
1971(1), 1977(0), 1981(1), 1982(1), 1986(1), 1989(1), 1994(0), 1998(1), 2002(1), 2003(0), 2006(1) 
2010(0), 2012(1) 
9/13 
Norway 1977(1), 1981(0), 1985(1), 1989(0), 1993(1), 1997(0), 2001(1), 2005(0), 2009(1) 5/9 
New Zealand 
1981(1), 1984(0), 1987(1), 1990(0), 1993(1), 1996(1), 1999(0), 2002(1), 2005(1), 2008(0), 2011(1) 
2014(1) 
8/12 
Portugal 
1980(0), 1983(0), 1985(0), 1987(1), 1991(1), 1995(0), 1999(1), 2002(0), 2005(0), 2009(1), 2011(0) 
2015(0) 
4/12 
Sweden 
1973(1), 1976(0), 1979(0), 1982(0), 1985(1), 1988(1), 1991(0), 1994(0), 1998(1), 2002(1), 2006(0) 
2010(1), 2014(0) 
6/13 
USA 1972(1), 1976(0), 1980(0), 1984(1), 1988(1), 1992(0), 1996(1), 2000(0), 2004(1), 2008(0), 2012(1) 
TOTAL 158/284 
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Table 2.A12: List of excluded countries 
Country Excluded electionsa Available elections 
Estonia 1990 (ﬁrst), 1992 (data), 1995 (data) 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 
Hungary 1990 (ﬁrst), 1994 (data) 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 
Latvia 1990 (ﬁrst), 1993 (data), 1995 (data) 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2011 
Mexico 
1976 (demo), 1982 (demo), 1988 (demo), 
1994 (demo) 
2000, 2006, 2012 
Poland 1990 (ﬁrst) 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 
Slovakia 1990 (ﬁrst), 1992 (data), 1994 (data) 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012 
Slovenia 1990 (ﬁrst), 1992 (data), 1996 (data) 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2014 
South Korea 
1978 (demo), 1979 (demo), 1980 (demo), 
1981 (demo), 1987 (ﬁrst) 
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012 
Switzerlandb - -
Turkeyc - -
aExclusion reasons: (1) ﬁrst democratic election (ﬁrst), (2) the ”Polity Democracy Index” indicates lack of democracy 
(demo) and (3) data inavailability (data). 
bExcluded due to its complex executive power. 
cExcluded because of its low per capita income. 
Figure 2.A6: Correlation between ”Sensitivity” and ”long-run GDP Growth” (Model 2) 
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Figure 2.A7: Histogram of the correlation (Model 2) 
Median of the EDF: -0.2512, Mean of the EDF: -0.2482
 
Prob(corr<0)=90%
 
B. Databases 
•	 Database of Political Institutions (DPI), World Bank. 
•	 International Financial Statistics (IFS9, International Monetary Fund. 
•	 World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank. 
•	 Political Finance Database, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
•	 Polity IV, University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Con­
ﬂict Management. 
•	 Economic Outlook Database (OCDE). 
•	 World Economic Outlook (WEO), International Monetary Fund. 
•	 A Historical Public Debt Database, International Monetary Fund. 
•	 World Political Leaders, Za´rate’s Political Collections 
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C. Variable Deﬁnitions 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ReelectParty. 
The deﬁnition is as follows: 
a) Case 1: The old and the new government are formed by a single party. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the incumbent party wins the elections 
-ReelectParty=0 if the incumbent party is defeated 
b) Case 2: The old government was formed by a single party and the new government is formed 
by a coalition of parties. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the incumbent party is member of the coalition formed after the elections 
and has more than 60% of the seats in the new coalition. 
-ReelectParty=0 otherwise 
c) Case 3: The old government was formed by a coalition of parties and the new government is 
formed by a single party. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the winning party was part of the ruling coalition before the election and 
had more than 60% of the seats. 
-ReelectParty=0 otherwise 
d) Case 4: The old and new government are formed by a coalition of parties. 
-ReelectParty=1 if the parties that were members of the previous coalition have more than 
60% of the seats in the new coalition and the parties who are members of the new coalition had 
more than 60% of the seats in the previous coalition 
-ReelectParty=0 otherwise 
SOURCES: The variable ”ReelectParty” is constructed from ”Database of Political Insti­
tutions” (DPI). This database provides annual data for the period 1975-2015 (updated January 
2017). We used the following DPI variables: 
•	 SYSTEM: Parliamentary (2), Assembly-elected President (1), Presidential (0) 21 
•	 TOTALSEATS: total seats of the parliament. 
•	 To identify when presidential/parliamentary elections were held: LEGELEC: 1 if there was 
a parliamentary election in this year (for parliamentary countries), DATELEG: month when 
parliamentary elections were held, EXELEC: 1 if there was a presidential election in this 
year (for presidential countries), DATEEXEC: month when presidential elections were held. 
•	 To identify the largest government party each year: GOV1ME (name of the party), GOV1SEAT 
(seats) 
•	 To identify the 2nd government party: GOV2ME (name of the party), GOV2SEAT (seats) 
21There are only three presidential countries in the sample (USA, France & Mexico) 
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•	 To identify the 3rd government party: GOV3ME (name of the party), GOV3SEAT (seats) 
•	 To identify other government parties: GOVOTH (number of parties), GOVOTHST (total 
seats) 
•	 To identify the largest opposition party each year: OPP1ME (name of the party), OPP1SEAT 
(seats) 
•	 To identify the 2nd opposition party: OPP2ME (name of the party), OPP2SEAT (seats) 
•	 To identify the 3rd opposition party: OPP3ME (name of the party), OPP3SEAT (seats) 
•	 To identify other opposition parties: OPPOTH (name of the party), OPPOTHST (seats) 
WGDPpcGrowth 
The deﬁnition is as follows: 
-WGDPpcGrowth: Weighted real per capita GDP growth rate over the legislature. 
n	 n
WGDPpcGrowth  = 
X 
>i ⇤ DGDP _i ⇤ (1/ 
X 
>i) (2.7) 
i=1	 i=1 
where, DGDP0 is the real GDP per capita growth in the month in which the election 
was held; n is the number of months of the term in ofce; GDP _n is the real GDP per 
capita growth in the ﬁrst month of the term in ofce; > is the discount rate (monthly) 
EXAMPLE: USA (2012 presidential election) 
-Date (2008 election): November 4, 2008 
-Date (2012 election): November 6, 2012 
-Duration of the term in ofce: 47 months (excluding November 2008 & November 2012) 
Table 2.A13: Example: USA Presidential Election (2012) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
GDPpcGrowth -9.7% -6.1% -1.2% 0.6% 3.2% 1.5% 1.4% 1.9% 1.6% -0.6% 1.7% 0.4% 3.2% 1.1% 0.4% 2.2% -0.5% 
Number of months 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 47 
Table 2.A14: Values of DGDP_i 
DGDP_47 DGDP_46 DGDP_45 DGDP_44 DGDP_43 ... DGDP_5 DGDP_4 DGDP_3 DGDP_2 DGDP_1 
Value -9.7% -6.1% -6.1% -6.1% -1.2% - 0.4% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% -0.5% 
Month Dec-2008 Jan-2009 Feb-2009 Mar-2009 Apr-2009 Jun-2012 Jul-2012 Aug-2012 Sep-2012 Oct-2012 
OTHER VARIABLES: Democracy 
-Democracy: Dummy variable that measures the existence of democracy. This variable 
is equal to 1 if the polity2 variable (Polity IV database) is positive and is equal to 0 
otherwise. 
SOURCES: The variable ”Democracy” is constructed from ”Polity IV Database” (Uni­
versity of Maryland). 
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Outcomes 
Vı´ctor Herna´ndez Garc´ıa
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Resumen en Castellano 
El principal objetivo de este estudio es proponer un algoritmo que utiliza datos proce­
dentes de los mercados predictivos para predecir los resultados de los partidos de fu´tbol. 
Los mercados predictivos son un campo de pruebas adecuado para testar la validez de 
nuevas te´cnicas estad´ısticas, ya que todos los participantes observan la informacio´n en 
tiempo real y con pocas asimetr´ıas, lo eventos tienen una fecha clara de terminacio´n y el 
resultado no esta inﬂuido por la propia actividad de los mercados, como si sucede en el 
mundo de las ﬁnanzas. En este trabajo, se propone un modelo de Poisson con intensidad 
constante en el tiempo y se utilizan datos de Betfair Exchange. Al mismo tiempo, varios 
me´todos de estimacio´n son propuestos: OLS, OLS ponderado y modelos bayesianos jer­
arquizados. La capacidad de prediccio´n de los modelos es evaluada utilizando la medida 
De Finetti, que es deﬁnida por la distancia eucl´ıdea entre la prediccio´n y la realizacio´n. 
Los resultados indican que el modelo propuesto tiene muy buenas capacidades predictivas, 
siendo capaz de vencer a las predicciones de los mercados, salvo en las u´ltimas jornadas del 
campeonato. Al mismo tiempo, presenta mejores resultados que los modelos tradicionales 
en la literatura, los cu´ales se basan en resultados pasados. Por lo tanto, es posible concluir 
que el uso de informacio´n de los mercados predictivos permite obtener estimaciones ma´s 
precisas de las distribuciones de probabilidad de los eventos futuros. 
Palabras clave: Prediccio´n, Mercados Predictivos, Me´todos Bayesianos, MCMC 
JEL classiﬁcation: C5 C6 D4 D8 
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Abstract 
The main objective of this study is to develop a market-based forecasting algo­
rithm for predicting soccer outcomes. A football model with defensive and o↵ensive 
parameters is estimated using information from prediction markets (Betfair Exchange 
Market). Prediction markets are an interesting testing ground to test the validity of 
new statistical techniques, since all participating agents observe the relevant infor­
mation without asymmetries, the events have a clear completion date and the ﬁnal 
outcome is not inﬂuenced by market activity. A time-homogeneous independent Pois­
son model is estimated applying the following techniques: OLS, Weighted OLS and 
hierarchical bayesian methods. The prediction capability of the proposed methodol­
ogy is tested using ”De Finetti” measure, which is deﬁned as the Euclidean distance 
between the prediction and the realisation. The results obtained indicate that the 
models have good predictive properties, being able to improve market predictions, 
except in the last weeks of the season. Moreover, they also generate better predic­
tions than models based on past performance. So, it can be concluded that the use 
of information from prediction markets can lead to more accurate estimates of the 
probability distribution of future events. 
Keywords: Forecasting, Prediction Markets, Bayesian Methods, MCMC 
JEL classiﬁcation: C5 C6 D4 D8 
⇤I thank Jose´ Ignacio Conde Ruiz and Marco Celentani for their help and support. I gratefully acknowl­
edge the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology from grants ECO2011-30323-C03-01 
& BES-2012-061597..  
†E-mail: victorhzgarcia@gmail.com 
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3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this study is to propose a market-based methodology for predicting 
the outcome of future events. High-frequency data from prediction markets are used 
as primary information. A prediction market is created for the purpose of trading the 
outcome of events, so equilibrium prices can be interpreted as the market belief about 
the probability of the di↵erent events. In these markets, the payo↵ is a binary option, 
in other words, agents get a ﬁxed amount of money or nothing at all. Some examples 
of prediction markets are: futures markets, stock markets, political markets and (sport) 
betting markets. 
Our initial hypothesis is that the use of information from prediction markets can 
improve the prediction capability of the models. Then we will examine whether prediction 
markets data can provide useful information about the probability distribution of future 
events. 
In this work, we focus on sport betting markets instead of ﬁnancial markets mainly for 
the following reasons. Firstly, the events have a clear completion date and the outcome 
is perfectly observed by all agents. Unlike ﬁnancial markets, in betting markets the ﬁnal 
outcome is not inﬂuenced by market activity and all participating agents observe the 
relevant information without asymmetries. Finally, betting markets are easily accesible 
and have a large volume of transactions. For the reasons given before, betting markets are 
an interesting testing ground to test the validity of new models and statistical techniques. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of the models proposed so far in the sport economics 
literature have used information from these markets. 
While we will use the Spanish Football League (LIGA) data as an illustrative example, 
the main goal of this paper is to lay out the methodology to systematically carry out 
inference from predictive markets data. This framework could be applied to a variety of 
structural models, sports and data sets. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, in Section 3.2, a review of 
the sport economics literature is presented. In Section 3.3, we describe our database, which 
include high-frequency betting data from Betfair Exchange. In section 3.4, we introduce 
and justify the ﬁve assumptions we will use to develop the models. On the one hand, 
we just incorporate some of the classical assumptions used in the literature, such as time­
homogeneous Poisson and independence assumptions. On the other hand, we include some 
additional reﬁnements, proposing an hypothetical partitioning of goal scoring intensity and 
allowing for ﬂuctuations in team’s performance over the season. Section 3.5 describes the 
methodology and the models. Several estimation methods are proposed: (1) (weighted) 
OLS, (2) hierarchical bayesian model with normal random shocks and (3) hierarchical 
bayesian model with autoregressive shocks. In Section 3.6, these methods are applied to 
calculate predictions for single matches and to simulate Liga 2013-2014. The predictive 
power of the models, relative to Market predictions and models based on past performance, 
is tested using De Finetti measure. Finally, in Section 3.7, conclusions are presented. 
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3.2 Literature review
 
Most studies on ”modelling soccer data” are based only on ”historical outcomes”. Maher 
(1982) uses a poisson model for predicting football scores using past performance. An iter­
ative ML (Newton Raphson) is used to estimate the following parameters: home defense, 
home attack, away defense and away attack. Dixon & Coles (1997) proposes a poisson dy­
namic model that accounts for ﬂuctuations in performance of individual teams. The model 
gives relatively more weight to the most recent results. Karlis & Ntzoufras (2003) relaxes 
the independent assumption and use a bivariate poisson distribution to predict soccer and 
water-polo scores using a expectation-maximization algorithm. Brillinger (2008) applies a 
trinomial model in order to model win, draw and loss probabilities using the outcome re­
sults. Everson & Goldsmith-Pinkham (2008) proposes a bayesian hierarchical framework 
with Poisson additivity and home-ﬁeld advantages to predict goal scoring. Finally, Karlis 
& Ntzoufras (2009) has employed the Skellam’s distribution to model the goal di↵erence 
between home and away teams. 
Some studies incorporate more information to the models, apart from the scores of 
matches already played. Dyte & Clark (2000) presents a log-linear Poisson for predict­
ing the distribution of scores in international soccer matches taking the FIFA ratings as 
covariates. Bueno et al. (2010) proposes a bayesian methodology for predicting soccer 
outcomes based on experts’ opinions and past performance. Langseth (2013) extends the 
classical soccer models by taking a vast amount of data into account, including ﬁred shots, 
shots on target, etc. Then a data intensive forecasting model is used in order to beat the 
bookie. 
Several articles refer to betting markets when modelling soccer data. Dixon & Robinson 
(1998) proposes a two-dimensional birth process1 to investigate setting prices in the spread 
betting market. Their model exploits only each teams’ past goal scores and the goal times 
within each match. Kuypers (2010) introduces a model of bookmaker behaviour and look 
for proﬁtable opportunities in soccer betting markets using an Ordered Probit. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the proposed models use predictive 
markets (betting data) as input to estimate the models. When modelling the stochastic 
processes that determine the goals scored by the di↵erent teams, we think that competitive 
markets provide a more complete information than the ﬁnal scores that, after all, are a 
simple realisation of each stochastic process. The outcome of a particular match may 
depend greatly on the luck and not really on the quality of both teams. Therefore, the 
use of high-frequency information from predictive markets is the main contribution of this 
study to the literature. 
Finally, this article is also very related to Prediction Markets literature (See Wolfers 
& Zitzewitz, 2006 for a review), which has grown signiﬁcantly over the last years taking 
advantage of the availability of detailed data sets. 
1A birth-death process is a Markov process with only two types of state transitions: ”births” (state 
variable increases by one) and ”deaths” (state variable decreases by one). See Moller & Sorensen (1994). 
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3.3 Data. 
Betting markets have experienced a remarkably growth during the last decades principally 
due to deregulation, globalization and the emergence of online gambling. At present, ac­
cording to the price setting mechanism, two types of betting markets can be distinguished: 
betting exchanges and ﬁxed-odds markets. 
Functioning of betting exchanges is quite similar to ﬁnancial markets. In these mar­
kets, agents exchange odds in real time on sporting events and such transactions generate 
a competitive price at any given time. It is posible to buy and to sell an outcome, allow­
ing backing and laying strategies. Bookmakers are simply intermediaries who fulﬁl the 
mission of bringing the di↵erent agents into contact and they generate revenue charging 
commissions on net winnings. In some cases, bookmakers use betting exchanges to hedge 
liabilities. 
At the same time, in ﬁxed-odds markets, bookmakers set prices to maximize proﬁts 
and to achieve a balanced book. In this case, bookmakers o↵er odds and usually generate 
revenue by setting unfair odds (the sum of the implied probabilities is always greater than 
1). In this market, punters have to bet against the bookmaker. 
In this work, we only focus on betting Exchange for several reasons. Firstly, we are 
interested in competitive equilibrium prices because we are trying to take advantage of 
the market consensus. Secondly, odds are not altered by commissions as in the ﬁxed-odds 
market case. Thirdly, it is possible to monitor the behaviour of both sides of the market 
(back and lay). Finally, in betting exchanges there are no maximum bet limits. 
Below is a summary of the data (Table 3.1). Our dataset include fully time-stamped 
historical Betfair Exchange Market price data2 . The database covers all 380 matches of 
the Liga 2013-2014 and includes pre-play and in-play data for several markets (Match 
Odds3, Correct Score4, Over-Under betting, Half Time Score, Next Goal...). The Liga 
2013-2014 is the latest available, as in November 2014 Betfair updated the application 
for downloading data5 . The frequency is one observation per second and the following 
information is included for each selection: 
• Best three back odds and its volume. 
• Best three lay odds and its volume. 
• Last price matched. 
• Total matched (including both back and lay transactions). 
• The status of the market (active or suspended). 
• Timestamp. 
2The data was downloaded from www.fracsoft.com
 
3Match odds is a 3-way market where punters can bet either home, away or draw.
 
4Correct Score is a 17-way market where punters can bet on the correct score (0-0,1-0,0-1...)
 
5Betfair API 6.0
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics (Betfair Exchange) 
Match Odds Correct score Other markets a 
Total Mean Median Total Mean Median Total Mean Median 
Observations (Total) b 22.8 0.6 0.4 136.8 0.36 0.16 50 0.13 0.08 
Observations (Pre-play) 15.5 0.4 0.31 93 0.24 0.18 34 0.09 0.07 
Observations (In-play) 7.3 0.2 0.15 43.8 0.12 0.10 16 0.04 0.03 
Observations (Active) 20.1 0.53 0.52 126 0.33 0.33 45 0.11 0.12 
Total Matched c 802 2.1 0.5 106 0.28 0.19 76 0.2 0.2 
No. of matches 380 380 380 
aThey include: half time correct score, over/under markets, correct score away, correct score home, 
next goal and both teams to score. 
bThe data are expressed in millions of observations. 
cThe data are expressed in millions of euros. 
• Pre-play or in-play 
It can be observed that match odds markets are the most liquid ones, matching 2.1 
millions of euros per match on overage. At the same time, correct score markets rank 
in the second place, according to the number of bets placed, with 0.28 millions of euros 
per match on average. Finally, the rest of the markets are much less liquid, so in these 
markets competitive prices do not reveal much information. 
3.4 Model Assumptions. 
The objective of this section is to introduce the ﬁve assumptions we will used to develop 
the forecasting models. Before that, some notation is required. In a match between teams 
indexed i (home team) and j (away team), we deﬁne the following variables: 
• Let XH represents the goals scored by team i against team j, or equivalently, the i,j 
goals conceded by team j against team i. 
• Let XA i,j represents the goals conceded by team i against team j, or equivalently, the 
goals scored by team j against team i. 
3.4.1 The Poisson Assumption: 
Assuming Poisson distributions for home and away goals is a classical assumption in the 
literature for predicting football scores (Everson & Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2008; Bueno et 
al., 2010). The Poisson distribution is a member of the exponential family and is actually 
a limiting case of a Binomial distribution when the number of trials grows and the success 
probability tends to zero. In a Poisson distribution, interarrival times follow a exponential 
distribution. Poisson distribution has a number of advantages which explain its wide use 
in empirical works, among them its simplicity (it is speciﬁed only for one parameter) and 
analytical tractability. 
Before assuming the Poisson Assumption, some tests are carried out to check whether 
our data is well-approximated by a simple Poisson distribution. 
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Testing the Poisson Assumption: 
i) Variance/mean ratio test. One of the most important characteristic of the Pois­
son distribution is that the variance equals the mean. We can use this property to check 
the validity of the Poisson assumption. According to (Simono↵, 2013), a comparison of 
the sample mean and variance would provide a valid way to check the validity of the 
Poisson assumption, given the inﬂation of variance of the negative binomial and other 
mixed-Poisson distributions. Following the methodology described in Karlis & Ntzoufras 
(2000), we calculate the variance to mean ratio6 for all 20 Liga teams (Figure 3.1). Note 
that 90-degrees line correspond to Poisson distribution, while points above the line are 
indications of overdispersion relative to the Poisson distribution. It can be observed that 
12 of the 20 points (60%) are above the line, as their variance to mean ratio is greater 
than one7 . Graphically, it is not possible to detect any pattern of deviation. For instance, 
under a negative binomial distribution, the variance is a linear function of the mean. In 
the case of the Poisson Inverse Gaussian, the variance is a quadratic function of mean. 
Figure 3.1: Index of Dispersion (goal variance / goal mean) 
Now, using the estimations of the variance to mean ratios, we perform a test to check 
if there are evidence against the Poisson distribution. Under the null hypothesis (i.e. the 
data follow a Poisson distribution) we expect that half of the teams present underdispersion 
and the other half present overdispersion. Then we can compute a classical Proportion 
Test8 using this information. The conﬁdent interval includes 0.5 and p-value equals 0.37, 
so we can not reject the Poisson Assumption. 
6Also known as index of dispersion. 
7Karlis & Ntzoufras (2000) obtained a similar proportion. In their study the 58.1% of the teams showed 
overdispersion 
8In Stata, the command is prtest 
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ii) Rootogram. Everson & Goldsmith-Pinkham (2008) proposes an alternative ap­
proach to check the validity of the Poisson Assumption. Following the methodology de­
scribed in their article, we develop a Rootogram of Liga 2013-2014 goal scoring. Firstly, 
we compute the square roots of the counts of individual goals for the 380 matches played 
during Liga 2013-2014 (760 observations). Secondly, we compute the square roots of the 
expected Poisson counts for 760 draws from a theoretical Poisson distribution (with pa­
rameter equal to 1.357, i.e., the goal average during the season). Results are displayed 
using a Rootogram (Figure 3.2)9 . In general, we can conclude that our soccer data are 
consistent with a Poisson distribution, although there are slight deviations between both 
rootograms. On the one hand, there are slight evidence that the true goal distribution 
has more density at zero. Several studies (See Karlis & Ntzoufras (2003)) obtained the 
same conclusion, proposing the use of a zero-inﬂated poisson distributions instead of a 
Poisson distribution. At the same time, the actual count for seven goals is greater than 
the theoretical expected count. In both cases, deviations do not seem signiﬁcant. 
Figure 3.2: Rootogram 
After ruling several tests, it seems that the Poisson distribution is appropiate and ﬁts 
the data well. So, henceforth we assume that in each match home-team and away-team 
goals follow a Poisson distribution with parameters  H i,j , respectively.  i,j and  
A 
XH XAAssumption 1: i,j ⇠ Poisson( H ; i,j ⇠ Poisson( A (3.1) i,j ⇤ t) i,j ⇤ t) 
In the above expression t stands for ”match time”. This variable measure the percent­
age of the time10 elapsed from the beginning of the match and ranges from 0 (the start of 
the match) to 1 (the end of te match). Then in the middle of a match, t equals 0.5. 
9In the Appendix, results are shown using home and way team goal distribution (ﬁgures 3.A13 and 
3.A14), obtaining similar conclusions. 
10Given as a fraction of unity. 
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3.4.2 The Independence Assumption: 
The inclusion of this assumption greatly reduces the complexity of the models and reduces 
the computation times of the inference process. In the literature, the decision of including 
the assumption of independence when modelling soccer data is widely debated. On the one 
hand, some authors include this assumption (Keller (1994), Ridder et al. (1994), Everson 
& Goldsmith-Pinkham (2008), Suzuki et al. (2010)). On the other hand, other authors 
suggest the use of more ﬂexible models that allow to model possible dependencies. Maher 
(1982) suggests the Bivariate Poisson distribution. Dixon & Coles (1997) obtained that 
the assumption of independence between scores is reasonable (except for the scores 0-0, 1­
0, 0-1 and 1-1) and proposed a bivariate inﬂation distribution. Karlis & Ntzoufras (2000) 
found evidence in favour of the dependence of the two variables, although in magnitude is 
very small, and proposes a Negative Binomial model. 
The ”Pearson Chi-square” independence test is then carried out using the ﬁnal scores of 
the 380 matches corresponding to the League 2013-2014, in order to identify the existence 
of possible dependencies and to assess whether the assumption of independence is appro­
priate. The Pearson Chi-square test is able to check the association between two nominal 
(categorical) variables. The null hypothesis states that knowing the level of Variable X 
does not help you predict the level of Variable Y. That is, the variables are independent. 
At the same time, the alternative hypothesis is that knowing the level of Variable X can 
help you predict the level of Variable Y. Figure 3.3 presents a two-way contingency table 
for scores and the ”Pearson Chi-square” independence test: 
Figure 3.3: Pearson Chi-square test for independence 
The test ﬁnds no evidence against the assumption of independence between both vari­
ables (p-value is much greater than 0.05). In view of the results, from now on we apply 
the Independence Assumption: 
Assumption 2: i,j (t) ? i,j (t) i 6 (3.2) XH XA = j 
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3.4.3 Additive Stochastic Process Assumption: Composite Poisson. 
Additive Property of Poisson Distributions: Let N1(t) and N2(t) be two independent Pois­
son processes with parameters  1 and  2, respectively, and let N(t) =  N1(t) +  N2(t). It 
follows that N(t) is a Poisson process with parameters  1 +  2. 
Using the additive property, as in (Everson & Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2008), we propose 
a hypothetical partitioning (Assumption 3) to model both team total scores, XH (t) and i,j 
XA (t), as the sum of two independent poisson processes. Then we are assuming the i,j 
following Composite Poisson model: 
Home team (i) goals: 
XH i,j (t) =  O
H
i (t) +  D
A
j (t) (3.3) 
H
i
H
i• O↵ensive parameter (home team): O (t) ⇠ Poisson(✓ ⇤ t) 
A
j
A
j• Defensive parameter (away team): D (t) ⇠ Poisson(  ⇤ t) 
Away team (j) goals: 
XA j,i(t) =  O
A
j (t) +  D
H
i (t) (3.4) 
A
j
A
j ⇤ t)• O↵ensive parameter (away team): O (t) ⇠ Poisson(✓
H
i
H
i ⇤ t).• Defensive parameter (home team): D (t) ⇠ Poisson( 
Note that it is required, ✓Hi > 0,  

A
j
A
j
H
i> 0, ✓
 > 0 and   > 0.
 
We also assume: 
Applying Assumption 2, we get: 
H
i
A
jO
 (t) ? D (t) (3.5) 
A
j
H
iO
 (t) ? D (t) (3.6) 
O
Hi (t) ? DAj Aj (t) ? DHi (t) (3.7) (t) ? O
Applying the additive property of poisson distributions, we get the following equalities, 
which will greatly facilitate inference: 
 H = ✓i,j 
H
i +  

A
j (3.8)
 
 A = ✓i,j 
A
j +  

H
i (3.9)
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3.4.4 Time-homogeneous Poisson Process: 
There is strong evidence that the probability of a goal being scored steadily increases 
over the course of the match, perhaps because of tiredness of players (Dixon & Robinson 
(1998)). Figure 3.4 shows the sample cumulative distribution of goals (Liga 2013-2014). 
Figure 3.4: Sample cumulative % of goals by minute (LIGA 2013-2014) 
Nevertheless, in this study we assume, for simplicity, that the goal score intensity does 
not depend on the time11 . 
 H  AAssumption 4: i,j (t) =   
H
i,j 8t; i,j (t) =   A 8t (3.10) i,j 
3.4.5 Team quality: 
In the literature, there is an intense debate about how to model team quality ﬂuctuations. 
Some authors assume, generally for simplicity, that the team quality is constant over the 
season. At the same time, other studies allow quality ﬂuctuations. Dixon & Coles (1997) 
accounting for ﬂuctuations in performance of individual teams. Bueno et al. (2010) 
also assumes that team quality is continually evolving. In our case, we will use both 
assumptions depending on the models: 
Assumption 5. i: Parameters (o↵ensive and defensive) are constant over the season. 
This assumption is less realistic but simpliﬁes calculations and computation times. We 
will use this assumption in the models presented in section 3.5.2.1 (OLS estimation) and 
3.5.2.2 (Hierarchical Bayesian Model with random shocks). 
Assumption 5. ii: Parameters (o↵ensive and defensive) change throughout the season. 
This assumption is more ﬂexible and realistic, because it allows ﬂuctuations in ”the qual­
ity” of individual teams. This assumption will be used in section 3.5.2.3 (Hierarchical 
Bayesian Model with autoregressive shocks). 
11A reﬁnement is introduced in Hernandez (2017b) to adjust match time according to historical goal 
distribution. 
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3.5 Methodology. Parameter inference. 
In this section we deﬁne a methodology to estimate the o↵ensive and defensive parameters 
(quality indicators) of the di↵erent teams using information from prediction markets. 
Remember that for each team we need to estimate a total of four parameters: home 
attack, home defense, away attack and away defense: 
The inference process consists of two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, we use information 
from the betting markets to estimate the parameters ( 0s) that characterise the Poisson 
processes in each of the 380 games of the season. Since there are two stochastic processes 
in each match, one for each team, we need to obtain a total of 760 values. It should 
be noted that in the rest of studies, this phase does not call for any calculation, since 
historical results (or expert opinions) are directly used as primary information. In the 
second phase, the information collected in the ﬁrst phase is used to estimate the o↵ensive 
and defensive capacity of the teams (✓0s and  0s). 
.H .ˆA3.5.1 Step 1: Obtaining input data (ˆ i,j , i,j ) 
First, it is necessary to calculate the inverse of the betting odds in order to obtain a 
probability measure. It is easy to check that for any match the sum of the odds of the 
three possible outcomes (home win, draw or away win) is more than 1, indicating that 
odds are not fair 12 . Next, we proceed to normalise the odds, so that the sum is equal to 
1 (100%). 
At this point we can already estimate the parameters. In this part, we make use of: 
Assumption 1 (Poisson distribution), Assumption 2 (independence) and Assumption 3 
(Time-homogeneous Poisson distribution). We will also need the Probability Mass Func­
tion (PMF)13 for a Poisson distribution, deﬁned as: 
-  ke
P(k events in the interval) = (3.11) 
k! 
where   is the average number of events per interval and k takes values 0, 1, 2... 
If we apply this formula to the soccer context, at the beginning of a match the prob­
ability of observing a particular ﬁnal score (k,m) is deﬁned by the following joint mass 
probability function: 
-(XH 
P(team i scores k goals, team j scores m goals) = 
e ) -(X
A 
i,j (XH i,j )
k 
k! 
⇥ e 
)i,j (XA i,j )
m 
m! 
(3.12) 
where XH i,j are the goal scoring parameters of team i and j, respectively, when i,j and X
A 
playing at team i home. k takes values 0, 1, 2... and m takes values 0, 1, 2... 
12In fact, sample mean is about 1.018 
13Discrete equivalent of a pdf. 
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Notation: In every moment of a match, let w be the current home team score and q 
the current away team score. Let t be match time (% of total time elapsed). Let ⇥t beH 
the set of possible ﬁnal home team scores conditioned to the current score (at time t). 
Analogously, let ⇥t be the set of possible ﬁnal away team scores conditioned to the current A 
score (at time t). For example, if the score at time t is (w=1, q=2), ⇥t = [1, 2, ....,1] and H 
⇥t	 .H= [2, 3, ....,1]. Let ˆ i,j,t be the estimated goal scoring parameter of team i against A 
team j in time t. Let ˆ i,j,t be the estimated goal scoring parameter of team j against team .
A
 
t
i at time t. Let ai,j and bi,j 
t be the Betfair Exchange implied probability of draw and local 
victory at time t, respectively. 
Using the implicit probabilities of Betfair Exchange and the PMF formula, we can 
solve the following implicit system of equations14 for every observation15 of every match: 
Equation 1: 
JˆH	 JˆA i,j,t  ˆH i,j,t  ˆA-( 1 t ) i,j,t )(k-w) -( 1 t ) i,j,t )(m-q)e ( e (1-t	 1-t t ✓ [0,1]0 =  
X X	 
⇥  a t (3.13) i,j i=j=1,...,20(k  w)! (m q)!
k ✓ ⇥t m=k A m ✓ ⇥t
 H
 
Equation 2: 
JˆH	 JˆH i,j,t  ˆH	 i,j,t  ˆH 
e-( 1 t )( i,j,t )(k-w) e-( 1 t )( i,j,t )(m-q) 1-t 1-t t ✓ [0,1]0 =  
X X	 
⇥  bt (3.14) i,j i=j=1,...,20(k  w)! (m q)!
k ✓ ⇥t m<k A 
k ✓ ⇥t
 A
 
tThe system is perfectly identiﬁed, so every pair (a and bt ) identify one and only i,j i,j
 
.H .ˆA
one pair (ˆ i,j,t, i,j,t). Solving all the systems of equations, we ﬁnd the pair of unknown 
(.ˆH .ˆA i,j,t) for every second of every match, so we have a entire distribution for every i,j,t, 
match and every team (ranging from 5600 to 5800 depending of the match duration). 
.H .ˆAFrom  ˆt’s to  ˆ’s: Once we have estimated (ˆ i,j,t, i,j,t), 8 t ✓ [0,1], we have to ﬁnd the 
way to summarize all this information (the entire distribution) into a single value. Three 
possible methods are considered: 
•	 Value at the beginning of the match. A simple option is to use match odds at the 
beginning of the match. But, with this method we are losing information, because 
we are not considering the entire distribution. 
•	 Median value along all the match. A second option is to use the odds of the entire 
match and calculate the median value of the parameters. Its main advantage is that 
it collects information from the entire match. In turn, it has the disadvantage of 
being somewhat conditioned to the circumstances of the match, such as strategic 
playing, red cards, injuries, refereeing, etc. 
14We solve the implicit systems of equations using FSOLVE command in Matlab.
 
15The frequency is one observation per second.
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•	 The median value between the beginning of the match and 80th minute (truncated 
median). This is an intermediate option that excludes the ﬁnal minutes of the match, 
in which the strategic factor can be very signiﬁcant. 
In principle, there are reasons to consider that the last option is the most appropri­
ate one, since it presents certain advantages over the others, so it will be the measure 
used throughout the article. However, all other methods will be used as an indicator of 
robustness in order to verify that the conclusions are maintained. 
Finally, we have the input data (.ˆ .ˆ H A , i=j=1,...,20) that we were looking for. In the i,j , i,j 
next stage, we will use this information to estimate the models instead of past scores, FIFA 
rankings or experts’ opinions, the primary data normally used in the soccer literature. 
3.5.2 Step 2: Estimation Methods (Inference) 
The goal of this section is to estimate the four quality parameters: home attack, home de­
fense, away attack and away defense. Several estimation methods are introduced. Firstly, 
we use classical methods: ordinary least squares and weighted ordinary least squares. Sec­
ondly, hierarchical bayesian methods are used. Bayesian inference uses prior probability 
distributions and data to estimate the posterior probability distributions, rather than a 
point estimate, as in classical models. Below, econometric models are described: 
3.5.2.1 (Weighted) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Econometric model: 
.ˆ H Hi +  

A
j
H 
i,j 6= jHome team: = ✓
 i = j = 1, 2, ..., 20; i (3.15)
 + ui,j 
.ˆ A Aj +  

H
i
A 
i,j 6= jAway team: = ✓
 i = j = 1, 2, ..., 20; i (3.16)
 + ui,j 
First of all, we have to normalize two parameters, one from the home team equation and 
the other one from the away team equation. Otherwise, we will have multiple solutions, 
as shown below: 
Imagine we have estimated the eighty parameters without applying normalizations. 
Then (✓ˆHi ,
 ˆ
H
i ,
 ˆ✓
A
i ,
 ˆ
A
i , i=j=1,...,20) forms a solution to the OLS problem. Let r and s be 
any real constants. Now we can construct the following parametes: 
✓¯
Hi =
 ˆ✓
H
i + r; ó¯

A
j =
 ˆ
A
j r (3.17)
 
✓¯
Aj =
 ˆ✓
A
j + s; ó¯

H
i =
 ˆ
H
i s (3.18)
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✓H óˆH ✓ˆA óˆAThen, for any real values of s and r, (ˆ , , i , i , i=j=1,...,20) is also a solution i i 
for the problem. So, before estimating the model, we normalize two parameters (one from
 
each equation).
 
Two conditions are required in order to identify the model:
 
Condition 1: (Number of matches ⇥ 2) > Number of parameters (3.19) 
Then, we need at least four complete rounds (weeks). Remember that we have to 
estimate 78 parameters16 and a round has ten matches. So, it is not possible to estimate 
the model before ﬁfth round17 . 
Condition 2: Existence of a link between all teams. (3.20) 
Our goal, once the model is estimated, is to have a measure to compare the relative 
quality of any pair of teams. This relative quality can be revealed directly (from the 
games between both teams) or indirectly (from the games against common rivals). In any 
case, there must be a link between the two teams. Formally, let  i be a set including the 
following elements: the rivals that have faced the team i so far (in the present season), the 
rivals that have faced team i’s rivals so far and so on ad inﬁnitum. In order to guarantee 
model identiﬁcation, we require that, 8 i 6= j, at least one of the following conclusions is 
true: sets  i and  j have at least one element in common or team i faced team j. 
The following estimation methods are proposed: 
i) Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. In this case, all the matches weigh exactly 
the same. We are implicitly assuming Assumption 5.i, i.e, parameters are constant over 
the season. 
ii) Weighted Ordinary Least Square regression. We introduce a exponential discount 
factor ( ) in order to give more weight to recent data. This is a simplistic approach to 
allow ﬂuctuations in performance over the season (Assumption 5.ii). Relative weight (RW) 
between two di↵erent rounds, indexed x and z, is deﬁned as follows: 
 z 
RWx,z = (3.21) 
 x 
When choosing the value of  , there are two possibilities. On the one hand, we can 
take the estimated discount factor from previous studies. Dixon & Coles (1997) proposes 
an exponential weighting function   in order to give more value to recent information. On 
the other hand, an alternative approach is to introduced an endogenous discount rate in 
the model speciﬁcation. This way, the value of   is estimated simultaneously with the 
other model coe cients. 
In our study, we consider that the second approach is more convenient, because there 
are very few studies that apply weighted ordinary least squares in the context of modelling 
soccer data, so we have few references. 
16We have twenty teams, four parameters per team and we have to exclude the two normalized param­
eters. 
17Unless previous season games are used. 
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3.5.2.2	 Hierarchical Poisson-Bayesian Model with Normal random e↵ects pri­
ors and Uniform-Gamma hyperpriors (HBM 1). 
Below, a two-level hierarchical bayesian model is proposed to model soccer data. From 
now on, we refer to this model as HBM 1. Subscript i is for home teams (i=1,...,20), 
subscript j is for away teams (j=1,...,20) and subscript k is for matches (k=1,...,3818). 
Level 1 (Structural model). It contains the central part of the model. 
XH ,  A ⇠ Poisson((✓H +  A i = j = 1, 2, ..., 20; i 6= j (3.22) i,j	 | ✓iH j i j ) ⇤ t) 
XA j ,  
H ⇠ Poisson((✓A +  H ) ⇤ t) i = j = 1, 2, ..., 20; i 6 (3.23) = ji,j	 | ✓A i j I 
XH ,  A ? XA j ,  H i = j = 1, 2, ..., 20; i =6 j (3.24) i,j	 | ✓iH j i,j | ✓A i 
Note that the estructural model contain the following four assumptions: 
•	 Poisson Assumption (Assumption 1). Given defensive and o↵ensive parameters, goal 
scoring is modelled using a Poisson distribution. 
•	 Independence Assumption (Assumption 2). Both goal scoring processes are inde­
pendent. 
•	 Additive Poisson property (Assumption 3). We use this property to decompose the 
H	 Aglobal processes into two parts: = ✓H +  A and = ✓A +  H i,j i j i,j j i 
•	 Time homogeneous Poisson process (Assumption 4). 
Level 2 (Hierarchical Normal Random E↵ect priors). In this level, the parameters of the 
estructural model (✓’s and  ’s) are modelled. We are assuming Normal Random E↵ect 
priors for these parameters. Doing this, we are implicitly using the ”assumption Parame­
ters are constant over the season” (Section 4.5.1). Shocks are normally distributed19 and 
have zero mean. 
log(✓i
H ) =  ↵i + ✏i,k i = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.25) 
log(✓j
A) =  ⌧j + ✏j,k j = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.26) 
log( i
H ) =  ⇢i + ✏i,k i = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.27) 
log( i
H ) =  !j + ✏j,k i = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.28) 
✏i,k, ✏j,k ⇠ Normal(0, ) 8 1 < i  20; 1 < j   20; 0 < k   20 (3.29) 
18Every team plays 19 matches at home and 19 away. 
19We have also considered Gamma distributed random shocks, which are mathematically convenient 
(the gamma distribution is the conjugate prior distribution for poisson), but may be restrictive. 
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Hyperpriors distributions. Now we are deﬁning the priors (also known as hyperpriors) 
for the parameters of the level 2. Following the literature (Best et al., 2011), we use 
non-informative Uniform-Gamma hyperpriors. 
↵i ⇠ Uniform( inf, +inf) i = 1, 2, ...,  20 (3.30) 
⌧j ⇠ Uniform( inf, +inf) j = 1, 2, ...,  20 (3.31) 
⇢i ⇠ Uniform( inf, +inf) i = 1, 2, ...,  20 (3.32) 
!j ⇠ Uniform( inf, +inf) j = 1, 2, ...,  20 (3.33) 
  ⇠ Gamma(0.01, 0.00001) (3.34) 
Parameter inference: Once the model is described, the objective is to estimate the param­
eters (✓’s and  ’s). The bayesian estimation process is summarized below: 
1. Input Data: We  use  the  ˆ 0s we have estimated in Section 5.1 as input data. Then, 
we can use the following expressions in order to estimate the model: 
H.ˆi,j = ✓i
H +  j
A (3.35) 
ˆA = ✓A +  H . . (3.36) i,j j i 
2. Normalization: As in previous section, before estimating the model we normalize 
two parameters, one from each equation. 
3. Estimation algorithm: Closed form bayesian estimation is not possible in this 
case. A Gibbs Sampler algorithm is proposed20 . This algorithm is a variant of Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain and is widely used in Applied Bayesian Modelling. It has also been used 
in the context of modelling soccer data (Everson & Goldsmith-Pinkham (2008)). Gibbs 
sampler has the advantage that is applicable when the joint distribution is not known 
explicitly or when is really hard to sample from directly. 
4. Sofware: JAGS (Just another Gibbs sampler) is a statistical software speciﬁcally 
designed for analysis of Bayesian hierarchical models using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(and its variants). So it is the perfect programming environment to estimate this kind 
of models. The algorithm was implemented calling JAGS from Matlab using MATJAGS 
interface. 
5. Results: Finally, we obtain the posterior probability distribution of the parameters 
(✓ˆ’s and  ˆ’s). Using this methodology, we are able to estimate the four parameters for 
each team: home attack, home defense, away attack and away defense. 
20Comprehensive information about Gibbs Sampler algorithm is provided in: Casella & George (1992) 
and Gelman et al. (2014). 
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3.5.2.3	 Hierarchical Poisson-Bayesian Model with autoregressive priors and 
Uniform-Gamma hyperpriors distribution (HBM 2). 
Below, another two-level hierarchical bayesian model is proposed to model soccer data. 
From now on, we refer to this model as HBM 2. Unlike the previous model, in this case 
it is allowed that the parameters change over the season. Now we focus on level 2 and the 
hyperpriors, given the structural model (Level 1) is exactly the same as in Section 3.5.2.2: 
Level 2 (Autoregressive prior distributions) 
In this case, temporal dependence of the data is speciﬁcally taken into account. Shocks 
are modelled as ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes, following the methodology described 
in (Best et al., 2011). This scheme allows for ﬂuctuations in the parameters over the 
season (Assumption 5.i). 
✓H = ↵i + ⇢ ⇤ (✓H	 i = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.37) i,k i,k ↵t-1,i) +  ✏t,i 
✓A = ⌫j + ⇢ ⇤ (✓A	 j = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.38) j,k j,k ⌫t-1,j ) +  ✏j,k 
 H = ✏i + ⇢ ⇤ ( H	 i = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.39) i,k i,k ✏t-1,i) +  ✏i,k 
 A = ⇡j + ⇢ ⇤ (✓A ⇡t-1,j ) +  ✏j,k i = 1, 2, ..., 20 k = 1, 2, ..., 38 (3.40) j,k j,k 
✏i,k, ✏j,k ⇠ Normal(0, ) 8 1 < i   20; 1 < j   20; 0 < k <  20 (3.41) 
Hyperpriors distributions 
Hyperpriors for ↵, ⌫, ✏ and ⇡ are non-informative. At the same time, we restrict  
values to be between 0 and 1 and we propose a Gamma hyperprior for the parameter  . 
↵i ⇠ Uniform( inf,+inf) i = 1, 2, ..., 20	 (3.42) 
⌫j ⇠ Uniform( inf,+inf) j = 1, 2, ..., 20	 (3.43) 
✏i ⇠ Uniform( inf,+inf) i = 1, 2, ..., 20	 (3.44) 
⇡j ⇠ Uniform( inf,+inf) j = 1, 2, ..., 20	 (3.45) 
 ⇠ Uniform(0, 1)	 (3.46) 
  ⇠ Gamma(0.001, 0.001)	 (3.47) 
Parameter inference: The estimation process is analogous to previous section. Nonetheless, 
now the output is totally di↵erent because we obtain a di↵erent posterior probability 
distribution for each week. 
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3.6 Application: LIGA 2013-2014 
Once we have designed the methodology to model soccer data using prediction markets 
information, we just apply this approach to Spanish Football League data (Liga 2013-2014) 
in order to check its validity and its prediction properties. 
3.6.1 Parameter estimates: 
Using Betfair Betting Exchange data from the ﬁrst ”k” weeks of the season, we generated 
estimates for each team’s parameters. We repeat this process for k=5,..., 38. Remember 
that we need at least 40 matches (4 Weeks) to estimate the models, that is the reason we 
start at Week 5. 
As an illustrative example, Table 3.2 shows OLS estimations using information from 
the ﬁrst half of the season (until week 19). Note that OLS method provides point esti­
mates instead of predictive distributions (Bayesian case), computing the ”best guess” of 
an unknown population parameter. 
Table 3.2: OLS estimates 
Quality index (week by week) 
OLS estimation Weighted OLS 
Team O↵. (Home) O↵. (Away) Def. (Home) Def. (Away) O↵. (Home) O↵. (Away) Def. (Home) Def. (Away) 
Barcelona 2.70 2.30 -0.54 -0.29 1.93 1.82 -1.64 -1.39 
Real Madrid 2.63 2.28 -0.41 -0.22 1.94 1.83 -1.46 -1.27 
Atle´tico 1.82 1.58 -0.51 -0.30 1.58 1.47 -1.60 -1.34 
Athletic 1.12 1.11 -0.18 0.21 1.18 1.07 -1.14 -0.88 
Villarreal 1.24 1.13 -0.29 0.18 1.24 1.13 -1.26 -0.91 
Sevilla 1.31 1.17 -0.19 0.21 1.25 1.14 -1.15 -0.88 
Real Sociedad 1.10 1.14 -0.15 0.36 1.23 1.12 -1.11 -0.79 
Valencia 1.33 1.20 -0.23 0.24 1.28 1.17 -1.18 -0.86 
Espanyol 0.98 0.91 -0.10 0.39 0.98 0.87 -1.09 -0.74 
Getafe 0.84 0.84 0.09 0.44 0.93 0.82 -0.96 -0.67 
Granada 0.96 0.95 0.00 0.41 0.93 0.82 -0.92 -0.70 
Ma´laga 0.79 0.89 0.00 0.52 1.01 0.90 -0.98 -0.72 
Levante 0.73 0.81 0.09 0.63 0.85 0.74 -0.89 -0.61 
Osasuna 0.75 0.86 0.08 0.54 0.88 0.77 -0.92 -0.65 
Celta 0.84 0.95 0.02 0.60 1.00 0.89 -0.96 -0.65 
Almer´ıa 0.84 0.81 0.18 0.62 0.82 0.71 -0.84 -0.59 
Elche 0.77 0.78 0.09 0.49 0.82 0.71 -0.91 -0.69 
Rayo Vallecano 0.84 0.94 0.17 0.64 1.01 0.90 -0.86 -0.60 
Valladolid 0.76 0.82 0.03 0.44 0.84 0.73 -0.93 -0.68 
Betis 0.93 1.03 -0.02 0.42 1.08 0.97 -1.01 -0.75 
Figure 3.5 shows Bayesian posterior distributions for some selected teams’s attack 
parameters. (Real Madrid, Barcelona, Sevilla and Atle´tico). Parameters have been esti­
mated using model BHM 1 and Gibbs sampling (100.000 draws). As in the previous case, 
algorithms only include information from the ﬁrst half of the season, so it is updated up 
to Week 19. 
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Figure 3.6 shows Bayesian posterior distributions for Real Madrid’s attack parameter 
for the whole season. Parameters have been estimated using model BHM 2 and Gibbs 
sampling. In this case, temporal dependence of the data is modelled and posterior distri­
butions evolve over the season. 
Figure 3.5: BHM 1: Posterior Probability Distributions for the home attack parameters 
of Real Madrid, Barcelona, Atle´tico, Sevilla y Valencia (Updated at Week 19). 
Figure 3.6: BHM 2: Posterior Probability Distributions for the home attack parameter of 
Real Madrid (from Week 5 to Week 38). 
84
 
3.6.2 Predictions for single matches (short-term forecast): 
Once we have estimated the parameters, we are able to predict any single match. Firstly, 
let’s introduce some notation: let PH i,j be the probability of local win (team i), let P
D 
i,j be 
the probability of draw and let PA i,j be the probability of away win (team j). Now we can 
deﬁne the set of possible forecasts (ri,j ) as: 
ri,j = [(P
H : (PH i,j ) = 1] (3.48) i,j , P
D 
i,j ) ✓ [0, 1]3 i,j + PA i,j , PA i,j + PD 
In the OLS framework, we use the point estimates (✓’s and  ’s) in order to get the 
predictions. For a given match played by team i and team j, the OLS prediction is 
computed as follows: 
Goal scoring processes: 
XH ✓H óAHome Goal Scoring (team i): i,j ⇠ Poisson(ˆi + ˆj ) (3.49) 
1 1-xX 
XA ✓A + óˆHHome Goal Scoring (team j): i,j ⇠ Poisson(ˆ ) (3.50) j i 
X 
Once we know both goal scoring processes, we use the joint probability distribution in 
order to compute the probability of all possible outcomes for the match. Then we compute 
match probabilities as follows: 
PH i,j P (X
H = x) ⇥ P (XA = y) (3.51) i,j i,j =
 
X x=1 y=0 1
PD i,j P (X
H = x) ⇥ P (XA = x) (3.52) i,j i,j =
 
11 -yXX 
x=0 
PA i,j =
 P (X
H = x) ⇥ P (XA = y) (3.53) i,j i,j 
y=1 x=0 
In the Bayesian context, the procedure is a little more complex since we have pos­
terior probability distributions instead of point estimates. Then the posterior sampling 
procedure is described as follows: 
1. We randomly choose one value for each parameter from the posterior probability 
distributions (✓ˆH óˆA óˆA ✓ˆH ).i,h, j,h, j,h, i,h
2. We compute: ✓ˆH óA and ✓ˆA óH i,h +
ˆ
j,h j,h +
ˆ
i,h. 
3. Obtain PH , PD , and PA , as in the OLS case. i,j,h i,j,h i,j,h
4. Repeat steps n times (for h=1,...,n21). 
5. Compute the median value: 
21In our study, n=100,000 
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P H 
Pn (P H )h=1 i,j,h
= (3.54) i,j n Pn (P D )h=1 i,j,h
P D = (3.55) i,j n Pn (P A )h=1 i,j,h
P A = (3.56) i,j n 
Once we have developed a systematic method to compute single match probabili­
ties from predictive markets, we check its performance. In the literature (Everson & 
Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2008), a normal method used to evaluate the goodness of a prediction 
is to calculate the De Finnetti distance (De Finetti, 1972) which is the Euclidean distance 
between the point correspondent to the outcome22 and that one correspondent to the 
forecast. For instance, consider predicted match probabilities (0.2, 0.3, 0.5). If the actual 
outcome is (0,1,0), De Finetti measure for that prediction equals 0.78 (0.22+0.72+0.52). 
Note that if we assume complete uncertainty about the ﬁnal outcome (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), 
i.e., equiprobable predictor, De Finetti distance always equals 2/3. The historical-mean 
predictor23 is also considered. Now, we can use these values as reference to evaluate our 
prediction model performance. If our model is not able to win equiprobable and historical­
mean predictors, our model is not useful at all. 
Below, we carry out an exercise to compare Betfair Exchange predictions and the pre­
dictions o↵ered by our models. Firstly, we use our models to compute match probabilities 
week by week, starting on Week 5 and ﬁnishing on Week 38. So, we have to forecast ten 
matches per week. When calculating match probabilities for some week, we use informa­
tion from the beginning of the season until the previous week. We do not use information 
of the current week in order to be on equal terms with markets. Secondly, we compute 
implied match probabilities from Betfair Exchange24 for all matches of the season. The 
data is collected at the beginning of the game. Finally, we compute the sum of all De 
Finetti distances week by week for both markets prediction and our models’ predictions. 
In order to have references we also include De Finetti’s distances for the equiprobable 
predictor and for the historical-mean predictor. 
Results are shown in Table 3.3. If we consider the whole season, market predictions 
are a bit better than models’ predictions according to ”De Finetti distance”. Remember 
that a smaller De Finetti distance indicates better ﬁt. At the same time, all the models 
perform much better than equiprobable and historical-mean predictors. 
However, if we evaluate predictions only from Week 5 to Week 32, excluding last 6 
Weeks of the season, models’ predictions are more accurate than market ones, because all 
of them present a smaller De Finetti measure in the subtotal (J5-J32). In conclusion, our 
forecasting models perform really well throughout the season and are able to beat betting 
markets, except in the last weeks. 
22There are three possible outcomes: (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and (0,0,1).
 
23This predictor uses the historical means (from 1998 to 2016) for the match probabilities (.48, .25, .27).
 
24We calculate the inverse of the odds and later we normalise values to sum 1.
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Table 3.3: A comparison of prediction capabilities (De Finetti Measure). 
De Finetti Distance (week-by-week) 
OLS Weighted OLS BHM 1 BHM 2 Betfair Exchange Equiprob. Predictor Hist. Predictor 
Week 4.94 5.13 5.15 5.47 5.13 6.67 6.73 
Week 6 2.99 3.09 3.29 3.06 2.88 6.67 5.38 
Week 7 6.62 6.43 6.81 6.62 6.91 6.67 7.06 
Week 8 4.07 4.22 4.13 4.16 4.24 6.67 5.38 
Week 9 8.57 8.29 8.24 8.34 8.21 6.67 7.06 
Week 4.78 4.92 5.02 4.87 5.07 6.67 5.75 
Week 11 6.67 6.62 6.51 6.66 6.92 6.67 7.55 
Week 12 4.49 4.39 4.48 4.49 4.55 6.67 6.16 
Week 13 5.94 6.00 5.99 5.97 6.02 6.67 7.10 
Week 14 4.19 4.22 4.31 4.20 4.37 6.67 6.16 
Week 5.57 5.54 5.65 5.58 5.48 6.67 6.24 
Week 16 5.54 5.60 5.48 5.48 5.72 6.67 5.87 
Week 17 5.09 5.06 5.07 5.17 5.00 6.67 7.02 
Week 18 3.33 3.39 3.48 3.44 3.39 6.67 5.38 
Week 19 5.92 5.82 5.99 5.97 5.75 6.67 6.24 
Week 6.12 6.19 6.15 6.23 6.30 6.67 6.77 
Week 21 5.05 5.04 5.01 4.94 5.08 6.67 5.79 
Week 22 6.83 6.70 6.83 6.76 6.86 6.67 6.28 
Week 23 5.71 5.73 5.58 5.64 5.67 6.67 5.87 
Week 24 5.79 5.64 5.63 5.66 5.59 6.67 6.65 
Week 6.98 6.88 6.90 6.92 6.73 6.67 6.69 
Week 26 5.74 5.73 5.71 5.81 5.81 6.67 5.91 
Week 27 6.40 6.31 6.38 6.36 6.58 6.67 6.20 
Week 28 4.33 4.21 4.43 4.39 4.04 6.67 6.28 
Week 29 5.78 5.80 5.88 5.84 5.90 6.67 6.65 
Week 5.34 5.33 5.30 5.37 5.19 6.67 6.24 
Week 31 6.49 6.51 6.42 6.47 6.70 6.67 7.06 
Week 32 3.87 3.89 3.99 3.63 3.89 6.67 5.79 
Subtotal (J5-32) 153.11 152.67 153.82 153.47 153.98 186.67 177.25 
Week 33 5.34 5.27 5.35 5.43 5.11 6.67 6.28 
Week 34 5.45 5.36 5.34 5.35 5.12 6.67 5.87 
Week 5.42 5.29 5.45 5.44 4.69 6.67 6.61 
Week 36 9.79 9.84 9.67 9.49 9.46 6.67 7.14 
Week 37 9.11 9.07 8.77 8.82 8.85 6.67 6.32 
Week 38 5.57 5.42 5.38 5.62 4.80 6.67 6.24 
Subtotal (J33-J38) 40.67 40.25 39.97 40.14 38.03 40.00 38.46 
Total 193.78 192.92 193.79 193.60 192.01 226.67 215.71 
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Finally, if we observe De Finetti distances in the last part of the season, it can be 
concluded that forecasting models perform really bad, since they are even beaten by 
predictors. This results should not be a matter of concern since last weeks are a little 
bit weird and are really hard to model. Quality is not as relevant as before and other 
factors become important, such as motivation, incentives, position in the table or even 
illegal bonuses for victory or defeat. At the end of the season, some teams do not play 
anything while other teams have a lot at stake. 
An example can be used to illustrate this fact. In the last week of the 2013-2014 
25:Liga, Rayo Vallecano faced Getafe. The OLS model predictions for this match are
Rayo Vallecano wins the match (50%), draw probability (35%) and Getafe wins the match 
(15%). However, the implied probabilities of the Betfair Exchange Market were quite 
di↵erent: Rayo Vallecano wins the match (17%), draw probability (22%) and Getafe wins 
the match (61%). These market probabilities are not consistent with the relative strength 
of Rayo Vallecano (position 13 in the table) and Getafe (position 18 in the table). But 
markets have more information and they took into account the di↵erent level of motivation 
between both teams. Rayo Vallecano was in a safe place and it had no incentives to win 
and Getafe was ﬁghting to not be relegated. Then markets incorporate all this information 
and update match probabilities according it. 
Table 3.4 shows the mean distance per match. It can be observed that the mean 
distance deeply increase in the last part of the season, not only for the models considered 
but also for markets’ predictions. There is therefore evidence that the last matches of the 
championship are more di cult to forecast in general. However, the increase is lower in 
Betfair predictions, because of the amount of information available to markets. 
Table 3.4: De Finetti Measure: Mean per match 
De Finetti Measure (mean per match) 
OLS Weighted OLS BHM 1 BHM 2 Betfair Exchange Equiprob. Predictor Hist. Predictor 
Subtotal (5-32) 0.547 0.545 0.550 0.548 0.550 0.667 0.633 
Subtotal (33-38) 0.678 0.671 0.666 0.669 0.634 0.667 0.641 
Total 0.570 0.567 0.570 0.569 0.565 0.667 0.634 
Table 3.5 shows the percentage of matches in which the historical-mean predictor loses. 
These percentages are higher than those obtained in Bueno et al. (2010), i.e., 62.5% of 
matches, although both results are not directly comparable since their study uses World 
Cup data instead of Spanish League data. 
Table 3.5: Comparison 
% of matches in which the historical-mean predictor loses 
OLS Weighted OLS BHM 1 BHM 2 Betfair Exchange 
Subtotal (5-32) 66.8% 65.0% 65.0% 65.3% 63.6% 
Subtotal (33-38) 56.7% 55.0% 58.3% 55.0% 63.3% 
Total 65.0% 63.53% 63.8% 63.5% 63.5% 
25Weighted OLS and Bayesian predictions are quite similar. 
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Figure 3.7 shows correlation between Betfair Exchange and OLS predictions week by 
week. It can be easily observed that the correlations are really high (close to one) all 
season except last four weeks. From week 34, correlations deeply decrease, evidencing 
that the last part of the season is anomalous. Figure 3.8 repeats the analysis for the 
Bayesian predictions, observing exactly the same pattern. 
Figure 3.7: Correlation between Betfair Exchange and OLS predictions (week by week). 
Figure 3.8: Correlation between Betfair Exchange and Bayesian predictions (week by 
week). 
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3.6.3 Past Performance vs Prediction Markets data (short term). 
At the beginning of the present article we enunciated the following hypothesis: ”using 
prediction markets data instead of past results can improve the predictive power of the 
soccer models”. In this section, we propose an exercise to check whether there is evidence 
supporting this hypothesis. 
The procedure is as follows. As in the literature (Everson & Goldsmith-Pinkham, 
2008), we use past results as primary information for estimating the defensive and o↵ensive 
parameters. Later, we use these estimates to compute match probabilities week by week, 
starting at Week 20 and ﬁnishing at Week 38. We start at Week 20 in order to have 
enough past results to estimate the models. Finally, we use actual results to compute De 
Finetti distances, as in Section 3.6.2. 
Results are reported in Table 3.6. It can be observed that models based on prediction 
market data beat models based on past results, according to De Finetti measure. For 
instance, the sum of the De Finetti distances for the second half of the season is 121.3 
when we use past performance, while it is less than 115 when we use prediction markets 
data. 
If we exclude the last weeks of the season and focus only between Week 20 and Week 
32, conclusions are maintained. In this case, the model based on past results performs 
better than predictors but worse than models based on predictive markets. 
Table 3.6: Past Performance vs Prediction Markets data 
De Finetti Measure (week-by-week) 
OLS Weighted OLS BHM 1 BHM 2 Betfair Exchange Past Performance Equiprob. Predictor Hist. Predictor 
Week 20 6.12 6.19 6.15 6.23 6.30 6.55 6.67 6.77 
Week 21 5.05 5.04 5.01 4.94 5.08 4.92 6.67 5.79 
Week 22 6.83 6.70 6.83 6.76 6.86 8.03 6.67 6.28 
Week 23 5.71 5.73 5.58 5.64 5.67 8.35 6.67 5.87 
Week 24 5.79 5.64 5.63 5.66 5.59 5.10 6.67 6.65 
Week 25 6.98 6.88 6.90 6.92 6.73 5.35 6.67 6.69 
Week 26 5.74 5.73 5.71 5.81 5.81 6.89 6.67 5.91 
Week 27 6.40 6.31 6.38 6.36 6.58 7.61 6.67 6.20 
Week 28 4.33 4.21 4.43 4.39 4.04 4.20 6.67 6.28 
Week 29 5.78 5.80 5.88 5.84 5.90 5.06 6.67 6.65 
Week 30 5.34 5.33 5.30 5.37 5.19 5.45 6.67 6.24 
Week 31 6.49 6.51 6.42 6.47 6.70 6.88 6.67 7.06 
Week 32 3.87 3.89 3.99 3.63 3.89 5.24 6.67 5.79 
Subtotal (J20-32) 74.42 73.94 74.23 74.00 74.35 79.63 86.67 82.18 
Week 33 5.34 5.27 5.35 5.43 5.11 5.37 6.67 6.28 
Week 34 5.45 5.36 5.34 5.35 5.12 4.69 6.67 5.87 
Week 35 5.42 5.29 5.45 5.44 4.69 5.52 6.67 6.61 
Week 36 9.79 9.84 9.67 9.49 9.46 9.89 6.67 7.14 
Week 37 9.11 9.07 8.77 8.82 8.85 9.68 6.67 6.32 
Week 38 5.57 5.42 5.38 5.62 4.80 6.48 6.67 6.24 
Subtotal (J33-J38) 40.67 40.25 39.97 40.14 38.03 41.63 40.00 38.46 
Total 115.10 114.19 114.20 114.14 112.38 121.27 126.67 120.64 
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3.6.4 Model Ranking. 
Now, we can rank the models according to their short-term prediction performance. 
Weighted OLS provides the most accurate predictions according to De Finetti measure 
(0.567 per match on average). BHM 2 ranks in second place (0.569 per match on average), 
followed by OLS and BHM 1 both with 0.57. 
An alternative approach, only valid for bayesian model comparisons, consist on com­
puting the Deviance Information criterion (DIC). DIC is a widely used hierarchical mod­
elling generalization of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian informa­
tion criterion (BIC). The idea is that models with smaller DIC should be preferred to 
models with larger DIC. DIC is easily calculated from the samples generated by a MCMC 
simulation. In our case, according to this criterion, the BHM 2 model (DIC=6112) is 
better than the BHM 1 model (DIC=6576), in the sense that it ﬁts the data better. This 
results are also consistent with what was observed before, i.e, BHM 2 presents better 
short-term prediction capabilities. 
In view of the results, the di↵erences between models are small. There is slight evidence 
that Assumption 5.ii (parameters change over the season) seems more reasonable than 
Assumption 5.i. (parameters are constant), because Weighted OLS is better than OLS 
and BHM 2 is also better than BHM 1. 
3.6.5 Tournament simulation (long-term forecast): 
The forecasting algorithms proposed in this paper can also be applied to tournament 
simulation. At any date, we can simulate the rest of the season, obtaining predicted 
points at the end of the season for each team together with a set of simulated variables, 
such as position, games won, goals scored, probability of winning the league, chances of 
being relegated, etc. 
The simulation procedure is described as follows. Firstly, we collect information of the 
ﬁrst half of the season26 (Betfair Exchange data) in order to estimate model parameters 
for each team (home attack, home defense, away attack and away defense). To do this, we 
focus on OLS Model. Secondly, we use these estimates to calculate the intensity27 of the 
goal scoring processes for the remaining matches until the end of the season. To do this, we 
use the methodology described in Section 3.6.2. Finally, we run Monte Carlo simulations 
28, sampling from these distributions. In each simulated league, we have to sample from 
380 di↵erent Poisson distributions, given there exist two goal scoring processes per match. 
During a simulation, we apply the Liga o cial rules for tie breaking29 . We repeat this 
process n times30 and we get a simulated distribution for each variable. 
26This exercise can be implemented at any point of the season. 
27( ˆH  ˆA i,j , i,j ), i=j=1,...,20 
28Simulations are implemented in Matlab. 
29In case of tie between six or more teams, we just break the tie randomly, because they are unlikely 
and it is really hard to code such situations. 
30In our case, we consider that n=100,000 is enough. 
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Table 3.7 presents a summary of the simulation results31 . Note that we are simulating 
from Week 19, approximately ﬁve months before the end of the season. Firstly, the 
medians32 of the simulated distributions of several variables are presented. The list of 
variables includes: matches won, matches drawn, matches lost, goals scored (GF), goals 
conceded (GC) and goal di↵erence (GD). In the Appendix (ﬁgures 3.A15, 3.A16 and 
3.A17), we compare the actual and predicted values of GF, GC and GD . Secondly, we 
pay special attention to points, so that in addition to the median, it is also included the 5th 
percentile and the 95th percentile of the simulated distribution. Finally, some probabilities 
are presented: probability of winning La Liga, probability of qualifying for Champions 
League (UCL)33, probability of qualifying for Europa League (UEL) and probability of 
being relegated to second division34 . 
Table 3.7: Simulated Season (LIGA 2013-2014) 
End-of-season median values Points End-of-season probabilities 
Pos. Team Played Won Drawn Lost GF GC GD Median Pctl 5 Pctl 95 Win Liga UCL UEL Relegated 
1 Barcelona 38 30.9 4.46 2.7 103.8 24.7 79.1 97.0 90 103 66.6% 100% 0% 0% 
2 Real Madrid 38 29.4 4.67 3.9 102.6 35.1 67.5 92.9 85 100 23.2% 100% 0% 0% 
3 Atle´tico 38 28.2 5.89 3.9 81.5 24.3 57.1 90.4 82 98 10.2% 100% 0% 0% 
4 Athletic 38 18.5 7.92 11.6 55.0 46.1 9.0 63.4 55 72 0% 36.3% 47% 0% 
5 Villarreal 38 18.2 8.59 11.2 61.9 42.3 19.6 63.1 55 72 0% 34.3% 48.3% 0% 
6 Sevilla 38 16.4 10.7 10.9 62.0 51.1 10.9 59.8 51 69 0% 16.0% 46.7% 0% 
7 Real Sociedad 38 16.4 9.76 11.9 59.6 51.1 8.6 58.9 50 68 0% 12.0% 42.2% 0% 
8 Valencia 38 15.4 6.55 16.1 52.2 53.2 -1.0 52.7 44 61 0% 1.4% 13.3% 0.1% 
9 Espanyol 38 12.2 8.66 17.1 42.0 50.2 -8.2 45.4 37 54 0% 0% 0.9% 3.0% 
10 Granada 38 12.2 6.65 19.1 36.9 52.6 -15.7 43.3 35 52 0% 0% 0.3% 6.8% 
11 Ma´laga 38 11.3 9.83 16.9 39.5 49.4 -9.9 43.6 35 52 0% 0% 0.5% 6.9% 
12 Getafe 38 12.2 6.93 18.9 37.6 57.8 -20.3 43.4 35 52 0% 0% 0.4% 7.5% 
13 Levante 38 10.7 9.65 17.6 34.9 55.8 -20.9 41.8 34 50 0% 0% 0.1% 11.8% 
14 Osasuna 38 11.1 7.80 19.1 34.7 57.1 -22.4 41.0 33 50 0% 0% 0.1% 15.4% 
15 Celta 38 10.2 8.76 19.0 41.7 59.2 -17.5 39.4 31 48 0% 0% 0.1% 24.7% 
16 Almer´ıa 38 9.91 8.60 19.5 39.0 67.8 -28.8 38.3 30 47 0% 0% 0% 31.5% 
17 Elche 38 8.86 10.6 18.6 33.9 56.4 -22.5 37.2 29 45 0% 0% 0% 39.0% 
18 Valladolid 38 8.18 11.9 17.9 38.1 58.9 -20.8 36.4 28 45 0% 0% 0% 44.2% 
19 Rayo Vallecano 38 10.2 5.58 22.2 38.2 74.8 -36.6 36.2 28 45 0% 0% 0% 47.3% 
20 Betis 38 8.06 9.90 20.0 36.4 63.7 -27.3 34.1 26 43 0% 0% 0% 61.9% 
31Actual table of LIGA 2013-2014 is presented in the Appendix (Table 3.A8)
 
32The mean gives similar results.
 
33The top four teams are qualiﬁed to Champions League
 
34The bottom four teams are relegated.
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Figure 3.9 shows the 90% interval for the points at the end of the season. The actual 
points fall within the bands for 18 out of the 20 teams. Only Barcelona (models over­
estimate its performance) and Celta (models infraestimate its performance) are outside 
the interval. At the same time, Figure 3.10 compares the actual points and the median 
predicted points, observing a good ﬁt in general terms. 
Figure 3.9: 90% conﬁdent interval for points. 
Figure 3.10: Points: Actual vs Simulation. 
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As an example, Figure 3.11 shows a probability distribution of points for Atle´tico de 
Madrid. The simulation was made considering only information from the ﬁrst half of the 
season. At that point, 91 points was the most likely outcome with a probability of 8.5%, 
followed by 90 and 92 points, with a probability of 8% and 7.8%, respectively. Atle´tico de 
Madrid ﬁnally got 90 points at the end of the season. 
Figure 3.11: Simulated distribution of points for Atle´tico de Madrid at the end of the 
season. 
3.6.6 Past performance vs Prediction markets data (long-term). 
We deﬁne the ”prediction error” as the di↵erence between the actual points and the 
median value of the simulated distribution. In order to obtain a measure of long-term 
relative performance, we simulate the entire season using both the model based on past 
results and the model based on prediction markets with information until Week 4. Later 
we repeat the simulation but this time using information until Week 5 and so on until 
Week 37. Now we compute the sum of squared errors for the model based on past results 
and for the model based on prediction markets. 
Figure 3.12 shows this information, i.e., the sum of squared errors of prediction (SSE) 
week by week. In the ﬁrst weeks the gap is very large and as the season is advancing the 
di↵erence is reduced, but the market-based model always perform better than the models 
based in past performance. 
If we consider long term predictions the marked-based algorithms also generate better 
predictions than models based on past performance. Moreover, they need less amount of 
information to generate accurate predictions. 
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Figure 3.12: Sum of Squared Errors of Prediction (SSE). 
3.7 Conclusions
 
In this article a market-based algorithm for predicting the outcome of events is proposed 
and illustrated for the 2013-2014 Liga. The main methodological contribution is the use 
of high-frequency data from betting exchanges as primary information for the estimation 
of predictive models. Until now, the models presented in the literature have been based 
solely on historical results or rankings, but have never used information from competitive 
markets. When modelling the stochastic processes that determine the goals scored by 
the di↵erent teams, we believe that markets can o↵er us better quality information that 
is more up-to-date than the ﬁnal scores that, after all, are a simple realisation of each 
stochastic process. 
First, in order to facilitate the process of inference, several assumptions are introduced. 
On the one hand, it is assumed that the goals scored by a certain team follow a time­
homogeneous Poisson process. On the other hand, it is considered that the processes that 
determine the goals of the local and visiting team are statistically independent. These 
assumptions are widely used in the literature and the tests performed to ascertain their 
validity ﬁnd no evidence against them. 
Next, predictive market information is used to infer the parameters of the stochastic 
processes that determine the goals scored by each team. For each second of each match of 
the season, a system of equations is proposed that uses as inputs the probabilities provided 
by the markets and outputs the estimated intensity of the Poisson processes for each of 
the teams. In this way, for each match we have a whole probability distribution for each 
of the possible ﬁnal scores instead of a single result. 
Subsequently, the additive property of the Poisson distributions is used to estimate 
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a total of four parameters per team: home attack, home defense, away attack and away 
defense. The intensities of the Poisson processes previously estimated are used as primary 
information. Several estimation methods are proposed: (1) (weighted) ordinary least 
squares, (2) hierarchical bayesian model with normal random shocks and (3) hierarchical 
bayesian model with autoregressive shocks. Now there is a mechanism by which any two 
teams can be paired and the outcome of their future matches predicted. 
The methodology described above is applied to predict the probability of each Liga 
2013-2014 match, calculated week by week, starting on Matchday 5 and ending on Match­
day 38. The prediction capability of the proposed models is tested using ”De Finetti” 
measure, which is deﬁned as the Euclidean distance between the prediction and the re­
alisation. The results obtained indicate that the models have good short-term predictive 
properties, being able to improve market predictions, except in the last weeks of the season. 
Moreover, they also generate better predictions than models based on past performance. 
Finally, we verify the predictive ability of proposed algorithms when simulating a 
league. In this exercise, information from the betting markets (ﬁrst half of the season) is 
used for estimating the structural parameters and then the rest of the season is simulated. 
Our models have also good long-term predictive properties, since the predictions derived 
from the simulation closely resemble what is observed in reality. 
These models can be easily extended to other sports just changing the structural model 
and the distributions. This methodology can also be applied to other prediction markets, 
such as stock markets, political markets... 
As a ﬁnal remark, it can be concluded that the use of information from betting markets 
can lead to more accurate estimates of the probability distribution of future events. 
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3.9 Statistical Appendix 
A. Tables and ﬁgures 
Figure 3.A13: Rootogram: Home goals 
Figure 3.A14: Rootogram: Away goals 
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Table 3.A8: Final Standing (LIGA 2013-2014) 
Pos. Team Played Won Drawn Lost GF GC GD Points Win Liga UEFA CL UEFA EL Relegated 
1 Atletico 38 28 6 4 77 26 51 90 Yes Yes No No 
2 Barcelona 38 27 6 5 100 33 67 87 No Yes No No 
3 Real Madrid 38 27 6 5 104 38 66 87 No Yes No No 
4 Athletic 38 20 10 8 66 39 27 70 No Yes No No 
5 Sevilla 38 18 9 11 69 52 17 63 No No Yes No 
6 Villarreal 38 17 8 13 60 44 16 59 No No Yes No 
7 Real Sociedad 38 16 11 11 62 55 7 59 No No No No 
8 Valencia 38 13 10 15 51 53 -2 49 No No No No 
9 Celta 38 14 7 17 49 54 -5 49 No No No No 
10 Levante 38 12 12 14 35 43 -8 48 No No No No 
11 Malaga 38 12 9 17 39 46 -7 45 No No No No 
12 Rayo Vallecano 38 13 4 21 46 80 -34 43 No No No No 
13 Getafe 38 11 9 18 35 54 -19 42 No No No No 
14 Espanyol 38 11 9 18 41 51 -10 42 No No No No 
15 Granada 38 12 5 21 32 56 -24 41 No No No No 
16 Elche 38 9 13 16 30 50 -20 40 No No No No 
17 Almeria 38 11 7 20 43 71 -28 40 No No No No 
18 Osasuna 38 10 9 19 32 62 -30 39 No No No Yes 
19 Valladolid 38 7 15 16 38 60 -22 36 No No No Yes 
20 Betis 38 6 7 25 36 78 -42 25 No No No Yes 
Figure 3.A15: Goals Scored (Actual vs Simulation). 
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Figure 3.A16: Goals Conceded (Actual vs Simulation). 
Figure 3.A17: Goals Di↵erence (Actual vs Simulation). 
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B. Alternative models 
Hierarchical Poisson-Bayesian Model with Gamma random e↵ects priors and 
Normal-Gamma hyperpriors distribution. 
Level 1 (Structural model). It contains the central part of the model. 
XH ,  A +  A i,j | ✓iH j ⇠ Poisson((✓H j ) ⇤ F (t)) i = j = 1, 2, ...,  20; i 6= j (3.57) i 
XA j ,  
H +  H i,j | ✓A i ⇠ Poisson((✓jA ) ⇤ F (t)) i = j = 1, 2, ...,  20; i 6= j (3.58) i 
XH ,  A ? XA j ,  H i = j = 1, 2, ...,  20; i 6= j (3.59) i,j | ✓iH j i,j | ✓A i 
Level 2 (Hierarchical Normal Random E↵ect priors). In this level, the parameters of the 
estructural model (✓’s and  ’s) are modelled. We are assuming Gamma Random E↵ect 
priors for these parameters. Doing this, we are using the ”assumption Parameters are 
constant over the season” (Section 4.5.1). 
✓H ⇠ Gamma(µ1,  1) i = 1, 2, ...,  20 k = 1, 2, ...,  38 (3.60) i 
✓j
A ⇠ Gamma(µ2,  2) j = 1, 2, ...,  20 k = 1, 2, ...,  38 (3.61) 
 H ⇠ Gamma(µ3,  3) i = 1, 2, ...,  20 k = 1, 2, ...,  38 (3.62) i 
 j
A ⇠ Gamma(µ4,  4) i = 1, 2, ...,  20 k = 1, 2, ...,  38 (3.63) 
Hyperpriors distributions. Now we are deﬁning the priors (also known as hyperpriors) 
for the parameters of the level 2. Following the literature (Best et al., 2011), we use 
non-informative Normal-Gamma hyperpriors. 
µ1 ⇠ Normal(0, 0.0001) (3.64) 
µ2 ⇠ Normal(0, 0.0001) (3.65) 
µ3 ⇠ Normal(0, 0.0001) (3.66) 
µ4 ⇠ Normal(0, 0.0001) (3.67) 
 1 ⇠ Gamma(0.001, 0.001) (3.68) 
 2 ⇠ Gamma(0.001, 0.001) (3.69) 
 3 ⇠ Gamma(0.001, 0.001) (3.70) 
 4 ⇠ Gamma(0.001, 0.001) (3.71) 
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Resumen en Castellano 
El principal objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar el proceso de agregacio´n de infor­
macio´n en los mercados predictivos. En particular, este art´ıculo utiliza datos procedentes 
de Betfair Exchange. En primer lugar, se comprueba si los precios ofrecidos por el mer­
cado estan bien calibrados. Tanto el test Hosmer-Lemeshow como las te´cnicas bootstrap 
indican que hay evidencia de falta de calibracio´n. En segundo lugar, se realizan una serie 
de regresiones con el ﬁn de investigar algunos de los sesgos ma´s habituales en la literatura. 
Hay evidencias de “favourite long-shot bias”, aunque su importancia es mucho menor 
debido probablemente a las particularidades del mercado predictivo analizado. A contin­
uacio´n, aplicamos el modelo propuesto en el segundo capitulo, tras an˜adirle una serie de 
reﬁnamientos, con el objetivo de: (1) modelar “in-play prices”, (2) evaluar la capacidad de 
los mercados para agregar informacio´n y actualizar los precios competitivos y (3) examinar 
la existencia de oportunidades de inversio´n. Los mercados predictivos en ocasiones tienen 
diﬁcultades para agregar la informacio´n, en especial cuando gran cantidad de informacio´n 
es revelada en poco tiempo. El modelo planteado para modelar “in-play prices” presenta 
un mejor ajuste, medido por la distancia De Finetti, que los precios del mercado, a pesar 
de disponer de una menor cantidad de informacio´n. Por u´ltimo, el algoritmo de inversio´n 
identiﬁca estrategias rentables bajo ciertas circunstancias. 
Palabras clave: Prediccio´n, Mercados Predictivos, Distribucio´n de Poisson 
JEL classiﬁcation: C5 C6 D4 D8 
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Abstract 
The main goal of this paper is to study the process of aggregation of informa­
tion in prediction markets. In particular, this article focus on high-frequency data 
from Betfair Exchange. Firstly, we analise whether market prices are well-calibrated. 
Both Hosmer-Lemeshow test and bootstrap methods indicate that there is evidence of 
miscalibration. Secondly, a number of regressions are conducted in order to identify 
potential biases in competitive prices. There is some evidence of ”Favourite Long­
shot bias”, although its magnitude is signiﬁcantly smaller than that observed in the 
literature, probably due to the characteristics of the market. Thirdly, we apply the 
model developed in the second chapter, after adding some reﬁnements, in order to: 
(1) model in-play soccer probabilities, (2) evaluate the prediction markets’ ability to 
aggregate information and to update competitive prices and (3) examine the existence 
of investment opportunities. Markets predictions are very good at the beginning of 
the match and worsen as new information (goals) is incorporated. At the same time, 
the investment algorithm is able to detect opportunities for investment under certain 
circumstances. In conclusion, prediction markets, despite having a large amount of 
information, sometimes have problems aggregating information. 
Keywords: Forecasting, Prediction Markets, Poisson distribution 
JEL classiﬁcation: C5 C6 D4 D8 
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edge the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology from grants ECO2011-30323-C03-01 
& BES-2012-061597..  
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4.1 Introduction 
Prediction markets1 are created for the purpose of trading the outcome of future events, 
so they can provide useful information about the probability distribution of the di↵er­
ent outcomes. Although prediction markets exist from long time ago (Rhode & Strumpf, 
2004), they have drawn considerable attention in the last years, both in the mass media 
and in the research community. In election time, media follow the evolution of political 
prediction markets, because they are often the most accurate predictors of election re­
sults. In the world of sports, prediction markets also attract media attention and sports 
enthusiasts get useful information from betting odds about the probability distribution of 
future sport events. At the same time, from a theoretical point of view, there is a grow­
ing literature about the functioning of these markets, with special attention to centralized 
prediction markets. Furthermore, prediction markets are an useful testing ground to check 
the validity of new models and statistical tools. 
Although there is strong evidence that prediction markets can be a good information 
aggregation mechanism under certain assumptions (E cient Market Hypothesis), it is 
necessary to point out some of their limitations. Firstly, prediction markets accuracy may 
depend on market liquidity (Tetlock, 2008 and Christiansen, 2007.). Secondly, competitive 
equilibrium is not very informative when public information is selective, inaccurate or 
misleading (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004a). Thirdly, there is strong evidence of time horizon 
limitations of prediction markets (Antweiler, 2012). It is really hard to create a prediction 
market for events with a long time horizon because opportunity costs discourage potential 
investors. Finally, participants may have incentive to manipulate market prices in order 
to inﬂuence the resulting decision, although these manipulation attempts are unlikely to 
be successful even in the short term (Hanson & Oprea, 2005). 
The main goal of this article is to study the process of aggregation of information 
and beliefs in prediction markets, in other words, how prediction markets incorporate new 
information and update competitive prices. Additionally, the following issues related to 
prediction markets are addressed. Firstly, one might wonder whether prediction markets 
produce well calibrated probability forecasts or not. Throughout this article, we will use 
data from a big-scale prediction market (Betfair Exchange) to answer this question. We 
will also check if prediction markets information can be systematically used to increase 
the accuracy of forecasting models. To to this, we will propose a prediction market-based 
non-homogenous independent Poisson model. Moreover, we are also interested in market 
e ciency, so the existence of investment opportunities will be examined. 
Our initial hypothesis is that markets are not able to aggregate information correctly 
under certain circumstances, such as the presence of biases, the lack of liquidity or when 
bettors face very unlikely events, etc. In these cases prices do not reﬂect all the available 
information and E cient Market Hypothesis does not apply. 
1Also known as information markets, virtual markets or idea futures. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Firstly, in Section 4.2, a brief 
review of the literature on ”prediction markets” is presented. Then, in Section 4.3, we 
describe the contain of our database and we also introduce some descriptive analysis. In 
Section 4.4, we analise whether market prices are well-calibrated, using Hosmer-Lemeshow 
test and bootstrap methods. In Section 4.5, a number of regressions are carried out in 
order to identify potential biases in prediction markets, such as favourite long-shot bias, 
home-team bias, etc. In Sections 4.6 and 4.7 we propose a forecasting algorithm based on 
high-frequency markets data in order to get more accurate predictions. We assume that 
goal scoring can be modelled using a non-homogeneous independent Poisson model. In 
Section 4.8, the predictive power of the model is tested using De Finetti measure. At this 
point, we use market predictions as a reference to evaluate the performance of the model. 
At the same time, a high-frequency investment algorithm is designed in order to detect 
opportunities for investment. Finally, in Section 4.9, conclusions are presented. 
4.2 Related Literature 
Our work is related to the literature on prediction markets, which has grown signiﬁcantly 
over the last years taking advantage of the availability of big-scale databases. Tziralis & 
Tatsiopoulo (2012) analyse the evolution of research on prediction markets (PM), providing 
an extended literature review that consists of more than one hundred and ﬁfty articles, 
all of them published between 1990 and 2006. 
Servan Schreiber et al. (2004) evaluates the relative accuracy of two di↵erent types 
of prediction markets: markets based on real money and markets based on play-money. 
Results show that the play-money markets perform as well as the real money markets. 
The authors speculate that this strange ﬁnding may reﬂect two opposing forces. On the 
one hand, real money markets generate incentives to discover new information. On the 
other hand, play-money markets may aggregate information in a more e cient way. 
Hanson & Oprea (2005) adapts a Kyle-style market microstructure model to check 
whether prediction markets accuracy is a↵ected by manipulators. It was found that ma­
nipulators are not able to inﬂuence on competitive prices and typically they lose money. 
At the same time, the rewards for informed trading and the accuracy of prediction market 
prices increase due to the rise in the volume of transactions. 
Wolfers & Zitzewitz (2006) ﬁnds prediction markets prices typically provide useful 
(albeit sometimes biased) estimates of average beliefs about the probability of future 
events. 
Applying the ”E cient Market Hypothesis”, prediction markets have been exploited 
to forecast all types of events. Election future markets have been used to predict election 
outcomes (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004b, Berg et al., 2008, Berg & Rietz, 2014). In the public 
sector, the Pentagon2 has used prediction markets data sets in order to forecast geopolitical 
risk (Hanson & Oprea, 2005). In the health sector, prediction markets have been applied 
2FutureMAP project 
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to forecast infectious diseases outbreaks (Polgreen et al., 2007). Recently, Cowgill & 
Zitzewitz (2015) analyzes the e ciency and performance of corporate prediction markets, 
including markets that forecast economic activity, demand, corporate sales, success of new 
products, etc. 
Our work is also related to the literature on sport economics and more speciﬁcally to 
the literature on modelling soccer data. A number of studies have tried to model soccer 
goal scoring. Most of the articles use past performance as prior information to estimate 
the models (Maher, 1982, Dixon & Coles, 1997, Karlis & Ntzoufras, 2003, Everson & 
Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2008). Bueno et al. (2010) proposes a soccer model based on past 
performance and also on experts’ opinions. 
Some of the articles on sport economics are closely linked to the search for arbitrage 
opportunities. Dixon & Robinson (1998) propose a two-dimensional birth process to inves­
tigate setting prices in the spread betting market. This study ﬁnds evidence of inaccuracies 
in spread betting prices. Taking a di↵erent approach, Kuypers (2000) introduces a model 
of bookmaker behaviour and look for proﬁtable opportunities in ﬁxed odds betting mar­
kets using an ordered Probit. It provides evidence against the e cient market hypothesis 
and o↵ers a betting rule to make money beating the bookie. Vlastakis et al. (2009) uses a 
Poisson count model and a multinomial Logit model to investigate proﬁtable arbitrage op­
portunities. It also ﬁnds that the ﬁxed-odds betting market are not completely compatible 
with weak-form market e ciency. 
4.3 Data 
In this article, we use the same database as in Hernandez (2017a). The dataset contain 
Betfair Exchange data for Spanish Football League (Liga 2013-2014)3 . Betfair Exchange 
is an online centralized marketplace where agents can place back bets or they can play 
the role of traditional bookmakers laying a selection. Betfair acts as the intermediary and 
generates revenue charging commissions on net winnings4 . It was impossible to choose a 
more recent league, as in November 2014 Betfair updated the application for downloading 
data5, so the Liga 2013-2014 is the latest available. 
The database consist of fully time-stamped data and includes pre-play and in-play 
information for several markets: Match Odds, Correct Score, Over-Under betting, Half 
Time Score, Next Goal... Our raw data set contain approximately 210 millions of obser­
vations and information for a total of 2680 markets6, matching more than 1000 millions 
of euros in total. The frequency is one observation per second and the following informa­
tion is included for each selection: best three back odds and its volume, best three lay 
odds and its volume, last price matched, total matched, market status and timestamp in 
deciseconds. Table 4.1 presents some descriptive statistics regarding the database: 
3The data was downloaded from www.fracsoft.com
 
4The top rate is set at 5%.
 
5Betfair API 6.0
 
6On average, 7 markets per match
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics (Betfair Exchange) 
Match Odds Correct score Other markets a 
Total Mean Median Total Mean Median Total Mean Median 
Observations (Total) b 22.8 0.6 0.4 136.8 0.36 0.16 50 0.13 0.08 
Observations (Pre-play) 15.5 0.4 0.31 93 0.24 0.18 34 0.09 0.07 
Observations (In-play) 7.3 0.2 0.15 43.8 0.12 0.10 16 0.04 0.03 
Observations (Active) 20.1 0.53 0.52 126 0.33 0.33 45 0.11 0.12 
Total Matched c 802 2.1 0.5 106 0.28 0.19 76 0.2 0.2 
No. of matches 380 380 380 
aThey include: half time correct score, over/under markets, correct score away, correct score home, 
next goal and both teams to score. 
bThe data are expressed in millions of observations. 
cThe data are expressed in millions of euros. 
Figure 4.1 shows a density histogram of probabilities for Match Odds markets. The 
probabilities are obtained computing the inverse of the match odds and normalizing. The 
observations are then divided into 100 equal size groups. Match odds markets have three 
possible outcomes, so the mean value is 1/3. This explains why the distribution is right­
skewed. It can be seen that probabilities tend to be concentrated around zero and around 
the mean. Note that about 13% of the probabilities are between 0% and 1% and 0% of 
the market probabilities are between 99% and 100%. The latter is explained by the fact 
that people are not willing to back at less than 1.01. 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of market probabilities (Match odds) 
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4.4 Calibration. 
Several studies have addressed the calibration of prediction market prices. Page & Clemen 
(2012) uses data from political and sport prediction markets in order to ﬁnd evidence of 
(mis)calibration. They found that prediction markets are well calibrated in general when 
time to expiration is relatively short, but miscalibration is observed for events with a long 
time horizon. Christiansen (2007) discusses calibration in small-scale prediction markets 
(rowing). The study concludes that small markets are very well calibrated and determines 
a potential minimum threshold of participation to guarantee well-calibrated probabilities. 
In this section, we study the calibration of the Betfair Exchange implied probabilities, 
after normalizing. We focus on the Match Odds markets because is the most liquid. Firstly, 
we discretize observations (market probabilities) into categories. Then observations are 
divided into 10 groups with equal range7 . Secondly, we compute the mean for each group. 
Thirdly, we look at the actual outcomes (0 or 1) and compute the observed mean for each 
group. Finally, Figure 4.2 presents the calibration plot for our sample. 
Figure 4.2: Calibration plot (Betfair Exchange) 
Small deviations from the 90-degree line (perfect calibration) can be observed, mainly 
in the upper area. But, graphically we can not evaluate whether or not deviations are 
statistically signiﬁcant. Then further analysis is needed. 
7[(0, 0.1), (0.1, 0.2), (0.2, 0.3), (0.3, 0.4), (0.4, 0.5), (0.5, 0.6), (0.6, 0.7), (0.7, 0.8), (0.8, 0.9), (0.9, 1)] 
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Testing Calibration: Some tests are carried out to check whether our data is well calibrated. 
i) Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is widely used to test cal­
ibration8, in the context of the logistic regression models. The test evaluate whether the 
expected event rate match observed event rates in subgroups of the model population. 
Then this framework is perfectly applicable to our case. 
In this section, we focus only on in-play probabilities9, so we have about ten millions 
of observations. Firstly, before performing the test, we ﬁt the market probabilities using 
a standard logistic regression, where the independent variable is the market probability 
and the dependent variable is the actual outcome for each observation (0 or 1). The 
curve obtained is almost a straight line. Secondly, we create ten groups10 for the ﬁtted 
probabilities as in the previous case. Finally, we carry out a Hosmer-leshow test using 
Stata software, setting ten groups. Table 4.2 presents the Stata output of the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test: 
Table 4.2: Hosmer-Lemeshow test for calibration 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 
Number of observations 10,650,300 
Number of groups 10 
Hosmer-Lemeshow  2 8 1665 
Prob > 2 0.0001 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates that there is strong evidence of miscalibration, be-
cause the p-value is less than 0.05. These results should not be surprising since with 
such a big sample any deviation is statistically signiﬁcant. We can conclude that Betfair 
Exchange implied probabilities are not well-calibrated. Note that Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
is for overall calibration. Then it is not valid to assess in which range of probabilities 
there are (mis)calibration. To answer this question we will use bootstrap methods in next 
section. 
8For a comprehensive review of the test, see Lemeshow & Hosmer(1982) and for an application, see 
Kramer & Zimmerman (2007). 
9In fact, pre-play probabilities are almost constant if we looking at a speciﬁc match, so they do not 
have much interest. 
10Results remain constant if we change the number of groups. 
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ii) Bootstrap Methods. Page & Clemen (2012) propose an alternative approach to 
check whether prediction markets produce well-calibrated probabilities: ”a non-parametric 
estimation of the calibration curve using bootstrap11”. We also apply empirical bootstrap 
methods in order to compute a conﬁdent interval for our calibration curve. The bootstrap 
proceeds by resampling with replacement from our empirical distribution. Following the 
suggestion in Orlo↵ & Bloom (2013), the resample size equals sample size. Figure 4.3 
shows a 95% conﬁdent interval for our calibration curve12 . Results suggest the presence 
of miscalibration when probability is greater than 80%, or in other words, when match 
odds are less than 1.25. For instance, a market probability of 95% is associated with a 
actual probability of 96.5%. The results are ambiguous with respect to the existence of 
favourite long-shot bias. On the one hand, favourites are slightly undervalued, so this is 
consistent with favourite long-shot bias. On the other hand, there is no evidence that 
bettors overvalue underdogs. Then further analysis about the existence of favourite long­
shot bias is required. In the next section, several regression will be carried out to check 
the presence of this bias. 
Figure 4.3: 95% interval for the calibration curve 
11For a review of bootstrap methods, see Hardle (1990) and Davison (1997). 
12We use the software Matlab to carry out bootstrap. 
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In the betting literature, the favourite-longshot bias is probably the most analized and 
documented bias. It is probably the main source of sport betting markets ine ciency. 
This bias refers to the tendency of bettors to undervalue favourites and overvalue long­
shots. Several empirical studies have found evidence of this bias in a variety of ﬁxed-odds 
betting markets. 
Two di↵erent explanations have been proposed to explain the existence of favourite 
long-shot bias: risk love models and misperceptions models (Snowberg & Wolfers, 2010): 
The neoclassical approach focus on rational punters with (al least locally) risk-loving 
utility functions. According to this theory, on the demand side, gamblers (on average) are 
willing to accept lower expected returns betting on long-shots, i.e, the riskiest investment. 
At the same time, on the supply side, risk neutral proﬁt-maximizing bookmakers know 
this fact and implement a strategy to take advantage of gambler’s preferences, setting 
unfavourable odds on underdogs. 
On the other hand, competing behavioural theories stress the role of misperceptions 
of probabilities. According to this explanation, cognitive errors explain the existence of 
the favourite long-shot bias. Several studies in the ﬁeld of psychology have shown that 
humans are systematically poor at discerning between small and tiny probabilities. Sobel 
& Raines (2003) design an information model and suppose that Bayesian bettors start 
with a non informative prior (equal probabilities). They update their prior distributions 
according to private information. As a result, long-shots are overestimated and favourites 
underestimated. 
From a empirical point of view, several studies have tried to identify the favourite 
long-shot bias in prediction markets. In general, the presence of favourite long-shot bias is 
widely accepted in the literature. Page & Clemen (2012) identify favourite long-shot bias in 
political and sport prediction markets using a non-parametric estimation of the calibration 
of market prices. At the same time, the magnitude of the bias is greater in long-term 
markets. Deschamps & Gergaud (2012) study the e ciency of soccer betting in England 
(from 2002 to 2006). As a conclusion, they found a positive favourite long-shot bias in both 
home and away odds, but surprisingly results indicate a negative favourite long-shot bias 
for draw odds. Constantinou & Fenton (2013) detect strong presence of favourite long-shot 
bias examining prediction markets based on 14 European football leagues. Vlastakis et 
al. (2009) conﬁrm the existence of favourite long-shot bias and also ﬁnd proﬁtable betting 
opportunities. 
Another bias that appears in the literature of sport economics is the home bias, de­
ﬁned as the tendency of bettors to overvalue home chances. Graham & Stott (2008) and 
Constantinou & Fenton (2013) identify a clear home-bias using football data. 
Finally, a less common bias is the ”immediate strike back bias”. It refers to the 
tendency of bettors to overvalue comeback chances. Dixon & Robinson (1998) ﬁnds no 
evidence for the immediate strike back bias. 
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Figure 4.4 shows expected returns for di↵erent intervals of market probabilities. As in 
the literature, it can be observed that low probabilities (high odds) are associated with 
low expected returns, while the opposite occur with respect to high probabilities (low 
odds). Speciﬁcally, in Betfair Exchange bets with an associated probability less than 10% 
and 20% make a expected return of -4.2% and -1.8%, respectively. Note that the average 
return in Betfair exchange is about -2%. 
Expected&return& 
<10%& <15%& <20%& >60%& >70%& >80%& 
1.00%&
 
0.00%&
 
!1.00%&
 
Expected(return(
!2.00%& 
Average(return(
!3.00%&
 
!4.00%&
 E
x
p
e
ct
e
d
&r
e
tu
rn
& 
!5.00%& 
Long!shot/Favourite&bets& 
Figure 4.4: Favourite Long-shot bias 
However, in terms of magnitude, these results contrast with the literature, because 
they are conclusive about the existence of the bias. For instance, Constantinou & Fenton 
(2013) ﬁnd that bets with an associated probability less than 10% and 20% generate a 
expected return of -40% and -30%, respectively (the average return in those markets is 
about -8%). Andrew (2012) analizes tennis data and ﬁnds that odds greater than 10 
(probabilities less than 10%) o↵er a expected return of -69%. 
It should also be taken into consideration that literature usually focus on ﬁxed-odds 
markets and pre-play bets, while we are considering a Betting Exchange market and in­
play bets. Fixed-odds markets charge higher commissions than Betting Exchanges and the 
prices are not generated by competitive equilibrium, but they are ﬁxed by the bookmakers. 
Theoretical models suggest that favourite long-shot bias is sometimes associated with 
bookmaker strategic behaviour. Bookmakers do not proportionally share the commission 
between all the possible events because it is not the strategy that maximizes their proﬁts. 
Bookmakers seeks a balanced book and take into account bettors’ behaviour while setting 
odds. 
At the same time, in our market (Betfair Exchange) prices are competitively deter­
mined and bookmakers are only intermediaries, so the context is totally di↵erent. The 
characteristics of the market may explain the sharp reduction in the favourite long-shot 
bias. 
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Now, following the methodology described in Stanek (2016), we propose a regression to 
identify both favourite long-shot and home bias. The functional form of the econometric 
model is as follows: 
Outcomei =  0 +  1 ⇤ log(Oddsi - 1) +  2 ⇤ Homei + ui (4.1) 
where Outcome is a binary variable that has a value of 1 if the bet was successful and 
0 otherwise, Odds are the market odds and home is a dummy value taking the value 1 if 
the bet is on the victory of local team and 0 otherwise. 
Interpretation of the coe cients: We  expect   1 < -1 in presence of favourite long­
shot bias, i.e., bets on favourites are more proﬁtable than bets on long-shots. Likewise, 
 1 > -1 in case of negative favourite long-shot bias. The negative value of  2 indicate the 
presence of home bias. 
Table 4.3 shows the regression output. Column 1 presents the result for the entire 
sample (8,607,330 observations). In order to analyze whether the results depend on liq­
uidity, we also divide the sample into two groups according to the level of liquidity, using 
the median value as threshold. Column 2 and 3 show the regression output for moments 
of low and high volume, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. The reported 
p-values for the variable FLSbias consider the null hypothesis  1 = -1 instead of  1 = 0. 
Table 4.3: Reggresion Analysis: Favourite Long-shot bias & Home bias 
(1) (2) (3) 
EQUATION VARIABLES Total Low Volume High Volume 
Outcome FLS bias -1.020*** -1.051*** -0.992 
(0.0082) (0.000) (0.4407) 
Home bias 0.0853*** -0.0248 0.191*** 
(0.000) (0.347) (0.000) 
Constant -0.0141 0.0594*** -0.0865*** 
(0.189) (0.000) (0.0151) 
Observations 8,607,330 4,311,720 4,295,610 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p <0.01; **p <0.05; *p <0.1 
When we consider all the observations, there is evidence of the favourite long-shot bias. 
Moreover, it can be observed that the bias becomes more intense in times of low liquidity 
and disappear when the volume of transactions is high, then liquidity matters. However, 
the favourite long-shot bias is less intense than in Stanek (2016), since in regression  1 < 
-1.15. At the same time, home bias is statistically signiﬁcant in Regression 1 and 3, but 
when we compute the marginal e↵ects at the mean, the magnitude is not economically 
relevant. 
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4.6 Model Assumptions. 
Some assumptions are required in order to develop our time-inhomogeneous independent 
Poisson model. Before that, we introduce some notation: 
In a match between teams indexed i (home team) and j (away team), we deﬁne the 
following variables: 
• Let XH represents the goals scored by team i against team j, or equivalently, the i,j 
goals conceded by team j against team i. 
• Let XA i,j represents the goals conceded by team i against team j, or equivalently, the 
goals scored by team j against team i. 
4.6.1 The Poisson Assumption: 
Assuming Poisson distributions for home and away goals is a classical assumption in the 
literature for modelling soccer probabilities (See Everson & Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2008, 
Bueno et al., 2010) 
In Herna´ndez (2017a) several test are carried out in order to check whether Poisson 
distribution ﬁts soccer data (Liga 2013-2014). Results ﬁnd no evidence against the Poisson 
assumption. That is the reason why we assume for the rest of the article that home­
team and away-team goals follow a Poisson distribution with parameters  H and  A i,j i,j , 
respectively. 
XH XAAssumption 1: i,j ⇠ Poisson( H ; i,j ⇠ Poisson( A (4.2) j,i ⇤ t) j,i ⇤ t) 
In the above expression t stands for ”match time”. This variable measure the percent­
age of the time13 elapsed from the beginning of the match and ranges from 0 (the start of 
the match) to 1 (the end of the match). Then in the middle of a match, t equals 0.5. 
4.6.2 The Independence Assumption: 
In the literature, the decision of including the assumption of independence when modelling 
soccer data is widely debated. On the one hand, there is some evidence that the scores 
of the two competing teams are not independent (Maher, 1982, Dixon & Coles, 1997; 
Karlis & Ntzoufras; Hernandez, 2017a). On the other hand, empirical studies show that 
in practice the correlation between the goals of the two competing teams is small, usually 
less than 0.05 (Karlis & Ntzoufras, 2003). 
In view of the results and for simplicity, from now on we assume the Independence 
Assumption, deﬁned as follows: 
Assumption 2: i,j (t) ? j,i(t) i 6 (4.3) XH XA = j 
13Given as a fraction of unity. 
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4.6.3 Time-inhomogeneous Poisson Process: 
There is strong evidence that the probability of a goal being scored steadily increases over 
the course of the match, perhaps because of tiredness of players. (See Dixon & Robinson 
(1998)). Figure 4.5 show the sample goal distribution by minute (Liga 2013-2014). It 
can be observed (adjusted line) an increase in the frequency of goals scored as a match 
progresses. Figure 4.6 shows the sample cumulative distribution of goals (Liga 2013-2014). 
Figure 4.5: Goal distribution by minute 
Figure 4.6: Cumulative (%) of goals by minute (LIGA 2013-2014) 
116
 
. . .
.
In the light of this results, it is necessary to allow the intensity of the poisson process to 
vary over the course of the game. We need a time-inhomogeneous Poisson process, so we 
have to incorporate some reﬁnements to the model proposed in Herna´ndez (2017a). To do 
this, we use historical goal distribution data and we assume the same kind of adjustment 
for all teams. We also assume, for simplicity, that the intensity does not depend on the 
current score. We propose two possible methods to model time-inhomogeneous Poisson 
processes: 
i) Method 1: Adjusting Match Time: One possibility is to take into account historical 
(cumulative) goal distribution to adjust match time according it. Note that this approach 
is analogous in some sense to ”capital per unit of e↵ective labour”, used in some Macroe­
conomics Growth Models, simply that in this case we consider ”e↵ective unit of time”. 
In order to apply this method, we introduced the function F (historical cumulative goal 
distribution). This function converts standard % of match time elapsed (t) into e↵ective 
% of time elapsed (tE ), using the historical cumulative goal distribution. 
EAssumption 4: F : [0, 1] ! [0, 1]; t = F (t) (4.4) 
The following example tries to illustrate how this method works. We focus on minute 
45, so we are exactly in the middle of the match. If we assume that the poisson process 
is time-invariant, we just consider that 50% of the time remains. But, as we know that 
the probability of a goal being scored steadily increases over the course of the match, we 
apply the F function. In this case, we obtain F(0.5)=0.43 (43%), i.e., only 43% of the 
time has been played, since looking at the cumulative distribution of goals we can observe 
that in the ﬁrst half only 43% of the goals have been scored. In this way, we have used 
the cumulative goal distribution to adjust the model. 
From now on, we assume goals in a football match follow the following time-inhomogeneous 
Poisson distributions: 
Home team: XH i=j=1,...,20 (4.5) i,j (t) ⇠ Po( i,j ⇤ F (t)) 
Away team: XA i=j=1,...,20 (4.6) i,j (t) ⇠ Po( i,j ⇤ F (t)) 
where F uses the cumulative goal distribution to convert match time (minutes) into 
”e↵ective percentage of time elapsed”. 
ii) Method 2: Estimating a parametric time-variant Poisson process: We assume that 
the Poisson parameters can be modelled as a linear function of time ( H (t),  A (t)).i,j i,j 
Speciﬁcally, we assume:  H i,j (t) =
¯ (t) = ¯ ⇤ (a+ b ⇤ t). Then, ¯
A can be interpreted as the average intensity over the match. In this case, goals in i,j 
H ⇤ (a+ b ⇤ t) and  H i,j i,j H H i,j i,j 
and ¯

a football match follow the following time-inhomogeneous Poisson distributions:
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Home team: XH .H i=j=1,...,20 (4.7) i,j (t) ⇠ Po(¯ i,j ⇤ (a+ b ⇤ t) ⇤ t) 
Away team: XA .A i=j=1,...,20 (4.8) i,j (t) ⇠ Po(¯ i,j ⇤ (a+ b ⇤ t) ⇤ t) 
We can use the historical goal distribution in order to estimate the parameters a and 
b. We expect bˆ >  0, since given t1 < t2, we expect that goal intensity will be greater in 
the second case. In addition, aˆ must be greater than zero, because Poisson distribution 
does not admit negative values. 
In this article, we will use ”Method 1” mainly for two reasons: it is more intuitive and 
easy to implement. 
4.7 Model for predicting in-play probabilities 
In this section, we propose a time inhomogeneous independent Poisson model to forecast 
in-play prices (probabilities). In order to model in-play probabilities two steps are required. 
Firstly, we estimate the goal scoring intensities at the beginning of the match ( 0s) for the 
two competing teams. In this part, we make use of: Assumption 1 (Poisson distribution), 
Assumption 2 (independence), Assumption 3 (Time-inhomogeneous Poisson distribution) 
and the PMF of a Poisson distribution. Additionally, we also use data from betting markets 
(Betting Exchange), in particular we look at the odds at the beginning of the match. In 
this phase, we estimate the goal scoring intensities for all league matches. Secondly, we 
use the previous estimates ( 0s) and our time inhomogeneous independent Poisson model 
to forecast systematically in-play probabilities. 
4.7.1 Step 1: Obtaining goal scoring intensities (.ˆH .ˆA i,j,t, i,j,t) 
Firstly, it is necessary to calculate the inverse of the betting odds in order to obtain a 
probability measure. It is easy to check that for any match the sum of the odds of the 
three possible outcomes (home win, draw or away win) is more than 1, indicating that 
odds are not fair 14 . Next, we proceed to normalise the odds, so that the sum equals 1. 
Secondly, we will also need the Probability Mass Function (PMF)15 for a Poisson 
distribution, deﬁned as: 
-  ke
P(k events in the interval) = (4.9) 
k! 
where   is the average number of events per interval and k takes values 0, 1, 2... 
14In fact, sample mean is about 1.018
 
15Discrete equivalent of a pdf.
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If we apply this formula to the soccer context, the probability of observing a particular 
ﬁnal score (k, m) is deﬁned by the following joint mass probability function: 
-(XH ) -(XA )i,j (XH )k i,j (XA )me i,j e i,j 
P(team i scores k goals, team j scores m goals) = ⇥ 
k! m! 
(4.10) 
where XH and XH are the goal scoring parameters of team i and j, respectively, when i,j i,j 
playing at team i home. k takes values 0, 1, 2... and m takes values 0, 1, 2... 
At this point some notation is required. In every moment of a match, let w be the 
current home team score and q the current away team score. Let t be match time (% of 
total time elapsed). Let ⇥t be the set of possible ﬁnal home team scores conditioned to H 
the current score (at time t). Analogously, let ⇥t be the set of possible ﬁnal home team A 
scores conditioned to the current score (at time t). For example, if the score at time t 
is (w=1, q=2), ⇥t = [1, 2, ....,1] and ⇥t = [2, 3, ....,1]. Let ˆ i,j,t be the goal scoring .H H A 
.A 
t 
parameter of team i against team j in time t. Let ˆ i,j,t be the goal scoring parameter 
of team j against team i at time t. Let a and bt be the Betfair Exchange implicit i,j i,j 
probability of draw and local victory at time t, respectively. 
Using the implicit probabilities of Betfair Exchange and the PMF formula, we can 
solve the following implicit system of equations16 for every observation17 of every match: 
Equation 1: 
0 =  
X 
k ✓ ⇥t A 
X 
m=k 
m ✓ ⇥t H 
e
-( 5ˆ
H 
i,j,t 
1-F (t) )( 
)ˆH i,j,t 
1-F (t) )
(k-w) 
(k - w)! ⇥ 
e-( 
5ˆA i,j,t 
1-F (t) )( 
)ˆA i,j,t 
1-F (t) )
(m-q) 
(m- q)! - a 
1 
i,j 
t ✓ [0,1] 
i=j=1,...,20 
(4.11) 
Equation 2: 
5ˆH 5Hˆi,j,t )ˆH i,j,t )ˆH 
e
-( 1-F (t) )( i,j,t )(k-w) e-( 1-F (t) )( i,j,t )(m-q) 1-F (t) 1-F (t) t ✓ [0,1]0 =  
X X 
⇥ - b1 i,j i=j=1,...,20(k - w)! (m- q)!
k ✓ ⇥t m<k A 
k ✓ ⇥t A 
(4.12) 
tThe system is perfectly identiﬁed, so every pair (a and bt ) identify one and only i,j i,j 
one pair (.ˆH .ˆA ). Solving all the systems of equations, we ﬁnd the pair of unknown i,j,t, i,j,t
(.ˆH .ˆA ) for every second of every match, so we have a entire distribution for every i,j,t, i,j,t
match and every team (ranging from 5600 to 5800 depending of the match duration). 
16We solve the implicit systems of equations using FSOLVE command in Matlab. 
17The frequency is one observation per second. 
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Figure 4.7 shows a particular example, the match between Getafe and Valladolid, 
corresponding to Week 22 (Liga 2013-2014). Using the time-inhomogeneous independent 
Poisson model, goal scoring intensities are estimated for each second of the match. At 
the beginning of the match, Getafe’s goal scoring intensity is 1.318 and Valladolid’s goal 
scoring intensity is 0.8. Note that Getafe is playing at home and markets reﬂect this home 
advantage. 
Once the match begins, bettors receive a lot of information about the match (goals, 
teams’ performance, motivation, injuries, tiredness, etc), so they update their beliefs about 
the quality and chances of both teams. That is the reason why goal intensity estimates 
are continually evolving as it is shown in Figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.7: Goal scoring intensities over the match: Getafe-Valladolid (Week 22) 
18Remember that goal scoring intensity can be interpreted as expected goals scored. 
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4.7.2 Step 2: Obtaining in-play probabilities 
In order to forecast in-play probabilities we need the goal scoring intensities estimated 
in the previous section. In particular, we are going to use goal scoring intensities at the 
beginning of the match (ˆ = j). We apply assumptions 1-3, then we have that 
the stochastic process that determine the goals scored by team i against team j follows a 
. H ˆA i,j,0; i. 6
i,j,0, 
time-inhomogeneous independent Poisson process with parameter: .ˆ 
computing in-play probabilities we assume that we know match time and the current score. 
At this point, we can match any pair of teams, so we can obtain match probabilities for 
any possible match. 
As an illustrative example, Figure 4.8 shows in-play match probabilities from both 
Betfair Exchange and the time-inhomogeneous independent Poisson model (Valencia vs 
Atletico). It can be observed that market probabilities have a lot of noise while the in-play 
probabilities derived from the model evolve smoothly. 
H Note that when i,j,0. 
Figure 4.8: Match probabilities (Valencia vs Atle´tico) 
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4.8 Application: LIGA 2013-2014 
Once we have developed a model to forecast in-play probabilities, we evaluate its per­
formance. We are mainly interested in its predictive power, together with its ability to 
generate proﬁtable investment opportunities. As an illustrative example, we use data from 
Liga 2013-2014 afresh. 
4.8.1 Goodness of ﬁt (De Finetti Measure): 
We apply the time-inhomogeneous independent Poisson model proposed in the previous 
section in order to forecast in-play prices. As primary information, we just use the market 
odds at the beginning of the match, the match time and the goals scored by each team. 
Other information is not available for our model. Then we can apply this model to predict 
all the in-play match probabilities of the Liga 2013-2014, obtaining about 200 millions of 
in-play probabilities. At this point, we have two match probabilities for each second of 
each match: market probabilities (Betfair Exchange) and probabilities generated by our 
algorithm. The next step is to compare which are best. 
To do this, we resort to De Finetti measure (De Finetti, 1972), which is deﬁned as 
the Euclidean distance between the point correspondent to the outcome and the point 
correspondent to the prediction. For every second of every match of the Liga 2013-2014, 
we compute the De Finetti measure for both market predictions and model predictions. 
Note that a smaller De Finetti measure indicates better ﬁt. As a way to test the robustness 
of the results, we repeat the previous exercise but considering this time Absolute Distance19 
instead of De Finetti measure. 
Results are shown in Table 4.4. To facilitate their interpretation and to have a relative 
measure of performance (RP), results are reported in percentages, as indicated by the 
following formula: 
Total sum of De Finetti measures (Model) 
RP = ⇥ 100. (4.13) 
Total sum of De Finetti measures (Betfair Exchange) 
Table 4.4: Relative Performance (Market vs Model) 
Relative Performance (Market vs Model) 
De Finetti Measure Absolute Distance 
Total 
Liquidity 
Total 
Liquidity 
Low volume High volume Low volume High volume 
RP 99.8% 99% 100.9% 97.1% 96.9% 97.2% 
19It reﬂects the distance on the real line between the actual outcome and the prediction. 
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According to Table 4.4, model’s in-play probabilities are slightly better than market 
ones, given the De Finetti ratio is less than 100%. Table 4.4 also disaggregates the results 
according to the level of liquidity. When the liquidity is high, i.e, there are a lot of 
transactions, the predictive power of market predictions improve. So we can conclude 
that a certain level of liquidity is required to guarantee competitive prices are accurate. 
Finally, Figure 4.9 compares De Finetti measures minute by minute. It can be observed 
that market performance worsen as match progresses. At the beginning of the match, 
model predictions and market predictions are more or less equally accurate. However, as 
match progresses and new information is revealed, it seems that prediction markets fails 
and the model presents better performance than the market. Finally, at the end of the 
match, di↵erences become more intense. 
Figure 4.9: Relative Performance (minute by minute) 
There is evidence that in-play probabilities estimated using our model are more accu­
rate than markets probabilities, despite having much less information than the markets. 
Note that the market observe a lot of information: red cards, teams’s performance, refer­
eeing, tiredness, injuries, motivation, etc. It can be concluded that the prediction markets 
fail to aggregate the information in a proper way, at least when the level of liquidity is 
low. A simple model that uses odds at the beginning of the match, match time and goals 
is able to equalise or even to beat the market. 
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4.8.2 Beating the bookie: 
In ﬁnance, a standard way to proof that markets do not aggregate information properly is 
to propose a proﬁtable strategy to make money. (See Hogan et al., 2004; Draper& Fung, 
2002) 
In this part, a high-frequency investment algorithm is designed in order to detect 
opportunities for investment. For simplicity, we focus only on back bets, but it could be 
extended to lay betting. The algorithm works in real time using match time (t), current 
score and markets odds at the beginning of the match. The steps required are summarise 
below (base strategy): 
-Step 1: At every second of every match, the algorithm receives information (input 
data) from the match: current score, market odds, volume of transactions, red cards, etc. 
-Step 2: Using the model20 and the input data mentioned before, the algorithm 
estimate in-play probabilities in every moment. 
-Step 3: The algorithm compares both in-play probabilities. Rule of decision: If 
model’s probability is higher than market probability for one selection (local victory, draw 
or away victory), algorithm decide to invest (one euro). 
-Step 4: Average return is computed. Note that if we invest randomly, the expected 
return of this market (for back betting) is approximately -1.9%. 
-Additional requirements: Extra conditions can be applied after Step 3. For in­
stance: algorithm can take into account extra conditions, such as the level of liquidity, 
number of goals, red cards, etc. We propose the following three extra conditions: 
• Condition A21: The level of liquidity is less than the median value. 
• Condition B22: No player has been sent o↵. 
• Condition C23: The current score is not 0-0. 
Table 4.5 shows the average return for the base strategy (0.6%) and also when extra 
conditions are applied. It can be observed that proﬁtable opportunities are detected, 
ranging from 0.6% to 13.5% depending on the strategy. This is further evidence that 
prediction markets are not fully e cient. 
Table 4.5: Investment strategies 
Investment strategies 
Random Base strategy Base + A Base + B Base + C Base + A + B + C 
Average Return -1.93% 0.6% 2.55% 2.45% 2.25% 13.54% 
% of observations 100% 43% 21% 40% 21% 8% 
20Time-inhomogeneous independent Poisson model 
21Markets’ performance improves as liquidity increases, so we take advantage of this fact. 
22Our model does not model red cards, so we decide not to invest if any player has been sent o↵. 
23We know from previous section that markets do better when little amount of information has been 
revealed. 
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4.9 Conclusions 
Throughout the present article we have focused on the prediction markets as a mechanism 
of aggregation of information. In particular we use information from Betfair Exchange, a 
centralized prediction market with high volume of transactions. We have chosen this mar­
ket for several reason: prices are competitively determined unlike in ﬁxed-odds markets, 
odds are almost fair (there are no commissions that distort the prices) and ﬁnally Betfair 
Exchange provides full information about the functioning of the market, including back 
and lay prices, volume, last price matched, etc. 
Firstly, we have analized whether market prices are well-calibrated, i.e, are e cient. 
An overall calibration test, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, indicates that there is evidence 
of miscalibration. Bootstrap methods help us to detect the origin of the miscalibration. 
Events with high probability, with probability greater than 80% are systematically over­
valued. Despite these results, we can conclude that Betfair Exchange market presents a 
better calibration than other prediction markets analized in the literature, perhaps due to 
the characteristics of the market. 
Secondly, we have checked the existence of biases. Following the literature, a regression 
is carried out in order to identify potential biases. There is evidence of ”Favourite Long­
shot bias”, but its magnitude is very small comparing to the literature and disappear 
when the level of liquidity is high. At the same time, ”Home bias” is identiﬁed but when 
we compute the marginal e↵ects at the mean, we can conclude that it has no economic 
relevance. 
Thirdly, we propose a time-inhomogeneous independent Poisson model in order to 
forecast in-play prices. As primary information, we just use the market odds at the 
beginning of the match, the match time and the goals scored by each team. Then we 
apply this model to predict all the in-play match probabilities of the Liga 2013-2014, 
about 200 millions of in-play probabilities. Later, we use De Finetti measure to compare 
the predictive power of the model. We obtain that the in-play probabilities estimated 
using the model are more accurate than markets probabilities, despite having much less 
information than the market. Note that the market observe a lot of information: red cards, 
teams’s performance, refereeing, tiredness, injuries, motivation, etc. It can be concluded 
that the prediction markets fail to aggregate the information in a proper way. A simple 
model that uses odds at the beginning of the match, match time and goals is able to 
equalize or even to beat the market. 
Finally, a high-frequency investment algorithm is designed in order to detect opportu­
nities for investment. For simplicity, we focus only on back bets, but it could be extended 
to lay betting. Several simple strategies are implemented and proﬁtable opportunities are 
detected under some circumstances, such as low level of liquidity, high-scoring match, no 
red cards, etc. 
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